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Chapter 1
Nostalgia and Hope: Narrative Master 
Frames Across Contemporary Europe
Anders Hellström, Ov Cristian Norocel, and Martin Bak Jørgensen
1.1  Intersections Between Politics of Culture, Welfare, 
and Migration in Europe
After the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent disbanding of various state 
socialist regimes across the former Eastern Bloc, which marked the end of the Cold 
War, there was a certain sense of optimism shared by most European societies con-
cerning a peaceful and prosperous future. Among scholars, while some representa-
tives of traditional approaches to world politics and international relations failed to 
predict the end of the Cold War, others were enthusiastic about what seemingly was 
the definitive victory of democracy and the market economy. The situation was 
paradoxical—both a source of optimism and uncertainty. What was still left to fight 
for? Had we reached the famous “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), marking the 
final victory of market capitalism and liberal democracy, and thus, the advent of a 
post-ideological world order? Soon enough, one such promise—that of enjoying the 
benefits of free movement from one country to another—was enshrined into the 
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union.
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Some three decades later, everything seems radically different: “Europe as an 
idea, as an identity and as a political project, seems incapable of practices of solidar-
ity and care; in other words, Europe is suffering from a crisis of solidarity.” 
(Martinsson and Mulinari 2018, p. 159). This has deepened the existing crisis of 
legitimacy, pushing the EU project of peace, prosperity, and integration farther 
away from the grim reality on the ground (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018; Trenz et al. 
2015; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). The failure to address the forced displace-
ment of millions of people, and above all, the lack of solidarity was too obvious to 
ignore, or as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked “We are facing the big-
gest refugee and displacement crisis of our time. Above all, this is not just a crisis of 
numbers; it is also a crisis of solidarity. […] We must respond to a monumental 
crisis with monumental solidarity” (UN 2016). Today, it seems that the initial 
euphoric optimism has vanished without much of a trace. To grasp this complex 
situation, we argue that there is an imperious need to sharpen and update the con-
ceptual scaffolding that is generally employed to examine the intersecting politics 
of culture, welfare, and migration across Europe, which are part of the “liquid 
modernity” of contemporary late capitalism (Bauman 2012).
1.2  Conceptual Setting
Upon closer look, the apparent triumph of the market economy paved the way for 
profound changes in the European welfare states. They not only entailed a dramatic 
transformation of the conditions of, and the means of, access to welfare provision 
but also involved a retraction of citizenship as well (Schierup et al. 2006). In turn, 
this triggered an exacerbation of welfare chauvinist appeals, the escalation of secu-
ritization fears, and the increased discrimination of migrants (be they regular or 
irregular) and their offspring (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Betz and Johnson 
2004; Dikeç 2007; Conversi 2014; Keskinen et  al. 2016; Norocel 2017; Ruzza 
2009). These developments have been accompanied by the continuous transfer of 
authority from the national level to transnational bodies like the EU and the increas-
ing dominance of the executive in national politics (Sassen 2006; Trenz et al. 2015; 
Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015), which brought closure to established political 
channels for civil society influence (Standing 2011).
The reaction to these changes manifested in two distinct ways. First, Europe has 
experienced the growing presence of right-wing populist parties, which were 
accompanied by a wave of manifestations of extremism and xenophobia. Anchored 
in the nostalgic longing for an ethnically homogenous past that never quite existed, 
these retrogressive forces have emphasized the importance of making and policing 
racialized, classed, and gendered borders as a means to identify and protect the 
native majority’s allegedly proprietary right to welfare (Bevelander and Wodak 
2019; Norocel 2016; Wekker 2016). Secondly, and in contrast to the first reaction, 
Europe has witnessed the coalescence of transnational and transethnic justice move-
ments across civil society and the forging of new alliances between migrant 
A. Hellström et al.
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networks and organizations, NGOs, precarious workers and students, and in some 
cases, labor unions (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018; Ruzza 2009; Schierup 
et al. 2017).
To make sense of the complex dynamic between these opposing trends, we sug-
gest approaching it from the perspective of the competing master frames of nostal-
gia and hope. The chapters compiled in the present volume expand our knowledge 
on how politics are conducted by investigating political projects which, taken 
together, “re-imagine and/or change established modes of doing politics” 
(Zienkowski 2019, p. 132) and thus provide multiple entry points to how these mas-
ter frames are interpreted in practice.
Illustrating this point is the slow democratic decay across Europe, which accom-
panied the access to power of right-wing populist and anti-immigration parties, and, 
in several less consolidated democracies, even the descent into authoritarianism 
(Bevelander and Wodak 2019, p. 31). Indeed, it seems that “the populist zeitgeist” 
(Mudde 2004) has attained a position of hegemony across Europe and elsewhere 
around the world, and even more so today than when Mudde wrote his article. 
Whereas scholarship in the field has treated right-wing populism as a normal pathol-
ogy of democratic societies, it has now become a pathological normalcy (see 
Akkerman et al. 2016; Hellström and Bevelander 2018; Minkenberg 2017; Rovira 
Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Rydgren 2018). Indeed, as right-wing populist parties sup-
porting anti-immigration attitudes have made significant inroads into the politics, 
researchers now argue that this marks no less than a fascitization of the mainstream 
(Bevelander and Wodak 2019). Examples are not difficult to find across Europe. For 
instance, the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz) under the leadership of 
Viktor Orbán embarked on a dramatic volte-face, disregarding the founding princi-
ples of liberal democracy in order to create their vision of “illiberal democracy” in 
Hungary. Free and government-critical media, independent and non-politicized 
judiciary, and autonomous universities that defend critical knowledge have all come 
under attack with dire consequences. These developments are mirrored by similar 
power grabs in Poland at the hands of the ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, PiS). Authoritarian reactions are coupled with legislative measures 
aimed at providing a veneer of social justice narrowly reserved to the native majori-
ties. Similar efforts were undertaken in Italy by the (Northern) League (Lega (Nord), 
LN) and Matteo Salvini during their brief spell as junior governmental partners in 
the aftermath of 2018 parliamentary elections. While Deputy Prime Minister in 
charge of the interior affairs, Salvini pursued hardline measures to abolish essential 
forms of protection for migrants, which were justified by the imperative to safe-
guard the Italian way of life. With this in mind, it is easy to become pessimistic.
This notwithstanding, we argue that, while indeed all these retrogressive advances 
have become more brazen, we are witnessing a concurrent coalescence of the pro-
gressive forces. Just to name a few examples, in Greece, the extreme-right anti- 
immigration party Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) lost parliamentary representation 
in the 2019 national elections after five consecutive elections that resulted in the 
party sending between 21 and 17 representatives to the Hellenic parliament. By the 
same measure, the much-discussed ascendency of the Alternative for Germany 
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(Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), which was foreseen after the AfD entered the 
German federal parliament in 2017 for the first time, failed to materialize. In turn, it 
was the Greens (Die Grünen) that made substantive gains in the 2019 European 
parliamentary elections, signaling the emergence of a “green wave” of progressive 
politics across Europe. Put differently, European societies are not on a dystopian 
path, at least not unequivocally.
Rather, we argue that politics—understood as the partial fixation of meaning in 
the antagonistic field of the political (Mouffe 2000, pp.  125–128)—are a site of 
struggle for competing forces, whose agendas are underpinned by the narrative 
master frames of nostalgia and hope. Consequently, various forms of political mobi-
lization attempt to alter existing political and social hierarchies, either in a retro-
gressive or more progressive direction.
Hope for a progressive and enlightened future finds itself in an uneasy coexis-
tence and fragile equilibrium with a strong nostalgic attachment to a time of great 
things past. If nostalgia often strives to restore the polity in question as it once was, 
the latter is its polar opposite—it is associated with progressive ideals and optimis-
tic, forward-looking visions. Nostalgia also has a visionary aspect, despite it being 
oriented in the past rather than the future. Nostalgia provides something to people 
to cling on to and promises to restore the glory of days past. Nostalgia and hope are 
experienced on a daily basis, connecting local practices and transnational loyalties. 
Some people long for essentialist and stereotyped identities as a means to make 
sense of, and slow down, the all-too-rapid changes in contemporary societies 
(Berliner 2018, p. 11). In this case, and often finding support in right-wing politics, 
it is a “restorative nostalgia” after a monocultural, racially homogeneous, and neatly 
defined collection of separate European societies that appeals (Boym 2001; Wekker 
2016). It foretells that one ought to protect “our welfare” and “our (traditional) cul-
ture” from outside (“them”) and overly permissive insiders who put the internal 
cohesion of “our society” at risk. At the other end, putting their hope into a forward- 
looking vision, people generally embrace a perspective that welcomes increasingly 
diverse and tolerant European societies, albeit one needs to be aware of the tempta-
tion that progress is inevitable (Snyder 2018, p. 7). In other words, hope represents 
an emotional glue that enables the crystallization of counter-hegemonic agendas 
among social movements and different organizations and creates the intellectual 
opening for “understanding that societies and our societal positions are possible to 
transform and that society as well as individual identities can emerge in a different 
way” (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018, p. 14).
A telling example is with Greece, where the most severe episode of the economic 
crisis was shortly followed by the most tangible manifestations of the refugee 
(reception) crisis (Dalakoglou and Agelopoulos 2018). Indeed, the social mobiliza-
tion and the everyday practices protesting the draconic fiscal austerity measures 
dictated by the so-called Troika (the EU Commission; the European Central Bank; 
and the International Monetary Fund) led to the emergence of Syriza (Συνασπισμός 
Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) as a political alternative to an incompetent and 
backward- looking political class. On cultural matters, the Syriza-led government 
pushed through the legal recognition of same-sex unions and the right to change 
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legal gender despite vehement opposition from the conservative forces led by the 
Greek Orthodox Church and violence from the extreme right. The same grassroots 
forces showed solidarity with the plight of those seeking refuge in Europe. This 
notwithstanding, Syriza’s inability—or unwillingness—to successfully challenge 
the Troika’s austerity push led to an impasse and can be held up as yet another 
example of the shortcomings of “movementist” politics in achieving sustainable 
changes (Badiou 2018). In turn, it paved the way to a return to power of center-right 
New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία), as the party won a majority in the 2019 par-
liamentary elections. This comes to show that the trajectories of nostalgia and hope 
are not fixed.
To better articulate the nostalgia and hope dichotomy at a theoretical level, we 
suggest a closer look at the conceptual construct of heartland (Taggart 2000, 
pp. 95–98). The concept entails “the positive aspects of everyday life” and is at the 
same time a construction of an ideal world, one which is constructed retrospec-
tively—a vision derived from the past and projected onto the present. As such, the 
heartland represents a claim to a common spiritual foundation, which creates a 
sense of belonging to an allegedly culturally homogeneous population (Betz and 
Johnson 2004, p. 320; Hellström 2016, p. 66). Importantly, this nostalgia is mani-
fested in a rather vicarious manner (Berliner 2018, pp. 19–20), in the sense that it 
need not build on personal stories and first-hand experiences but rather crystallizes 
under the effect of larger narratives of what represents the specificity of our respec-
tive communities. Certain narratives that distinguish “our nation” from others are 
iterated on a daily basis. Appeals to a particular homeland nurture a sense of deep 
community between “the virtuous people” that share a proprietary right to their 
lands, which is founded on the belief of a long-lasting and continuous past. These 
appeals are marked by deep skepticism—or at times, outright opposition—to 
extending these rights to those who are perceived as “unworthy newcomers”. These 
narratives may be based for example on such “civic virtues” as gender equality and 
tolerance, though underpinned by the tacit conviction that these newcomers—par-
ticularly Muslims—are not sufficiently accustomed to and full-heartedly embracing 
“our ways”. Such reasoning is often paired with ideas of unbridgeable differences 
that separate the “native us” from “migrant them” on the basis of a distinct genea-
logical ethnic descent. In extremis, this opens for an identitarian logic of “ethnoplu-
ralist” difference which recasts the racist distinctions of racial biology into 
insurmountable cultural distinctiveness, which privileges “our culture” as both 
separate and, importantly, discreetly better than “their culture”. This logic is inti-
mately connected to the French New Right (nouvelle droite) and the emergence of 
cultural racism (Taguieff 1990). In our view, nostalgia is a master frame under-
pinned by these narratives of cultural difference, which are expressed with varying 
degrees of intensity, as detailed above.
Hope is the opposite master frame, which is often associated with movements 
that build their identity around progressive narratives that embrace solidarity and 
diversity. In this context, the solution is an active accommodation to new differ-
ences of welcoming the aforementioned “migrant them” rather than disbarring 
them. New solidarity practices and political alternatives take different forms across 
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Europe, such as the civil society Venligboerne in Denmark; the feminist and queer 
collectivity mobilizing against both Greek traditionalist homophobic patriarchy and 
neoliberal austerity mantra in Athens; or the institutionalization of solidarity in the 
Refugee Plan in Barcelona (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018; Athanasiou 2018). 
Southern Europe, and particularly Greece and Spain, have become social laborato-
ries for experimenting with new forms of participation pointing to material manifes-
tations of hope through concrete practices (Agustín and Briziarelli 2018; Dalakoglou 
and Agelopoulos 2018). What all these have in common is a visionary orientation 
towards a shared future, which builds on the crystallization of a new societal cul-
ture, rather than a consistent political tactics—a future to come that has “meaning 
(as possibility), but no predetermined direction, for it can end either in hope or 
disaster” (de Sousa Santos 2004, p. 26). Consequently, in order to locate these gusts 
of hope, scholarly attention must move beyond mere analyses of political competi-
tion among parties and enter the realms of civil society mobilization on local, 
national, and transnational European, and global levels of community making.
1.3  Interdisciplinary Contributions
The present volume has an interdisciplinary profile, making significant contribu-
tions to migration studies as well as scholarship on right-wing populism, extreme- 
right activism, feminist mobilizations, and other social movements. A point of 
departure for this volume is the assumption that the narratives constructing our col-
lective identities (i.e. the shared experience of ourselves in contact and contrast to 
the alterity) are not arbitrary and rarely innocent and consequently shape the pro-
cess of formulating and implementing the politics of migration of the polity in ques-
tion. We operationalize these narratives around the master frames of nostalgia and 
hope. They provide the discursive context wherein societies articulate the manner in 
which politics are done and who are deemed as legitimate political subjects.
From this perspective, the chapters in this volume expand their attention beyond 
the institutionalized forms of doing politics, dealing with the political mobilization 
of civil society actors. The chapters offer a diverse range of empirical contributions, 
ranging from Sweden and Finland in its northernmost corners of Europe to Poland 
and Romania in the east and Italy in the south. They critically examine the junction 
between the politics of culture, welfare, and migration across the continent that are 
not only embedded in specific national contexts but also transnational in a compara-
tive perspective by examining transnational mobilizations and global cities.
In the aftermath of the 2008 economic and financial crises, the heated debates 
concerning the financial and moral implications of bank bailouts, growing unem-
ployment, and the apparent victory of the fiscal austerity mantra were clear signs of 
a reactivation of the socio-economic cleavage and the politics of welfare pertaining 
to it. At the same time, migration and what later came to be labelled the 2015 
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“European refugee (reception) crisis”, gave rise to passionate discussions about 
controlling migration flows, demographic anxieties, and demands for preserving 
national cultures (Agustín and Jørgensen 2018), thereby widening the focus to poli-
tics of (national) culture and migration. As several contributions in the present vol-
ume show, these calls for protecting national specificity are often tinged by more or 
less discrete xenophobia, and in some cases, by outright racism. Notwithstanding 
this, on a more abstract level, both issues of welfare and (national) culture concern 
national identity in the context of contemporary migration patterns: how a people 
defines their collective identity, what bounds of solidarity among its members are 
valued, and how they describe themselves as different from others.
Another important contribution of the present volume is the articulation of a 
gender perspective on the narrative use of said master frames. For instance, several 
chapters widen the focus of scholarship on right-wing populist parties and extreme- 
right mobilization by delving further into how gender is employed strategically to 
do ideological work. On the one hand, particularly in Northern and Western Europe, 
the right-wing populist parties formally acknowledge gender equality provisions 
and incorporate these into their welfare chauvinist appeals as a means to distinguish 
between allegedly emancipated natives and deeply patriarchal migrants (Farris 
2017; Norocel 2017). On the other hand, the extreme right mobilization vehemently 
opposes women’s emancipation and nostalgically calls for a return to a traditional 
gender hierarchy, which posits women as frail and in need of defense from the men-
acing figure of the male (Muslim) migrant. This notwithstanding, other chapters 
highlight the importance of feminist mobilization in bringing about a “politics of 
intersectional hope” (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018), which builds bridges between 
anarcho-feminism, queer and Roma feminism and engages in struggles for social 
justice. The following section discusses more in detail the organizational logic of 
the present volume and provides brief explanations of each chapter’s focus and key 
findings.
1.4  Disposition of the Book
The present book is a collection of chapters that are organized around three inter-
nally coherent thematic parts. The chapters may be read as standalone pieces of 
research. They employ both comparative and single case studies to address different 
perspectives, and by means of various methodological approaches, the manner in 
which the master frames of nostalgia and hope are articulated in the politics of cul-
ture, welfare, and migration. The chapters may just as well be read as constitutive 
contributions of the aforementioned parts, which deal thematically with right-wing 
populist party politics across Europe (Part I), with an articulation of politics beyond 
party politics either by means of retrogressive mobilization (Part II) or emancipa-
tory initiatives (Part III).
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1.4.1  Part I: Right-Wing Populist Party Politics Across Europe
The chapters collected in this part examine right-wing populist party politics across 
Europe. They illustrate how the articulation of right-wing populist politics relies on 
and is undergirded by the master frame of nostalgia. Particularly important in this 
context seems to be the manner in which the online strategies of individual party 
members attach onto the wider political narratives in the areas of party-political 
competition. The chapters in this part display a diverse array of qualitative method-
ological approaches that examine a variety of empirical material (such as political 
debates, social media and blog entries, party documents and party leaders’ inter-
views during election campaigns), with the analyses focused mainly on the after-
math of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis.
These chapters provide both in-depth single case studies (Finland) of the way 
right-wing populist politicians discursively deflect accusations of racism against 
Muslims as well as comparative analyses of how discourses on national culture, 
immigration, and the welfare state are articulated. These chapters either analyze 
national differences in a seemingly common regional context (Denmark and 
Sweden), map out diverse positions and electoral strategies for acceding to political 
prominence (Poland, Hungary, and Romania), or investigate how entire countries or 
their diaspora in Europe are instrumentalized as culturally polarizing issues (in the 
UK, Austria, and Germany). The key argument of these chapters is that, across 
Europe, right-wing populist parties successfully politicize both issues of national 
identity and welfare provision and consequently pressure, with varying degrees of 
success from one context to another, the mainstream parties into altering their stand-
ing on these matters.
Examining two socio-economically similar North European countries such as 
Denmark and Sweden, Anders Hellström and Mahama Tawat evidence in Chap. 2 
how discourses on immigration, culture, and the welfare state are articulated differ-
ently. Studying a combination of both conventional political discourses and the 
blogosphere in the two countries, Hellström and Tawat show that the mainstream 
political discourse, as well as in the blogosphere in Denmark, gained increased rec-
ognition in a wider public for ideas and policies based on cultural incommensurabil-
ity on the eve of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis, whereby cultural diversity was 
depicted as incompatible with social cohesion and a threat to the Danish welfare 
system. By contrast, the mainstream political discourses in Sweden consistently 
associate cultural issues with redistributive policies, although the debate was highly 
polarized. The rhetoric around immigration, culture, and welfare varied according 
to ideological lines along the left-right cleavage. Nevertheless, in the blogosphere, 
welfare chauvinism and opposition to multiculturalism seem as strong as in 
Denmark, particularly among right-wing populist supporters.
Nevertheless, also in the North European context, Katarina Pettersson explores 
in Chap. 3 how Finnish right-wing populist politicians discursively deflect accusa-
tions of racism against Muslims. Pettersson undertakes a discursive psychological 
analysis of selected politicians’ Facebook profiles and identifies four ways of 
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denying accusations of racism: first, by constructing the racist statements as mere 
accounts of indisputable facts and common-sense; second, by providing personal 
narratives and ontological gerrymandering which act as “proof” of their non-racist 
disposition; third, by moving the discussion from issues about race to matters of 
cultural threats; and fourth, by reversing racism onto their political antagonist. 
Pettersson evidences that in their discursive denial of racist hate speech against 
Muslims, the analyzed Finnish politicians relied more on cultural arguments than on 
welfare chauvinism. More clearly, these discourses employed nostalgic references 
to Finnish national identity, people and values, and appeals to save them by resisting 
the alleged cultural threat that Islam represents.
Concentrating on the Central and Eastern European context in Chap. 4, Radu 
Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel add complexity to the discussion concerning the 
interplay between national identity ideals and welfare chauvinist appeals. Cinpoeş 
and Norocel provide a comparative framework that maps out the various positions 
right-wing populist parties occupy in mainstream politics in the region, selecting 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania as their case studies. They examine the official dis-
courses of key right-wing populist parties in the chosen countries from the begin-
ning of 2015 onwards. Cinpoeş and Norocel offer a convincing analysis of the 
various electoral strategies of these parties, which were employed with varying 
degrees of success, that juxtapose cultural protectionist appeals to welfare chauvin-
ist proposals. In so doing, they shed light on the particularities of the culture and 
welfare nexus in the Central and Eastern European context.
Taking a slightly different approach, in Chap. 5, Gokay Özerim and Selcen Öner 
scrutinize and compare how Turkey as a potential EU Member State, and the pres-
ence of Turks as a significant ethnic minority group in Europe, was instrumentalized 
politically. Özerim and Öner analyze how Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in 
Europe are constructed as a culturally polarizing issue as part of a larger right-wing 
populist preoccupation with “cultural security” matters. For this purpose, they 
examine three cases. The first concerns the “Vote Leave” campaign part of the 
Brexit referendum in the UK; the second is constituted by the instrumentalization of 
Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s EU membership bid in Austrian domestic politics; 
and the third pertains to the German domestic political debates in the aftermath of 
the 2015 European refugee (reception) crisis and its impact onto the Turkish com-
munity in the country.
1.4.2  Part II: Retrogressive Mobilizations Outside 
the Political Arena
The chapters gathered in this part map out the different manners and actors, and the 
various settings in which retrogressive ideals are juxtaposed in diverse combina-
tions nostalgia for past/imagined ethnic homogeneity, belief in immutable national 
identities, and “post-welfare melancholia” (Pallas 2011). These chapters 
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concentrate on transnational developments (Europe-wide), as well as several 
national settings (Sweden, Hungary, and Germany). They use a diverse array of 
qualitative methodological approaches to examine various empirics (such as social 
media posts, nationwide daily newspapers, nationalist symbols, in-depth interviews, 
and mobilizing anthems). In so doing, they provide both a birds-eye view and a 
more granular perspective concerning the various forms that the retrogressive mobi-
lization outside the political arena may take. Put differently, the main argument of 
this part is that outside the political arena there are certain segments of society that 
both reverberate to and shape right-wing populist discourses that are underpinned 
by conceptions of monolithic and exclusive national identity and welfare chauvinism.
Examining the transnational cooperation framework of the European youth 
movement Generation Identity (GI), Anita Nissen evidences in Chap. 6 how differ-
ent national GI chapters constructed and assigned protagonist and antagonist identi-
ties in the context of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis. Nissen exposes the 
ethno-pluralist conception of society onto which the GI bases its understanding of 
“identity”; this is tied to the imperatives of ensuring ethnic segregation and a nostal-
gic yearning for a time of European ethnic homogeneity. Consequently, the move-
ment’s endeavor to “return to the future” is to be achieved by confronting today’s 
Universalist and egalitarian principles as well as alleged “mass-immigration” and 
Islamization. Nissen unveils how strategies such as highlighting the negative conse-
quence of particularly Muslim third-country immigration and questioning the truth-
fulness of the migrants’ and refugees’ residence claims are employed in the effort to 
return Europe to its imaginary ethnically homogeneous roots.
Concentrating on the Swedish context, in Chap. 7 Emil Edenborg uses the 
debates about sexual violence, immigration, and gender equality—in the wake of 
reports about large-scale sexual harassment during the New Year’s Eve celebrations 
in Cologne and at a summer festival in Stockholm—to examine critically the rela-
tion between welfare and culture in Sweden. Analyzing both newspapers’ reporting 
and the party leaders’ speeches pertaining to these events, Edenborg argues persua-
sively that the circulation of the “migrants’ sexual violence” trope engendered a 
bordering practice, implicitly or explicitly supporting the stricter border regime 
introduced in November 2015. The idea of “endangered gender equality” was part 
of a securitization process whereby immigration was portrayed as an existential 
threat to the Swedish welfare model, which effectively closed off the possibility to 
argue for a return to previously more generous asylum policies.
Focusing on Hungary, a country where welfare chauvinism and anti-immigrant 
rhetoric is a mainstay of the public debate, Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler 
examine in Chap. 8 the uses of nostalgia in the construction of national identity for 
the purpose of far-right organizing. Kondor and Littler scrutinize several Hungarian 
organizations, both from the more traditional far-right movement and the Hungarian 
chapter of the Generation Identity network, with their heavily anti-immigration 
rhetoric. To grasp the politics of culture at work among various Hungarian far-right 
organizations, she analyzes both the identities of these organizations as well as in- 
depth interviews with far-right activists. Kondor and Littler argue that what these 
far-right organizations have in common is a nostalgic longing for a time when 
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Hungarians were “pure”, before interaction and integration with their European 
neighbors. This nostalgia is simultaneously mixed with the seemingly contradictory 
belief in the importance of Christianity and Christian values in the construction of 
Hungarianness.
Concentrating in turn on the German context, Andreas Önnerfors scrutinizes in 
Chap. 9 how important a role the sentiments of nostalgia and melancholia play in 
retrogressive mobilization, particularly in the case of PEGIDA. Departing from the 
theoretical discussion concerning “retrotopia” (Bauman 2017) and “post-welfare 
nostalgia” (Pallas 2011), Önnerfors argues for an interpretive framework with the 
potential to inform cultural nationalism studies. From this perspective, Önnerfors 
discusses PEGIDA’s organizational development and its ideological fuzziness, 
which then are used to examine two illustrative examples of PEGIDA’s retrotopian 
performance of culture. This allows Önnerfors to address the normative conflict 
between civil society agency as beneficial for democracy and the rise of retrogres-
sive forces among certain sections of society that espouse “unwanted” values from 
a detached vantage point.
1.4.3  Part III: Emancipatory Initiatives Mobilizing 
Beyond Politics
The chapters reunited in this part engage in various ways to what we call “politics 
of hope”. Politics of hope describe a symbolic move beyond party politics to focus 
on emancipatory initiatives from below, or to be more precise, those initiatives in 
civil society that deal with contentious politics revolving around the nexus of wel-
fare and culture. These chapters concentrate on several national settings (Denmark, 
Finland, and Romania) as well as on “global cities” (Brussels). They do so by 
employing several methodological approaches, such as mixed-methods, in-depth 
interviews and ethnography as well as discourse analysis. The chapters offer various 
answers to the question of how to promote progressive politics when the sphere of 
party politics in a certain country is seemingly restrictive. The chapters in this part 
identify diverse forms of praxis across Europe. In other words, the key argument in 
this part is that civil society is emerging as a new political subject with claims for a 
progressive renegotiation of citizenship that denounces welfare chauvinism and 
narrow cultural retrenchment.
Focusing on the Danish context, in Chap. 10, Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel 
Rosengren Olsen analyze the development of civil society organizations (CSO), 
which move beyond “politics of fear” (Wodak 2015). Their analysis is set against 
the backdrop of a political climate built on crisis scenarios and “There is No 
Alternative” (TINA) politics. The chosen case study is the Danish CSO Venligboerne, 
which has carved out a space for itself in the contemporary Danish social landscape 
as an interlocutor amidst the broad spectrum of organizations that constitute the 
refugee solidarity movements (Toubøl 2017). Jørgensen and Rosengren Olsen argue 
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compellingly that Venligboerne’s position in this context may be best understood as 
a transitional space of learning between the various positions offered by the array of 
organizations within the network.
Using the Finnish context to examine how the concept of civil society is reinter-
preted, in Chap. 11, Camilla Haavisto analyzes the “Right to Live” collective. 
Consisting of Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers and their allies, the collective pro-
tested unjust asylum processes and deportations in the center of Finnish capital city 
day and night for more than six months in 2017. During these protests, the collective 
recast the culture of gratefulness that asylum seekers in Finland traditionally have 
adhered to and stretched the understanding of who and what constitutes civil soci-
ety. Haavisto scrutinizes the strategies used by the collective for gaining voice, vis-
ibility, and legitimacy as information sources or experts in the public sphere. She 
highlights the main obstacles that hinder protesting asylum seekers from being 
understood, contrasting the “right to be understood” (Husband 1996) with the 
“impossibility” of political activism led by asylum seekers (Nyers 2003).
Employing the Romanian context as an example of ongoing developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe, in Chap. 12, Alexandra Ana maps out the use of hope 
as a master frame in crystallizing support for the rising “street feminism” (Ana 
2017), in opposition to the NGO-ized feminism of previous decade (Guenther 
2011). NGO-ized feminism marked women’s withdrawal from politics and wit-
nessed their engagement in competition for scarce resources and the adoption of a 
women’s empowerment discourse that was permeated by individualism and neolib-
eral free-market assumptions. In opposition to that, street feminism is contentious 
and disruptive in its form, intersectional in its stance, and engages concomitantly in 
different struggles for social justice, articulating an anti-capitalist critique. Ana 
argues persuasively that in the context of the successive financial and refugee 
(reception) crises, street feminism contours a politics of intersectional hope through 
a process of bridge-building and solidarity among forcibly evicted persons, feminist 
NGOs, anarchist groupings, Roma feminism, anti-racist organizations, and refugees.
In Chap. 13, with a “global city” like Brussels as their backdrop, Larisa Lara- 
Guerrero and María Vivas-Romero examine Latin American migrants as active civic 
agents participating in transnational social movement that create, transform, and 
exploit transnational networks in both their homelands and their hostland. Because 
of their emigration experience, migrants accumulate political and cultural knowl-
edge, symbols, and have become aware of varying practices in the different settings 
they are active in. Lara-Guerrero and Vivas-Romero analyze how social remittances 
shape the way migrants develop their political and cultural repertoires of conten-
tion, constitute their social identities, and influence their political behavior, and 
illustrate their ideological stances and norms that are shaped by the multiple cities 
they have lived in. Their main finding is that Latin American migrants defend their 
political struggles and ideals by successfully developing and sustaining transna-
tional fields of social and political mobilization.
Last but not least, by way of conclusion, in Chap. 14, Carlo Ruzza concentrates 
on the civil society formations and activities in the European political environment, 
arguing that we are witnessing a redefinition of the long-established ethos of 
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inclusionary civil society groups. Certain moralized ideational constructs such as 
“community”, “belonging”, and “solidarity”, which have traditionally been associ-
ated with a cosmopolitan and tolerant conception of the role of civil society, are 
undergoing a process of redefinition. In this context, an individualistic, nationalist, 
exclusionary, and socially conservative conception of civil society is emerging. 
Ruzza frames the contrast between these rival images of civil society as a move-
ment–counter movement dynamic that opposes a right-wing populist and an anti- 
populist block. He interprets these with reference to studies of “civil” and “uncivil” 
society, and provides a typology of their roles and values, making useful connec-
tions between the other chapters in the present volume.
1.5  Conclusions
With this volume, we offer empirical contemporary examples of how the contours 
of the political terrain shift in accordance with processes of societal formation in 
contemporary “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2012). The refugee (reception) crisis in 
late 2015 exposed emerging conflict lines in domestic as well as EU politics, rever-
berating among both societal actors arguing against immigration and those with a 
more positive view. The volume illustrates how parties, social movements and civil 
society organizations articulate their political agenda and societal endeavors by 
means of the narrative master frames of nostalgia and hope.
There is no readymade response to how European societies could or should act 
in the aftermath of these crises. The much referred-to common person in the street 
may well vent their frustration against elites in various contexts, but who they 
“really” are, and what they ultimately wish for, is contingent upon each national 
context and Europe as a whole. This does not by any means imply the end of ideol-
ogy, as the classical ideologies are still very much alive. Conversely, these polariz-
ing developments breed ideological battles between progressive forces and 
retrogressive counter-mobilizations at the intersection between the politics of cul-
ture, welfare, and migration.
On this matter, we deem that the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis serves as a turn-
ing point, and this requires a serious refinement and even profound redefinition of 
the analytical instruments needed for studying contemporary European societies. 
The focus of the present book is thus not only to what extent or if, but most impor-
tantly, how the politics of migration affect community-building in the twenty-first 
century. Political engagement is taking different forms of expression beyond the 
conventional means of doing politics and to understand the web of entanglements of 
the politics of culture, welfare and migration, researchers must venture past ordi-
nary approaches to party politics and traditional cleavage structures (such as culture 
and welfare) and consider other types of social mobilization as well. The present 
volume takes a first step in this direction. Individually, the collected chapters explore 
how the master frames of either nostalgia or hope uphold these. To finish this 
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introductory chapter by means of a metaphor, while acknowledging that the nostal-
gic winds blow into the sails of right-wing populist parties and retrogressive move-
ments, our analyses also provide compelling evidence that these inauspicious gusts 
are accompanied by winds of hope brought about by vigorous emancipatory mobi-
lizations across Europe.
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The welfare systems of Denmark and Sweden contain many similar socio-economic 
features. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), they are ideal examples of Social 
Democracy, with universal access to welfare provisions, the absence of stratifica-
tion, a high level of decommodification or the extent of welfare provisions in rela-
tion to previous earnings during periods of employment, and with corporatist 
agreements between trade unions, employers, and the state. However, Denmark and 
Sweden espouse two distinctively different discourses on immigration and integra-
tion. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the conventional discourses at the inter-
section of welfare, culture, and immigration and determine how they are reflected in 
different opinion communities. Specifically, we ask what meanings are embedded 
in the different political discourses. What is acceptable to say in one context may 
not necessarily be the case in another, as the borders of what is considered normal-
ity differ.
We draw from the work of Anthropologist Claudia Strauss (2012), whose rele-
vant book, Making Sense of Public Opinion, shows how discourses disseminated in 
opinion communities are built around distinctive cultural schemas. In other words, 
they are “simplified understandings” (Strauss, p. 17) about the historical heritage of 
the nation—of what immigrants are like, how they behave, what preferences they 
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have, and how they comprehend gender relations. Our empirical materials are drawn 
from the government policy strategy, “Culture for All: Culture in the Whole 
Country” (Kultur for alle: Kultur i hele landet), the Cultural Canon (Kultur Kanon), 
and the Danish Canon (Danmark Kanon) as well as the parliamentary debate on the 
government bill in Sweden called Culture for All (Kultur för alla). In Denmark, 
decision-making in cultural policy rests upon the incumbent government and is not 
routinely debated in parliament; thus, the formats of our selected materials differ.
In addition to examining the aforementioned empirical materials, we explore the 
Facebook community of Martin Henriksen, who is a high-ranking official of the 
right-wing populist Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) and was an 
elected member of parliament (Folketing) for the Danish People’s Party between 
2005 and 2019. In the Swedish case, we examine the blog community of Therese 
Borg, a prominent member of the anti-immigration, right-wing populist party, 
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). Borg was a member of the munici-
pal council of Klippan, a small town in southern Sweden, and is a member of the 
party’s executive committee. The chapter proceeds as follows: The following sec-
tion gives a background to the development of political discourses on immigration 
in Denmark and in Sweden. Section two elaborates on the conceptual framework, 
while section three gives an analysis of the policy arena in Denmark and Sweden. 
This is followed by an analysis of the blogospheres in Denmark and Sweden.
2.1.1  Background
At the end of the nineteenth century, Sweden and Denmark were countries of emi-
gration primarily to North America. However, the extent of this emigration was far 
less in Denmark than in Sweden, where it is estimated that approximately one-fifth 
of the population emigrated to the United States in the late decades of the nineteenth 
century (Hellström 2016: 34). In 1930, Sweden became a country of net immigra-
tion far earlier than Denmark. Also, after the Second World War, with a booming 
economy and gaping labor shortages in their industries, labor migrants became the 
main component of immigration in both countries. However, with a decline in eco-
nomic and industrial growth and the outbreak of the Oil Crisis, Sweden and Denmark 
stopped labor immigration respectively in 1972 and 1973. Thereafter, the two coun-
tries witnessed the progressive increase in the number of refugees and their families 
fleeing conflict or dictatorships from Eastern Europe, certain parts of Asia, the 
Middle East, and Africa. The numbers peaked during the Iran–Iraq wars in the 
1980s, the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and Kosovo in the 
late 1990s.
The recent peak in 2016 is related to the Syrian conflict that, in the summer 2015, 
forced more than one million refugees to seek abode in Europe, mainly Germany 
and Sweden. In contrast to Denmark—which, in the 1990s and most notably the 
early 2000s, moved with many other European countries toward the implementation 
A. Hellström and M. Tawat
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of stricter policies regarding immigration, integration, and citizenship—Sweden 
went in the opposite direction.
Swedish exceptionalism ended on 12 November 2015, when the government 
enacted temporary border and ID controls between Denmark and Sweden to stem 
the influx of Syrian refugees. On 24 November of the same year, the government 
proposed a temporary law that would give all successful asylum seekers temporary 
rather than permanent residency. The legislation officially came into effect on 20 
July 2016, and Sweden thereby lowered its standards to the EU level (Bevelander 
and Hellström 2019). Today, the proportion of immigrants in the Swedish popula-
tion in 2019 was is 19,6% (SCB 2019), whereas in Denmark, the corresponding 
figure is 13% (Statistik Denmark 2019).
2.2  Multiculturalism in the Welfare State
Sweden adopted multiculturalism as its official policy in the early 1970s. Its first 
state cultural policy and first immigrant integration policy, which were passed 
respectively in 1974 and 1975, made the preservation and promotion of immigrants’ 
cultures an unequivocal matter of state policy. Defining culture in the anthropologi-
cal sense, as “a way of life, including traditions, food, religion, language,” (Puri 
2004, p. 24),1 it was argued that immigrants’ home cultures were necessary not only 
for their well-being but also for enriching Swedish society. Since then, these poli-
cies have been reproduced more or less in the same terms. In contrast, Denmark did 
not adopt such policy, although the government at that time and its successors were 
aware of the developments in neighboring Sweden and of the legal requirement to 
inform if not consult each other on policy development (Tawat 2017). However, it 
was not until 2006, with the official adoption of a Culture Canon highlighting the 
main elements of Danish culture with which immigrants were encouraged to get 
acquainted, that an official policy was formulated.
Given that welfare permeates every aspect of social life as a contract of rights 
and obligations bestowed upon citizens from cradle to grave, it has become part of 
the national self-image and central to cultural policy regarding immigrants. As 
Hellström et al. write in the introduction to this volume, welfare policies are embed-
ded in cultural notions of how the national community should be crafted and by 
whom. Nevertheless, attitudes vary among the population regarding immigration. 
These range from welfare chauvinism (i.e. welfare for the natives) to welfare for all, 
which includes the appraisal of multiculturalism.
Welfare chauvinistic claims argue that multicultural policies have negative 
effects on the welfare state (see Norocel 2016; Schierup et al. 2006). The first effect 
is “crowding-out” which consists of laying focus, energy and time on “soft” issues 
such as the numerical representation of minorities instead of “hard issues” such as 
1 The other definition of culture is aesthetics comprising arts, cinema, library, and theatre.
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economic redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, pp. 10–11). Whereas immi-
grants may benefit more from having equal opportunities as a result of structural 
change. The second effect is “corroding”, where it is assumed that ethnocultural 
diversity undermines trust and solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, p. 11). As 
such, citizens are less likely to contribute to welfare schemes if they perceive that 
the beneficiary is not “one of them” but rather an immigrant or from a historic 
minority. In the same vein, it is argued that because most welfare arrangements 
result from reparations to historical injustices, they lead to a “politics of identity” or 
“politics of grievance” which undermines trust between groups. The third effect is 
“misdiagnosing”. It is alleged that the problem of minorities is “economic margin-
alization not cultural misrecognition” and policies that are based on culture are 
inadequate to solve problems that are structural in nature (Banting and Kymlicka 
2006, p. 13). For instance, multicultural education cannot alter wage differences 
between natives and immigrants. In our empirical analysis, we investigate the nar-
ratives around these themes in the parliamentary arena and in online communities.
2.3  Political and Media Narratives
A conventional discourse synthetizes and rationalizes all the various expressions on 
a particular issue reflected on the group and national levels (Strauss 2012). Hellström 
and Nilsson refer to these as rhetorical figures (2010, p. 56). However, people some-
times hold on to a repertoire of contradicting views and positions that do not neces-
sarily follow congruent ideological lines or logical reasoning. As Pettersson 
explains, individuals do not identify with a congruent set of identity positions 
throughout life but rather often adopt contradictory points of identification. Class 
background, social milieu, formative experiences, gender, and ethnic affiliations 
spin a complex tapestry of identities (2017, pp. 35–36). From these data, one can 
find two types of discourse:
• Discourses from the policy arena.
In the Danish case, we examine the content of Culture for All (Kultur for alle), a 
policy enacted on 2 December 2009 by Culture Minister Carina Christensen 
(2008–2010), the Danish Cultural Canon published in 2006 by Brian Mikkelsen, 
Culture Minister for Denmark from 2001–2008 and the Danish Canon formu-
lated by Bertel Haarder, Culture Minister from 2015 to 2016. As stated, the 
Danish mode of policymaking has often consisted of speeches to the Danish 
parliament (Folketing) or public statements. Some ministers launched elaborate 
policy projects, but these were not always debated in the parliament. In the 
Swedish case, we analyze the debate on the government bill, Culture for All 
(Kultur för alla), which has the same title as its Danish equivalent examined 
previously and which was held on 23 February 2017.
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• Discourses from the blogosphere.
Katarina Pettersson (2017, pp. 40–44) explains that blogging is an essential tech-
nique for promoting nationalist and anti-immigration ideas:
Blog entries provide useful insights into the rhetoric used by representatives of anti- 
immigrant parties, their followers, and other audiences. The opportunities to comment on 
the posts enable interaction and foster political mobilization. Together, these claims consti-
tute a particular opinion community. Claims are delivered in the form of emotionally engag-
ing stories or narratives through vivid powerful images.
The blog community serves as a platform for the dissemination of ideas and 
political participation by means of the collaborative and interactive features 
(Pettersson 2017, p. 10). In the communication, the position of mediator (such as 
journalists) connecting the sender and the receiver is eradicated (Hellström 2016, 
pp. 69–74). Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018) have shown that mainstream policy 
claims and the mode of communication are disseminated in social media.
We study posts by Martin Henriksen of the Danish People’s Party (DF) and 
Therese Borg from the Sweden Democrats (SD), including the comments made by 
their followers on matters pertaining to culture and welfare. Martin Henriksen of the 
DF is a member of the executive committee of his party. He was the DF representa-
tive on Immigration and Integration, and representative for the Danish minority in 
the German region of Schleswig-Holstein, which was lost in the aftermath of the 
1864 Danish–German war. He has been a member of corresponding select commit-
tees when he was member of the Folketing. His Facebook page2 has a significant 
number of active followers, and he oftentimes engages in discussions with them. 
Therese Borg is a member of the SD party executive board and holds a chair in the 
local municipal council in Klippan, a town situated in the south of Sweden (although 
she recently stepped down from this post). She published frequently on her blog,3 
and during the analyzed period, she was a chairperson on the party’s national board. 
Her opinions and views are meaningful because they represent a bridge between the 
official politics of the SD and the views held by its sympathizers. We searched three 
sections on Borg’s blog page associated with welfare issues. Each section included 
a number of replies from the public. These were Work/Unemployment Insurance 
Fund/Social Assistance (Arbete/A-Kassa/Försörjningsstöd) (five replies); Health, 
Medical Treatment and Patient Safety (Hälso- och sjukvård, patientsäkerhet) (20 
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2.4  Analysis of the Policy Discourse in Denmark
The policy discourse in Denmark on multiculturalism in the welfare state has been 
marked by criticism of its corroding effects more than its crowding out and misdi-
agnosing effects. That is, multiculturalism causes fragmentation and thus poses a 
threat to social cohesion and the sustainability of the welfare system. Following the 
center-right liberal-conservative victory in the November 2001 Danish general elec-
tions, the new liberal Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed Brian 
Mikkelsen, from the conservative Party as Minister in charge of Culture. One of 
Mikkelsen’s first actions was to lay down the Cultural Development Fund, set up by 
the Social Liberal Party in 2002. It was the only public institution that aimed to fund 
immigrants’ cultural productions, although it was largely unsuccessful in achieving 
this goal. The institution’s budget of DKK 5  million was re-allocated (Danish 
Ministry of Culture 2002). Then in 2006, Mikkelsen gathered seven committees 
headed by a lead expert and coordinated by Professor Jørn Lund with the purpose of 
formulating a canon of Danish culture (Kultur Ministeriet 2010). The canon was 
said to represent Danish culture. Its goals were to “serve as a compass showing the 
directions and milestones in Denmark’s long and complex cultural history; serve as 
a platform for discussion and debate; provide reference points and awareness of 
what is special about Danes and Denmark in an ever more globalized world; and 
strengthen the sense of community by showing key parts of our common historical 
possessions”4 (Duelund 2009). Four months later at the Conservative Party annual 
conference, he returned to his initial argument that multiculturalism has corroding 
effects on the society that follows from immigration flows from Muslim countries 
“…when immigrants from Muslim countries refuse to recognize the Danish culture 
and European norms. In the midst of our own country, it is becoming a parallel 
society in which minorities practice their medieval norms and undemocratic ways 
of thinking” (Mikkelsen 2005).
The speech stirred strong reactions amongst the public. Lund asked for a clarifi-
cation, and two members of the canon-drafting committee threatened to resign 
(Andersen 2005). The topic of what distinguishes Danish culture in relation to 
“Muslim culture” became a topic of controversy, and many felt the need to engage 
in critical dialogue with him. The newspaper Politiken quoted him as saying that 
“Yes, [Danish culture] is better. Yes. I am a declared opponent of value relativism 
because I think something is better than another” (Andersen 2005). A month later, 
in an interview to the newspaper Berlingske Tidende, he fully reinstated his claim 
that the canon was part of the fight to preserve Danish culture (Petersen 2006).
Published in 2006, the final canon project consisted of 96 items. Each of the fol-
lowing sectors was represented by 12 works: art, architecture, photography, design, 
sculpture, film, literature, and theatre. There were 24 works in the music sector, among 
which 12 were classical music pieces and 12 were popular music pieces. A Canon for 
children’s culture was unveiled as well. A special website  (www.kulturkanon.kum.
4 https://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/compendium-topics.php?aid=149
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dk), a booklet, and teaching materials on the Canon were made available in schools 
and public libraries. None of these works was authored by a non-Western immigrant 
or anyone who embodied the immigrant experience. The only work which referred to 
non-Western culture was Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp (Aladdin, eller den 
forunderlige lampe), a portrait of Aladdin dating from 1805 and made by the artist 
Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850). The Canon well illustrates the discursive context 
in which the contemporary rhetoric on immigration is framed and is an example of the 
politics of assimilation (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). The conventional discourse 
encompasses the view that Danish culture is unique and reflects a unique people.
Since the initial policy change initiated by Mikkelsen, there has been remarkable 
continuity in Danish policy and politics, as shown by two of the ministerial policies 
that followed. The conventional discourse is thus to enable assimilation. However, 
this continuity has not been fluid but rather incremental in nature. Carina Christensen, 
a Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, K) minister in charge 
of culture between 2008 and 2010 sought with her policy program Culture for All 
(Kultur for alle) published on 2 December 2009 to widen access to the Cultural 
Canon produced by Mikkelsen. A former culture spokesperson for her party between 
2001 and 2005, Christensen wrote in the foreword of the policy document that:
There is a threat to cohesion in our community if we do not uphold a picture of our common 
history and cultural heritage; if we only have a uniform picture of the world that surrounds 
us; if we lose the desire and the ability to speak sensibly with those who we disagree with – 
yes we can. Democracy and community will not survive in the long run. But when we know 
our culture and cultural heritage in its diversity, it is the opposite that occurs. (Christiansen 
2009, p. 4)
Another rhetorical element underpinning this conventional discourse emphasizes 
the uniqueness of Danish culture in a turbulent world. In insecure times, facing 
globalization, the national culture is not only needed, it must also be safeguarded 
and made available to all Danes. New Danes (immigrants) must also adhere to it.
The second policy program, the Denmark Canon published on 12 December 
2016 by Bertel Haarder (2015–2016), a former Minister for Refugees, Immigrants 
and Integration (2001–2005) for the center-right Liberal Party added a social wel-
fare dimension and arguably a bottom-up perspective. With much sophistry, it set 
out with the question, “Which social values, traditions or movements that have 
shaped us in Denmark will you carry through to tomorrow’s society?” This question 
aimed “to raise awareness about the historical and cultural social values, traditions 
and events that have particularly shaped society and people in Denmark” (www.
danmarkskanon.dk).
From the responses offered by 2425 respondents, ten main values ranked by 
order of importance were identified: (1) the welfare society; (2) Freedom, namely 
individual freedom; (3) trust; (4) equality before the law; (5) gender equality; (6) the 
Danish language; (7) associations and voluntary work; (8) liberality/tolerance; (9) 
hygge “a special way of being together in a relaxing, nice atmosphere”; and (10) 
Christian heritage or “charity and the Protestant thoughts about the importance of 
work, the personal responsibility and the equality of all people to God”. An infor-
mation campaign was launched in relation to this, which included roundtable 
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discussions at festivals as well as on radio and TV programs and an online digital 
platform called Denmark Canon (www.danmarkskanon.dk; #Dkkanon).
Clearly, if one understands these policies as not only continuous but also incre-
mental as it appears, it appears that, similarly to Sweden, the welfare state ranks 
highest in the world of Danish politicians. Regarding this link between the Danish 
welfare system and Danish culture and the alleged threats that globalization and 
immigration pose to its sustainability, the national culture and not multiculturalism 
is viewed as the ferment needed for its preservation. Consequently, this national 
culture must be reactivated and broadly diffused. National culture here is cotermi-
nous with national identity. The latter is considered as a pillar for cohesion that is 
essential for the (sustainability) of the welfare system. As the Denmark Canon web-
site states, “The purpose of the canon is also to make it clearer what creates our 
national identity and cohesion” (www.danmarkskanon.dk). As shown herein, this 
policy development is used and followed by the mainstream parties in Denmark. In 
other words, the rhetoric of the DF is embedded in mainstream political discourse 
in Denmark, whereas in the Sweden, the views of SD stir up emotions and are heav-
ily challenged by the other parliamentary parties, as detailed in the following 
section.
2.5  Analysis of the Policy Discourse in Sweden
The parliamentary debate on the policy proposal, Culture for All (Kultur för alla), 
took place in the Swedish parliament on 23 February 2017. In this debate, represen-
tatives from all the parties in parliament participated with 32 contributions to the 
debate. In general, the speakers did not tackle culture in abstract ways but rather 
focused on practical matters. In the initial phase of the debate, culture was connoted 
with art, museums, and classical music. Thereafter, it shifted to values, heritage, and 
traditions. The conventional discourse identified was that culture is an engine for 
the society’s development, and welfare sustainability but is removed from citizens’ 
day-to-day concerns.
In the first statement, Marie-Louise Rönnemark from the governing Social 
Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti, SAP) held up culture as the 
engine of society. Rossana Dinamarca from the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) 
emphasized the importance of having a national culture that represents all the peo-
ple living in Sweden today. The way into “culture” for her was through diverse 
avenues, such as, via hip-hop and not merely through official channels such as clas-
sical music. Patriarchal structures, class divisions, and structural racism inhibit 
people from sharing a common national culture made up of various currents. In her 
view, culture is about democracy, and the “free market” cannot guarantee a “culture 
for all”. Conversely, the representative of the Liberal Party (Liberalerna, L), Bengt 
Eliasson, made the point that the state should not decide what culture is or should 
be on a local level.
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This notwithstanding, the intersection between culture and welfare became 
apparent when Aron Emilsson, the SD speaker for religious matters and the preser-
vation of national heritage took the floor. In his statements, he linked culture to 
society at large and not solely to practical matters. In line with his party’s position, 
he suggested a cultural canon inspired by Denmark: “If Denmark can do it so can 
we”. He further remarked that “There are five Nordic countries, which have a lot in 
common. We share the same cultural sphere”. In this statement, culture is not merely 
“crowded out” as a soft issue. Immigration was seen as not only problematic because 
it increases competition for immigrants on the lower end of the labor market, but 
also, in this debate, as foremost associated with corroding effects, although this 
position was opposed by the other parties’ representatives.
Marie-Louise Rönnmark (SAP) explained that culture knows no boundaries, and 
it is despicable to only grant ethnic Swedes free entrance to libraries, museums, and 
invite them to a joint discussion on what comprises Swedish values. Niclas 
Malmberg from the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna, MP) remarked that when 
“Old Swedish” is prioritized, you risk neglecting all the important international 
influences that have shaped who we are. Per Lodenius, spokesperson for the Centre 
Party (Centerpartiet, C) on cultural affairs, emphasized that culture is an important 
aspect of social life and a stimulus for civic participation. Lars-Axel Nordell from 
the Christian Democratic Party (Kristdemokraterna, KD) stated that culture is a 
meeting point for organizations and individuals in civil society.
The views of political representatives diverged along the left/right ideological 
spectrum on the connotations of culture, how much influence the state should have 
on local cultural practices, and what culture should be. However, everyone (except 
the representative from the right-wing populist SD) agreed that cultural policies 
should be reflective of all the diverse layers of the population in Sweden, including 
immigrants, and not only, those residing in the urban areas, for example. The con-
ventional discourse is thus to facilitate integration among diverse parts of the peo-
ple living in Sweden. The intersection between welfare and culture gave way to 
more abstract discussions about how social cohesion can best be fostered, especially 
in insecure times, and how unity in terms of a common identity and history must be 
emphasized. The discussion of the Danish cultural canon mooted by the SD repre-
sentative became the focus of deliberations. This is also reflected in the blogosphere, 
as analyzed in the following sections.
2.6  Analysis of the Blogosphere in Denmark
Martin Henriksen’s Facebook page has a high “view rate”. It has a significant num-
ber of followers (26,412 as of 10 July 2019) and “Likes” (25,699 as of 10 July 
2019). From the launch of his page on 15 July 2015 until 11 July 2019, he wrote 
eight posts on welfare, which our search with the keyword “velfærd” uncovered. 
Each of his posts has had no less than 200 “likes” and none had gone unanswered. 
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Their lines of argumentation reveal strong similarities with Therese Borg’s blog (see 
next section). The conventional discourse – that Denmark cannot afford multicultur-
alism – exalts welfare chauvinism. Immigration is viewed as a zero-sum game for 
the welfare state, notably for its financial sustainability and pensioners’ well-being.
In one post from 16 March 2017, Henriksen writes that:
DF’s policy works! In the election campaign, we promised to work to tighten up the asylum 
system so that we get fewer asylum seekers to the country – and thus can spend more money 
on welfare instead. Last year, far fewer asylum seekers came to Denmark than expected, 
and thus there are now DKK 400 million more in the treasury, which can be used for wel-
fare, among other things. We are continuing the fight to implement more udlænding-
estramninger so that we can get asylum numbers much lower and more money for welfare. 
Just like we promised before the election. Do you agree with DF that Denmark needs far 
more immigration restrictions and a strengthened and permanent border control so that we 
can get more money for welfare?5
In another post drawn from his opinion piece in the newspaper Berlinske Tidende 
(Henriksen 08 November 2017) with the title “Drop snakken om velfærd vs skat-
telettelser – her er det vigtige spørgsmål!” (Drop talk about welfare vs tax cuts – 
here’s the important question!), Henriksen writes that immigration is the biggest 
threat to the welfare system. Alongside many grievances, he cites a report from the 
Ministry of Finance according to which non-Western immigration has cost DKK 
33 billion in 2014.6 The most popular reaction among readers is that of A.D. (anony-
mized) with 41 replies. It deals with the introduction halal food in “dagis” (nursery 
schools). A.D. writes:
that we, as Danes, have to forego our culture to take care of Muslims and therefore we are 
happy to remove pork in the institutions. It is simply absurd that such a religion should 
dictate what is right and wrong in Denmark. Totally absurd and more absurd it becomes 
when Christians are more or less forced to eat food blessed in the name of an idol. It’s called 
idolatry.7
In an image that Henriksen posted on his Facebook profile on 31 May 2017, it is 
stated that stopping asylum will release enough money to increase old-age pension 
by DKK 11000 (about € 1474). Henriksen’s argument is that it is not possible to 
both fund the welfare state for pensioners and cater to immigrants’ needs.8
Conversely, as we found out in the study of Swedish politicians’ conventional 
discourses, which we discussed in the previous section, issues concerning the wel-
fare state are dissociated from those of multiculturalism. Multicultural policy, dis-
course, and even its adverse effects mentioned before are not discussed. 
Multiculturalism is a non-starter. For example, in another image featuring Henriksen 
5 https://www.facebook.com/pg/Martin-Henriksen-1604502423155684/posts/?ref=page_internal
6 https://www.facebook.com/pg/Martin-Henriksen-1604502423155684/posts/?ref=page_internal
7 h t tps : / /www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos /a .1607823059490287/ 
2138790309726890/?type=3&theater
8 h t tps : / /www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos /a .1622432261362700/ 
2297663740506212/?type=3&theater
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posted on 03 September 2018, [Muslim] immigrants are urged to “throw away the 
[Muslim] scarf and join Denmark”. It is accompanied by the following text:
Danish People’s Party has launched a new nationwide campaign. The Danish People’s Party 
would like people with an immigrant background to become part of Denmark. but it 
requires personal effort to adopt Danish culture and join the society. It has always been so. 
Agree? Please share.9
The same image was used in a subsequent post from 1 May 2019  in which 
Henriksen wrote:
In the latest edition of Sports Illustrated there is a woman wearing the Muslim scarf. It 
rightly creates a lot of debate. Read the following: https://ekstrabladet.dk/nationen/mega-
smuk-muslimsk-model-skaber-debat-jeg-forstaar-det-ikke/7615648. Unfortunately, there 
is still a good reason to make sure that the Muslim scarf does not belong in neither a 
Western nor Danish context. It’s a totalitarian, misogynist and actually also a symbol of 
hostility against men. It is simply incompatible with Danish culture and the world heritage 
that Denmark rests on. Agree? Please share.10
Unlike other posts, there was a strong pushback by visitors against this post. 
Most reactions oppose Henriksen’s statement with an equally harsh tone. They 
defend the freedom of women to choose what to wear and relate the idea to totali-
tarianism, fascism, and even Nazism. The DF is accused of focusing on an issue of 
little importance.11 This indicates the presence of a growing counter-movement to 
radical ideas in the Danish blogosphere.
2.7  Analysis of the Blogosphere in Sweden
The welfare state requires cultural conformism to distribute resources evenly in the 
population, indicative of the corroding effects of migration. In one entry on a recent 
proposal on enhancing social cohesion in the local community, it is apparent that 
Therese Borg and the SD would like to enhance the integration of citizens in the 
national community. The ambition is hampered by the fact that the society cannot 
guarantee support for its native citizens, and the non-natives are either culturally 
alienated or alienated in terms of welfare (or both) from the rest of the society12 
(Borg 09 November 2011). According to her, the reason is “mass immigration”. 
Native pensioners and the poor should be helped before we help “the others”; hence, 
we need to maintain stable welfare institutions in the national community.
9 h t tps : / /www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos /a .1607823059490287/ 
2138790309726890/?type=3&theater
10 h t tps : / /www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a .1607823059490287/ 
2282498652022721/?type=3&theater
11 h t tps : / /www.facebook.com/1604502423155684/photos/a .1607823059490287/ 
2282498652022721/?type=3&theater
12 https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/som-man-fragar-far-man-svar/
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In the lines of argumentation, the conventional discourse is that natives should be 
helped first (pensioners and the poor). The SD has brought this to the forefront of 
politics many times. In Borg’s view, many are waking up, albeit slowly, to the notion 
that they had been clinging on to idealistic dreams13 (Borg 12 June 2011). 
Immigration costs the society more money than it is actually worth. In order to 
maintain trust in the welfare institutions, society cannot sponsor divergent cultural 
practices. In a discussion on boys’ circumcision, associations are made between 
other cultures and the mistreatment of boys. In a blog entry comment, B.A. (anony-
mized) says, “this hatred cannot be ignored, neither can the violence. In our rough-
est city districts such as Rosengård, Rinkeby, and Lövgärdet, Bagdad-style gang 
culture is alive”14 (Borg 22 November 2011).
The alleged crisis of the welfare state is a recurrent topic. Statements are made 
about local health center closures, while those higher up in the hierarchy misuse 
money. Many blog posts are concerned with welfare cuts, criticizing welfare money 
being spent on illegal immigrants instead. Poor students (who are deemed most 
deserving of help) are pitted against illegal immigrants (who are deemed not enti-
tled to welfare privileges). Much space is devoted by Borg to the SD proposal for 
estimating the costs of multiculturalism. The conventional discourse is that We can-
not afford multiculturalism. The differences between cultures are explicit with those 
who comment on her blog, while the actual blog entries communicate the same 
message in line with the basic tenets of neo-racism but with slightly less vigor 
(Hellström 2016).
Other common themes in her blog entries are sexual harassment and healthcare. 
Typically, these are reports on doctors of immigrant background who offend their 
female patients15 (Borg 30 July 2011). Concerns are voiced regarding the lack of 
efficient communication between the immigrant doctor and the native patient16 
(Borg 17 May 2011; see also Edenborg Chap. 7, in this volume). The argument is 
that the immigrants lack proper language training. The political claim being made 
in that blog post is that more native doctors should be employed or trained. Such 
examples are taken as a proof that the natives and the immigrants cling to different 
gender ideologies. In another blog post, Borg stresses the need to encourage immi-
grant girls to play soccer. Replies by her readers cite, more explicitly, cultural dif-
ferences as the reason for their low participation rate17 (Borg 14 March 2012).
In her view, multiculturalism represents the opposite of solidarity and joint val-
ues. Instead of multiculturalism, Swedes must learn to appreciate their own culture. 
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among different sections in society, rather it must be framed as one national cul-
ture”. Governmental policies are harshly criticized. It is alleged that Sweden is run 
by a coalition of bourgeois parties with an elitist view on culture. Instead of pro-
vocative art, cultural politics should be about cherishing what native culture has 
created through generations and what the common man appreciates18 (Borg 9 
November 2011).
Several blog posts are about the exhibition “Thou Ancient, Thou Free”, the de 
facto Swedish national anthem (Du gamla du fria), concerning Swedish culture, 
curated by the Eskilstuna Museum. In this discussion, the most prevalent opinion 
was that celebrating midsummer is more Swedish than celebrating Ramadan. Borg 
suggested that most of the Swedish population agrees on this point19 (Borg 25 
February 2011). The conventional discourse thus says that “Our common cultural 
heritage is important to recognize”.
2.8  Conclusions
Our analysis has revealed that the discourses on immigration, culture, and welfare 
and their embedded meanings in Denmark and Sweden share some similarities, and 
certainly, some important differences as well. They are similar in that they both 
emphasize the importance of culture for societal cohesion and the sustainability of 
the welfare state in insecure times. However, they differ in that assimilation is a 
mainstream policy in Denmark but not to the same extent in Sweden, as illustrated 
in the following Table 2.1.
To argue for assimilation is accepted wisdom in Denmark, while in Sweden, the 
focal point is on multiculturalism. The borders of normality are not the same. 
Politicians in Sweden have been preoccupied with practical concerns regarding day- 
to- day access to cultural goods. Although they show concern about the negative 
effects of social fragmentation, this is to a lesser extent than their Danish counter-
parts. While in Denmark, ethnocultural diversity is seen as antithetic to social cohe-
sion across the political landscape, in Sweden, opinions vary along ideological 
lines. However, when the refugee crisis struck in autumn 2015, Sweden’s immigra-
tion policy became more restrictive and less generous: Border controls on the 
Öresund Bridge were introduced and asylum rights were lowered to the EU minimal 
requirements (Law 2016: 752). Nevertheless, this has not dented Sweden’s reputa-
tion as a generous country for refugees, alongside Germany. This is because, 
although Sweden has restricted its immigration policy, it has not changed its inte-
gration policy to a significant extent and the changes are not seen on the ground.
The conventional discourse among established parties in Denmark is accentuated 
in the blogosphere. Online strategies correlate with mainstream policies; for 
18 https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/som-man-fragar-far-man-svar/
19 https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/2011/02/25/du-gamla-du-fria/
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example, the argument that society cannot afford multiculturalism is explicit and 
sometimes expressed in vulgar terms. Also, the claim that the promotion of ethno-
cultural diversity can counter patriarchy or racism is ridiculed. The same goes for 
the recognition of minority groups’ rights. Conversely, these expressions rest on the 
notion of a fixed national heritage in need of urgent preservation, and the revaloriza-
tion of the national culture is considered a powerful response. This is manifest in the 
implementation of cultural and normative canons, and similar expressions are found 
in the Swedish blogosphere. However, our examination shows that what is tacitly 
agreed upon in mainstream Danish politics is widely contested in Swedish politics. 
Only time will reveal the right and probable path ahead.
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Chapter 3
The Discursive Denial of Racism 
by Finnish Populist Radical Right 




The European Union has experienced turbulent times lately: it is being abandoned 
by Britain, one of its members since 1973; it has received more than one million 
refugees and asylum-seekers from war-laden countries in the Middle-East and 
Africa; and it has experienced multiple attacks of brutal terrorism. Concomitantly, 
so-called “established” political parties have seen their positions threatened by radi-
cal right wing political parties that have managed to appeal to the electorates with 
promises of a return to a nostalgic past of national and cultural unity and safety.
This chapter will look at one consequence of these happenings by delving into 
the context of Finland, in Europe’s Northeastern corner. The background of this 
study may be traced back to the autumn of 2015 when, due to the “refugee crisis”, 
Finland received more than 32,000 asylum-applications  – a number ten times 
greater than during previous years. Like elsewhere in Europe, the Finnish public 
and political debate hardened, and hate-speech and hate-related crime rates rose 
with more than 50% during that year (Tihveräinen 2015). In the majority of cases, 
the hatred was directed at a particular group: Muslims.
Unlike many other European countries Finland, however, did not see a sudden 
rise in electoral support for populist radical right parties. The reason is simple: it had 
already happened. The Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset/Sannfinländarna) had risen 
from a marginal to a major political actor already through their remarkable triumph 
in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary elections. The success continued in the subse-
quent 2015 elections, when the party entered the national government for the first 
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time. Thus, and even though the Finns Party had and still would manage to harden 
the Finnish asylum-policy, the party was regarded responsible for the management 
of the 2015 crisis, and consequently saw its voters abandon it.
The Finns Party was never a unanimously xenophobic party, but rather, it was 
divided into two camps. Its “moderate” faction, led by the party’s popular and char-
ismatic leader Timo Soini, carried on the legacy of its predecessor the Finnish Rural 
Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue/Finlands landsbygdsparti), claiming to stand up 
for the “vulnerable”, ordinary people. Its more radical faction, championed by the 
internationally (in)famous Jussi Halla-aho, was outspokenly hostile towards immi-
gration and multiculturalism in general, and the influence of Islam, in particular, and 
set a “return” to a homogeneous nation-state at the forefront of the party’s agenda. 
In June 2017 the Finns Party elected Halla-aho as party-leader, with the conse-
quence that the party split into two: the Halla-aho-led Finns Party, on the one hand, 
and the “Soini-faithful” Blue Future (Sininen tulevaisuus/Blå framtid), on the other.
During the twenty-first century, members of Halla-aho’s faction of the Finns 
Party have been involved in racist scandals, and many have been charged and con-
victed of criminal hate-speech against Muslims (Finnish Broadcasting Company 
2017). The Finns Party leadership had long been in an uncomfortable position in 
terms of how to handle such cases: on the one hand, it had to maintain its distance 
from racist crimes, but on the other, it had to keep satisfied the significant proportion 
of its supporters that voted precisely for the party’s radical members (Horsti 2015). 
When responding to accusations of racism in the media, the party displayed an 
ambivalent stance on racism, combining submissive and confrontational strategies, 
thus striving to please their moderate as well as their radical voters (Hatakka et al. 
2017; Norocel et al. 2018).
The present chapter approaches the intriguing position of the Finns Party (at the 
time it was still one unified party) and racist hate-speech, by looking at how three of 
its members who were prosecuted for hate-speech against Muslims during the “ref-
ugee crisis” accounted for their actions. Analyzing the Facebook-accounts of these 
politicians, this chapter asks whether and how they sought to deny that they had 
incited to racial hatred. In so doing, it pays special attention to the ways in which the 
concepts of hope and nostalgia, on the one hand, and arguments related to Finnish 
culture and welfare, on the other, are used as discursive resources in these accounts.
3.2  The Denial of Racism in Radical Right Political Rhetoric
Social scientific research has paid considerable attention to the topic of discursive 
denials of racism. In her analyses of a television interview with the Austrian radical 
right Freedom Party leader H. C. Strache’s talk about an anti-Semitic caricature he 
had posted on his Facebook page, Ruth Wodak (2015) identified four strategies 
whereby Strache sought to deny that his post was anti-Semitic. These ways of 
racism- denial involved, first, the argument that since he had Israeli friends of his 
own, he cannot be anti-Semitic; second, the shifting of blame to others through 
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claims that someone else had distorted the original caricature; third, an “act-denial”, 
that is, the denial that the caricature actually contained visible references to Jews; 
and fourth, that the accusations against him were actually the product of a witch- 
hunt on behalf of a conspiracy of political antagonists. As Wodak shows, these strat-
egies fulfilled their purpose efficiently, as they distracted attention away from the 
topic of anti-Semitism, and as Strache was, in the end, freed of charges.
Research on anti-immigration political rhetoric in various country-contexts has 
identified rhetorical strategies that aim to protect the speaker from charges of hold-
ing racist views (see, Augoustinos and Every 2007; Billig 1988; Capdevila and 
Callaghan 2008). Because of societal taboos against blatant expressions of preju-
dice (Billig 1988), politicians are forced to come up with means of formulating 
views that are hostile towards ethnic or cultural minorities in ways that nevertheless 
allow the speakers to appear rational and non-biased.
As the example of Strache illustrates, self-defensive discursive strategies (van 
Dijk 1993) that protect the speaker from accusations of holding racist views are of 
crucial importance in the context of politics, where arguments are expressed pre-
cisely in order for the speaker to come across as trustworthy and informed, and for 
the sake of persuading potential voters. A classic rhetorical strategy is to disclaim 
racism by preceding negative views against immigrants or minorities with state-
ments like “I am not racist, but…” (van Dijk 1992). As research for example in the 
UK (Goodman and Johnson 2014; Wood and Finlay 2008), France (van Dijk 1993) 
and Sweden and Finland (Sakki and Pettersson 2016) has shown, such denials of 
racism may become by further extension reversals thereof (van Dijk 1993). This 
entails that the speaker accuses immigrants and minorities of racism towards the 
majority population; or political antagonists  – typically left-wingers  – of having 
abandoned “the people” in favor of multicultural agendas, thus de facto succumbing 
to racism towards this people. Not only does such talk allow the speakers to deny 
and reverse racism, but also to rhetorically position themselves as “protectors” of 
and speaking on behalf of this “forsaken people”, and providing them hope amidst 
the alleged threats of multiculturalism and immigrants.
Further self-defensive discursive strategies include those that seek to give a “fac-
tual”, objective connotation to the given arguments. This can be done, for example, 
through empiricist discourse (Potter 1996) that establishes the nature of a claim as 
based upon external facts, rather than (potentially biased) personal convictions. 
Radical right politicians oftentimes refer to “common-sense knowledge” (Billig 
1987; Capdevila and Callaghan 2008; Lynn and Lea 2003), to external “facts” and 
prevailing consensus (Augoustinos et al. 2002; Potter 1996; Verkuyten 2001), or to 
factors unrelated to issues of race and ethnicity, such as economic ones (Augoustinos 
et al. 1999) when justifying negative stances towards immigrants and ethnic minori-
ties. Resistance to immigration may, for example, be warranted by depicting immi-
grants and asylum-seekers as entailing an excessive strain on society or exploiting 
the welfare system (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, Hellström and Tawat Chap. 
2 in this volume; Hellström and Pettersson 2020; Mudde 2007; Pettersson 2017).
Another central feature of contemporary radical right political rhetoric is its de- 
racialization (Augoustinos and Every 2007), that is, the discursive removal of 
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notions of race from this rhetoric. In such talk, rather than attributing positive versus 
negative features to different groups of people based upon their race, discriminatory 
practices towards immigrants or minorities can be warranted through arguments 
related to the nation (Reicher and Hopkins 2001; Wodak and van Dijk 2000) or to 
cultural differences (Every and Augoustinos 2007; Richardson and Colombo 2014; 
Verkuyten 2013). The speaker may appeal to the protection of national borders and 
preservation of a national identity of “the people” (van Dijk 1993; Wodak and van 
Dijk 2000) in order to justify restrictions on immigration and asylum-seeking. As is 
discussed throughout this book, such nationalist political rhetoric has surged in 
Europe since the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis.
Discourses where notions of race are replaced with references to cultural incom-
patibilities are illustrative of contemporary anti-Islamic discourse, where a juxtapo-
sition is created between the “liberal, tolerant and democratic” Western, Christian or 
European cultures, on the one hand, and the “oppressive, intolerant and authoritar-
ian” Islam, on the other. Such cultural essentialist discourse implies that since these 
differences are inherent, essential characteristics of cultures, they cannot be over-
come, thus the co-existence of Western and Islamic values is by default impossible 
(Verkuyten 2013). This kind of talk allows the speakers to dodge accusations of 
racism or intolerance, first, because they may thus place themselves as explicit 
defenders of benevolent, liberal values (Wetherell and Potter 1992), and second, 
because criticism is directed at an abstract target: at Islam as a culture and ideology, 
not at individual Muslims (Richardson and Colombo 2014; Verkuyten 2013; Wood 
and Finlay 2008).
Taken together, the self-defensive discursive strategies described above, and the 
replacement of notions of race with talk of national protection and cultural differ-
ences, serve to construct the speaker as informed, logical and unbiased, and immi-
grants and asylum-seekers as deviant, inferior and/or undeserving Others (Capdevila 
and Callaghan 2008; van Dijk 1993). To further consolidate this positive self- 
presentation, the speakers may present themselves as representing “the common 
people” (Mudde 2007; Pettersson 2017; Rapley 1998), protecting them and their 
rights from external (or internal) threats. As discussed above, the “other”, that is, 
political antagonists, in turn, becomes accused of racism and elitism, and of having 
abandoned the nation and its “rightful” people in favor of immigrants and nefarious 
multicultural projects (see also Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume). Such “us and them” 
constructions and switching of the racist label may serve particularly efficiently to 
portray the self as virtuous and the other as evil.
The majority of discursive work on radical right and racist political rhetoric has 
focused on its occurrence on party websites, in political speeches and programs, and 
traditional media outlets such as newspapers or television. Although the list of 
exceptions is growing (Burke and Goodman 2012; Pettersson and Sakki 2017) there 
is still a shortage of discursive research exploring radical right discourse within the 
sphere of the social media. Given the importance that this sphere has played for the 
electoral fortunes of the radical right, not least in the Nordic region (Hatakka 2017; 
Horsti 2015; Keskinen 2013) this is a topic that arguably needs attention. Utilizing 
radical right politicians’ writings in the social media as empirical material entails 
K. Pettersson
39
distinct benefits: unlike in the case of interviews, this sort of “naturally occurring” 
material allows the researcher to analyze discourse that the politicians have pro-
duced independently, without the involvement of journalists or researchers (Potter 
and Hepburn 2005). Studying politicians’ writings in social media channels also 
makes it possible to analyze discourse that connects the politicians with their read-
ership, and that thus constitutes an important vehicle for politicians to engage pre-
sumptive voters into political participation and debate (Baumer et  al. 2011; 
Pettersson 2017).
This chapter aims to build upon the stream of research outlined above by explor-
ing the ways in which three Finns Party politicians prosecuted for hate-speech 
against Muslims seek in their Facebook accounts to deny their guilt of racist hatred. 
A further aim is to relate the Finnish populist radical right politicians’ strategies of 
denying racism towards Muslims to previous research findings, especially those of 
Wodak (2015) regarding the Austrian radical right party leader’s denials of anti- 
Semitism, hoping that such a comparison may inform us about the context and type- 
specific versus global character of racism denials.
The chapter approaches the topic relying on work in critical discursive psychol-
ogy (CDP) (Edley 2001; Wetherell 1998). The approach has its roots in the social 
constructionist paradigm (Burr 2003; Gergen 2009), which views reality as continu-
ously constructed by human beings in social contexts and through social practices. 
CDP is a research approach that draws inspiration from both discursive (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987) and rhetorical (Billig 1987) psychology. CDP views the concept of 
discourse as a production of its historical and societal contexts (Edley 2001), as well 
as of its particular argumentative context, that is, it pays attention to the alternative 
views that the discourse is arguing against (Billig 1987). Moreover, the perspective 
takes into account the social and political consequences that the discursive patterns 
might have (Wetherell 1998). Thus, CDP allows for the critical examination of dis-
course at both an immediate argumentative and a broader societal level. I find the 
approach particularly useful for the purposes of the present study: to explore the 
rhetorical means whereby the Finns Party politicians accused of racist hate-speech 
sought to deny these accusations, and, finally, what these denials aimed to achieve 
in a social and political sense.
3.2.1  The Present Cases
The Finnish constitution does not recognize hate-speech as such as a criminal act, 
but persons found guilty of incitement to racial hatred or breach of the sanctity of 
religion may be punished with a fine or prison sentence of up to 2  years, and 
6 months, respectively (Finnish Criminal Code Chapter 11, Sections 10–11). At the 
time of writing, since 2004 forty-two people had been charged with such criminal 
hate-speech (Finnish Broadcasting Company 2017). Six of these, that is, one in 
seven, had been members of the Finns Party. This chapter explores three such cases 
that received massive public and media attention: those of Terhi Kiemunki, Teuvo 
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Hakkarainen and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Terhi Kiemunki was at the time of her case 
head of the Finns Party local branch in Tampere, Finland’s third biggest city, and 
assistant to a party Member of Parliament (MP). Kiemunki had already been pub-
licly criticized because of her blog-writing comparing Muslim girls to witches. 
Hakkarainen is an MP, well known for his radical statements and involvement in 
racist scandals. In turn, Tynkkynen is the (now former) president of the Finns Party 
Youth organization, a very active and similarly radical political debater, who has 
become known not only for his severe criticism of Islam, but also for his vocal dis-
approval of the Finns Party’s previous leadership.1
The three politicians were charged for their writings about Muslims in the social 
media – on Facebook in the case of Hakkarainen and Tynkkynen, and in her blog in 
the case of Kiemunki. Hakkarainen and Tynkkynen wrote their statements in July 
2016, shortly after the terrorist attack in Nice, where a man of North-African origin 
drove a truck into a crowd, killing 86 people. Hakkarainen was charged with incite-
ment to racial hatred because of his writings claiming: “not all Muslims are terror-
ists, but all terrorists are Muslim”. Tynkkynen had compared the prophet Mohammed 
to a monster and called for the “return-mill” to start turning and removing all 
Muslims from Finland. The court found him guilty incitement to racial hatred and 
breach of the sanctity of religion. Kiemunki had been sentenced for incitement to 
racial hatred because of her blog-entry written in March 2016, where she had drawn 
an image of a future Finland where women and children are raped, “heathens” killed 
and mosques erected because of an Islamic invasion. None of the three politicians 
were expelled from the Finns Party because of their sentences,2 despite the then- 
party- leader Timo Soini’s earlier promise that this would be the fate of any member 
who engages in racist activities.
3.2.2  Material and Method
The material for this study consists of Facebook-entries by Kiemunki, Hakkarainen 
and Tynkkynen during the months following their statements that had rendered 
them convicted of criminal hate-speech. The time-period stretches from March 
2016 to February 2017, covering the time preceding, during, and following the poli-
ticians’ trials. I selected the accounts for analysis on the basis that they involved the 
topic of hate-speech, racism and/or the politicians’ individual cases, ending up with 
38 accounts. Given the study’s critical discursive psychological approach that com-
bines both “micro” and “macro” perspectives on discourse, I went beyond the 
1 In the 2019 Finnish national parliamentary elections, Tynkkynen gained a seat in parliament. Later 
that year, he was again prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred.
2 In February 2017, well after her involvement in the racist scandals, Kiemunki was expelled from 
the Finns Party, officially because of her “unclear financial affairs”. However, Kiemunki continued 
her political activities in the party at local level. Tynkkynen and Hakkarainen have remained within 
Halla-aho’s Finns Party since the party split in June 2017.
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 material when conducting my analyses, taking into account the potential counter-
arguments that the politicians sought to argue against in their discourse (Billig 1987).
My analytical procedure involved three distinct, yet intertwined stages  (see: 
Sakki and Pettersson 2016). First, I thoroughly read the material multiple times in 
order to identify the consistency and variability within and between accounts in the 
material (Potter and Wetherell 1987). In accordance with my research interest, the 
patterns I sought for were the ways in which the politicians talked about racism in 
their Facebook-accounts. I paid special attention to the accounts wherein the politi-
cians constructed their own positions vis-à-vis racism, distancing themselves from 
it. Second, I set out to explore in detail how these different versions of racist hate- 
speech and the concomitant denials thereof were constructed. Here, I relied on the 
analytical toolkit of discursive (Potter 1996; Potter and Wetherell 1987) and rhe-
torical (Billig 1987, 1988) psychology, striving to identify the discursive and rhe-
torical strategies that the politicians utilized in their denials of racism. Third, 
acknowledging that individuals in general – and politicians in particular – strive 
with their rhetoric to achieve certain actions (Billig 1987; Potter 1996), I analyzed 
the Facebook-accounts as part of their argumentative contexts. This entailed taking 
into account the broader social and political debate that the accounts sought to par-
ticipate in, and importantly, what counter-positions they sought to refute. This stage 
involved the critical evaluation of what the politicians’ discourse about racism 
might achieve in a social and political sense.
3.3  Analysis: Four Ways of Denying Racist Hatred
Through my analyses of the politicians’ Facebook accounts I identified four domi-
nant ways in which the speakers sought to defend themselves against accusations of 
racist hate-speech. Through providing illustrative examples, I aim in the detailed 
analyses below to demonstrate the intricate rhetorical ways in which the politicians 
accomplished these self-defenses.
3.3.1  Empiricist Discourse: “Facts, Common Sense”
The first way in which the politicians sought to deny that their statements about 
Muslims had been racist was to describe them, not as personal opinions, but as 
undisputable “facts”, as in the first two extracts below wherein Kiemunki (explic-
itly) and Tynkkynen (implicitly) discuss their respective cases:
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Next Thursday the District Court will give its view on whether this text 
is criminal hate-speech. If the District Court sees that it is, I will take 
the matter to the Court of Appeal. During these current times, each of 
you can think about: can the truth be condemned?  











In Finland serious security-problems and the warranted concerns they 
cause among the citizens are dealt with through empty words, by 
encouraging children to denounce their parents’ wrong kind of talk, 
and by bringing FB-accounts to court.
That is not the right way. It is an untenable way, where the true 
problem is ignored and thereafter censored. Now I won’t speak of 
those true problems, because the nice-speech network has been 
intelligent enough to manage to define a price and criminal label for 
the expression of opinions. Next time I have money I will talk about 
those real problems that should be dealt with.  
In both extracts above, the speakers exploit what Potter (1996) has called an empiri-
cist repertoire: they present their claims as based upon objectively and collectively 
recognized matter-of-facts, rather than on any personal, potentially biased opinions. 
In Extract 3.1, the speaker uses factual language, maintaining that her writings had 
merely stated the truth (line 4). This claim is phrased in the form of a rhetorical 
question directed at the readership, which in the present context allows the politi-
cian’s discursive self-defense to become co-constructed together with the readers. 
As has been shown elsewhere (Pettersson and Sakki 2017; Sakki and Pettersson 
2016) this kind of collaborative talk is a specific affordance of the social media (e.g., 
blogs and Facebook) that allows politicians to increase a sense of mutual under-
standing and togetherness with the readership.
Extract 3.2 was written by Tynkkynen after he had received his sentence. He 
constructs his writings as statements of “true problems”. Through consensual for-
mulations (1–2) he depicts these problems as widely recognized concerns among 
the Finnish people, warranting why they should be discussed and dealt with. 
Tynkkynen accuses the “nice-speech network”,3 that is, those who support his sen-
tence, of having done their utmost to silence voices of truth like his own (7–10), thus 
constructing these antagonists as unjust and himself as unjustly treated. Furthermore, 
we can see that Tynkkynen uses his sentence (a fine) as a self-defensive discursive 
tool: through an ironic and martyred tone, he concludes that he cannot this time 
afford to comment upon the “true problems”; that is, the alleged threat that Muslims 
3 In Finnish, the word “kivapuhe” is an anagram of the word for hate-speech, “vihapuhe”. This 
word was launched by the Finnish police as part of their campaign to combat hate-speech and is 
here ironically referred to by Tynkkynen.
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entail to Finland (9–10), a formulation that consolidates his position as an innocent 
martyr and truth-teller.
To summarize, in displaying the politicians’ statements as mere descriptions of 
undisputable facts and common-sense (Billig 1987), the empiricist repertoire in 
Extracts 3.1 and 3.2 above protects the politicians from charges of holding preju-
diced views, and thus, serve to deny that the writings reveal any racist intentions. 
Put differently, it creates the impression that their sentences had been highly 
unwarranted.
3.3.2  Narrative and Gerrymandering the Terrain: “Own Black 
Friends”
A second way in which the politicians sought to distance themselves from racism 
was by referring to their own black friends. This discourse echoes that demonstrated 
by Wodak (2015) in her analyses of Strache’s denials of anti-Semitism, as illustrated 
in Extract 3.3 below:





From my perspective people coming to our country wanting death
penalty for homosexuals is no “who cares” issue. It is also not a 
question of skin-color, since as I have noted before, my best friend has 
dark skin.  
In this extract, the politician discusses his upcoming trial, and accounts for his 
motivations for the statements about Muslims for which he was sentenced. Earlier 
in the Facebook-entry from which this extract derives, Tynkkynen had mentioned 
his own bisexuality, an identity he often makes explicit when publicly warranting 
his suspicion of Islamic ideology that, according to Tynkkynen, entails a lethal dan-
ger to sexual minority members. In the present context, indeed, through construct-
ing his own previous statements against Muslims as the worries of a vulnerable 
minority-group member (1–2), such statements seem much better founded. Further, 
Tynkkynen chooses to refer to his own black friend as “living proof” of the impos-
sibility of him being racist: a racist person could not, the reasoning goes, have black 
friends of his own. The extract above provides an illustrative example of how racism 
can be denied through a personal narrative that strategically gerrymanders the dis-
cursive terrain (Potter 1996), that is, that carefully selects which aspects of the self 
to emphasize and which ones to leave out in order to draw attention away from the 
topic of hate-speech against Muslims. In this way, Tynkkynen is able to construct 
his statements as the legitimate worries of a threatened minority-member with a 
multiracial friend group, not those of a radical right politician that actively resists 
the presence of Muslims in Finland.
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3.3.3  Discursive Deracialization: Talk About Culture 
and the Nation
In line with what research on the discursive deracialization of radical right political 
rhetoric has shown, contemporary Islamophobic statements are typically warranted 
through depicting Islam and Christian or “Western” values as inherently incompat-
ible (Verkuyten 2013). Indeed, the politicians in the present study exploited such 
talk of cultural differences in order to warrant their anti-Muslim views, as illustrated 
in Extracts 3.4 and 3.5 below:




Islamists don’t accept the festivities of us infidels. This is again an 
indication of how much they value and respect our Western way of life. 
Is it hate-speech if one expresses one’s opinion about their actions?  








Hate-speech and incitement or not, one cannot keep silent about these 
things [referring to a case in which a man of Iraqi origin was suspected 
of rape of a Finnish woman]. I’ll bombard, until I hit. In some countries, 
a woman’s life is not worth as much as a man’s. Here in Oulu [speaker’s 
home city] our women become the victims of the horrendous 
multicultural experiment. Islam and respect for women fit very poorly 
together.  
In Extracts 3.4 and 3.5 above, the speakers draw an image of Islam as not only 
incompatible with, but in fact threatening to “our way of life”, due to its implied 
inherent violent (Extract 3.4) and misogynist (Extract 3.5) nature. Extract 3.4 was 
written shortly after the terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, when a man of 
Tunisian origin drove a truck into a Christmas market, killing twelve people. The 
speaker uses this example to justify his claim that critique of Islam must be allowed. 
In this extract – as in the statement that caused his sentence – Hakkarainen smoothly 
places radical Islamists and Muslims in the same category. This serves to homoge-
nize the violent behavior of terrorists to represent a threat posed by the entire 
Muslim community, thus discursively warranting and deracializing criticism of the 
latter group (Sakki and Pettersson 2016; Wood and Finlay 2008). Moreover, and 
resembling Extract 3.1 above, the speaker uses a rhetorical question (3) through 
which the meaning of the message becomes constructed together with his reader-
ship (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).
The speaker in Extract 3.5, in turn, uses another classic version of cultural essen-
tialist discourse: he claims that Islam is inherently oppressive of women, and should 
therefore be resisted (see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this volume). The speaker 
makes use of metaphorical language, emphasizing that regardless of the personal 
risk involved (1), he will continue his “bombardment” of Islam (3) in order to 
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 protect “our” women from the dangers of multiculturalism, expressed through the 
extreme-case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) “horrendous”. As previous research 
(Mols and Jetten 2014) has shown, metaphors of struggle and battle between liberal, 
democratic values, on the one hand, and authoritarian ones, on the other, may serve 
to create an air of urgency and threat, emphasizing the need to protect the vulnerable 
in-group from the dangerous out-group. In this way, the politician manages to pres-
ent himself as a true and brave defendant of women’s rights; in contrast to Islam, 
and implicitly, in contrast to those who favor multiculturalism (Keskinen 2013). 
This leads me to the final way in which the politicians in this study sought to deny 
racism: through reversing it.
3.3.4  The Reversal of Racism
As Teun van Dijk (1993) has proposed, perhaps the strongest way of denying racism 
is to “reverse” it by accusing “the other” of racism. An illustrative example of such 
discourse is provided in Extract 3.6 below by Kiemunki:








What makes a person become as full of hatred and bad feelings as the 
so-called “anti-racists” and the “tolerant” seem to be? Someday, when 
I have time, I will make a collage of texts that I myself would call hate-
speech. It has never occurred to me to use such language about anyone, 
and I hope these people won’t be met with hatred, because they rather 
need instant help to get rid of their tormenting emotions and 
misanthropy.  
In the extract above, in order to remove her guilt of racist hate-speech, Kiemunki 
refers to cases that, in her own view, fulfil the criteria of such speech. Stating that 
she will make a collage of these statements (3–4), Kiemunki makes a discursive 
maximization (Potter 1996), implying that these accusations exist en masse. 
Through a contrast structure (Gill 2000/2010) between such and her own language 
(4–6) the politician manages to construct herself as truly innocent, in contrast to the 
“opponents of racism” and the “tolerant” that, ergo, are practicing racist hate-speech 
on a regular basis. In the context of (radical right) politics the strategy of reversing 
racism is especially powerful, as it removes the racist label commonly attached to 
the politician’s own party and instead attaches it to their political opponents, whose 
alleged “anti-racism” thus becomes discursively rebutted (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).
Before finishing with some concluding remarks, let us turn to one final example, 
written by the same politician as in Extract 3.6 above. As we shall see, the extract 
below provides a conglomerate of the ways of denying racism outlined above, and 
adds further dimensions to them:
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Those living in the red-green bubble and calling themselves tolerant 
label people racist when they imagine that they don’t tolerate or that 
they even hate every person who has even a partial foreign background 
or darker skin-color. Maybe such people exist, but I have not met a 
single one. For most people, including myself, it is a matter of (a) an
intolerant and oppressive religion and culture that I don’t want to get 
power, (b) young men who invade the country on false and wrong
grounds, and ruthlessly abuse our social system, demanding and 
complaining, (c) the financial situation of our country and the fact that
we cannot even take care of our own weakest ones, and instead take 
debts that coming generations will pay, and that we now use to provide 
a living for impostors who leave the truly distressed – children, elderly 
people and women – in the midst of war, (d) the Europe-wide security-
threat, terrorism, violent criminality and rapes.  
The speaker in Extract 3.7 begins her statement with a powerful reversal of rac-
ism (van Dijk 1993), wherein she accuses the “allegedly tolerant people”, meta-
phorically living in a red-green bubble (line 1) of irrationality (line 2) and anti-white 
hatred and discrimination (see Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume; Sakki and Pettersson 
2016; Wood and Finlay 2008). The politician implicitly includes herself in this vic-
timized category, whose innocence she insists upon by emphasizing that she has 
never even met a racist person (4). In what follows, the politician discursively denies 
racism through cultural essentialist arguments (5–6) (Verkuyten 2013) and categori-
cal generalizations (Every and Augoustinos 2007) about Muslims (7–9) and Islam 
entailing a threat to Finnish and European security (13–14). Further, the speaker 
draws upon a common stereotype in radical right discourse, referring to immigrants 
and asylum-seekers as a homogeneous category of “bogus” young men, who are 
only here to exploit the system (Norocel et al. 2018; Pettersson and Sakki 2017).
An explicit juxtaposition is made between “our people”, the vulnerable, and 
these “external intruders”, who are acting as parasites upon the Finnish welfare 
system and economic resources that, the politician contends, should be reserved for 
the Finnish people alone. Such welfare-chauvinist stances are indeed a common 
feature of radical right discourse (see Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, Hellström and 
Tawat Chap. 2 in this volume; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016; Sakki and Pettersson 
2016) that allows the politicians to position themselves as speaking “on behalf of 
the people”, thus downplaying racist intentions when proposing discriminatory 
practices against “outsiders”. The speaker presents her arguments in the pseudo- 
scientific form of an abcd-list, and as widely shared (5), allowing her to come across 
as reasonable and informed (Potter 1996). Throughout this extract, the vast use of 
extreme-case formulations (Pomerantz 1986) such as “even hate every person” (3) 
and “ruthlessly abuse” (8), a rhetorically powerful dichotomy is created between the 
allegedly vulnerable, honest and non-racist “us”, the Finns, on the one hand, and 
“them”, political antagonists, on the other, who by engaging in anti-white racism 
and sanctioning the intrusion of the “dangerous and oppressive” Islam into Finland, 
K. Pettersson
47
entails the true threat to the Finnish nation and its people. Having thus removed the 
racist label and attached it to her antagonists, the politician is able to claim the posi-
tion of the true protector of the Finnish people and identity.
3.4  Conclusions
As demonstrated in the above analyses of the three Finns Party politicians’ 
Facebook-entries, these politicians went through extensive rhetorical work in order 
to deny their guilt of racist hate-speech against Muslims. The analysis showed that 
the politicians did so in four distinct ways: first, through constructing their state-
ments as the mere displaying of undisputable facts and common-sense (Billig 
1987); second, through personal narratives and ontological gerrymandering (Potter 
1996) that acted as “proof” of the politician’s non-racist disposition; third, through 
transferring the discussion from issues about race to concern matters of cultural 
threats (Verkuyten 2013); and, fourth, through reversing racism to the politicians’ 
political antagonists (van Dijk 1993). As Extract 3.7 showed, these strategies of rac-
ism denial were by no means isolated patterns, but could intermingle in the politi-
cians’ discourse, and be further strengthened by economic (Augoustinos et al. 1999) 
and welfare-chauvinist arguments (Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016).
As in particular Extracts 3.1 and 3.4 above illustrated, the specific context of the 
social media, in this case Facebook, allows the politicians to express these denials 
in ways in which they become the joint accomplishment of the politician and the 
readership. Allowing the readers to reach the conclusion about the politicians’ inno-
cence creates an air of mutual understanding, and functions in a powerful way to 
produce a sense of “us”, the non-racist, against “them”, who falsely accuse “us” of 
racism (Sakki and Pettersson 2016).
An interesting finding of the present study is that the denials of anti-Muslim 
hate-speech studied here bear notable similarities to the denials of anti-Semitism in 
the Austrian context (Wodak 2015). Specifically, the Finns Party politicians’ 
accounts of their own black friends, and of their trials being nothing less than witch- 
hunts against them by their political opponents, echoed the rhetoric of the Austrian 
radical right party leader. Nevertheless, my findings also highlighted aspects that 
were not salient in Strache’s denials of anti-Semitism, such as the vast use of an 
empiricist repertoire (Potter 1996) and of culturally essentialist arguments. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that the discursive denial of racism may very well 
have a transnational character, regardless of the target of this racism. Yet, it also 
does seem to vary as a function of this target, and importantly, of the specific argu-
mentative context in which the denial takes place.
My analysis also indicates that the Finnish politicians’ discursive denial of racist 
hate-speech against Muslims was primarily warranted through nostalgic references 
to Finnish national identity, people and values; and claims that the hope of saving 
these rests on resisting the cultural threat posed by Islam. This finding is in line with 
previous research that has highlighted the centrality of cultural essentialist  arguments 
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in contemporary anti-Islamic (political) discourse (Richardson and Colombo 2014; 
Verkuyten 2013; Wood and Finlay 2008). Nonetheless, as the final Extract 3.7 dem-
onstrated, such appeals could very well be intertwined with arguments about pro-
tecting the Finnish welfare system against intruding and undeserving “others” 
(Sakki and Pettersson 2016). It may be that denials of anti-Muslim hate-speech 
could rely more strongly on blending culture and welfare protectionist arguments 
for instance in the context of Sweden, where the notion of the “people’s home” – the 
Swedish welfare-model – is even more heavily intertwined with constructions of an 
essential “Swedishness” in radical right political rhetoric (Hellström and Pettersson 
2020; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume; Norocel 2016; Norocel et al. 
2018). Along with the comparison between the present study and that of Wodak 
(2015) in the Austrian setting, this chapter is a reminder of the importance of exam-
ining political discourse that aims to warrant antagonistic juxtapositions between 
“us” and “them” in their specific social and historical context. Only in this manner 
may we unpack political talk whose potentially harmful consequences are con-
cealed under veils of anti-racist rhetorical formulations.
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Right-wing populist parties across Europe made significant inroads into main 
stream politics in the past couple of decades, to the point that they are actively 
involved in setting the political agenda in several countries (the Brexit vote in the 
UK, and the election of Donald Trump in the US are but two such surprising exam-
ples in this respect). Within this context, increased attention is given to the eco-
nomic dimension. This is not a new aspect in the study of right-wing populism, the 
role played by uneven socio-economic development being highlighted by scholars 
conceptualizing the effects of modernization on the rise of right-wing populism 
(Minkenberg 2000). Nonetheless, what recent research has evidenced is a clearer 
understanding that a new phenomenon labelled “welfare chauvinism” has entered 
the language and practice of right-wing populist parties. Thus, nationalist values are 
promoted to derive a preferential distribution of welfare s provision, which is exclu-
sionary on ethnic and racial grounds (see Derks 2006; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016). 
In North and Western Europe, this phenomenon manifests through an ethno-centric 
protectionist discursive framework that highlights the need to differentiate between 
the “more deserving” people, which are conceived as belonging to the ethnic major-
ity, and the undeserving “others”, those who exploit the welfare system, the 
“scroungers”, etc.  – particularly immigrants who do not belong to the national 
group. (This is not to say that more nuanced differentiations do not exist within the 
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in-group; an analysis of these distinctions, however, is beyond the scope of this 
study, see Keskinen et al. 2016).
Central and Eastern Europe is to a certain extent different in the way right-wing 
populist discourses approach the issue of welfare chauvinism, inasmuch as it dis-
plays an idiosyncratic pattern. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolically 
marked the Soviet Union losing its grip onto the region, opened the opportunity for 
the accession process into the European Union (EU). This demanded of countries in 
the region to move past their “communist legacy” (and the welfare principles it 
engendered), embrace economic “shock therapy” as an expedient means to adapt to 
market economy, and unquestionably follow neoliberal dogma. These steps were 
presented as part of a symbolic “return to Europe” from a previously exterior posi-
tion to the European construction, thereby confirming and consolidating these coun-
tries’ national identities as European. This notwithstanding, the countries in the 
region are primarily countries of emigration, not in small part due to the aforesaid 
economic upheavals, whose citizens that emigrated westwards have consistently 
been subjected to right-wing populist abuse in relation to welfare (among other 
things) in the countries they immigrated. Instead of seeing the emergence of some 
sense of empathy for those forced to rely on the safety net of welfare provision, a 
similarly welfare chauvinistic discourse as in North and Western Europe has devel-
oped in Central and Eastern Europe, operating largely on the same basis of ethno- 
cultural distinctions between the in-group and out-group. The main difference lies 
in the fact that oftentimes the out-group is formed of ethnic minorities who, due to 
their membership in a particular community (e.g. the Roma), were traditionally 
deemed to have a lesser status in relation to the ethnic majority in the respective 
national context. A recent addition are discriminatory discursive practices targeting 
immigrants (including based on welfare) that started to appear since 2015  in the 
context of the refugee (reception) crisis stemming out of the Syrian conflict (Mavelli 
and Wilson 2016).
It is on this basis, of difference and of alignment of right-wing populist discourse 
in Central and Eastern Europe with phenomena in North and Western Europe that 
our attention is focused on the previously underexplored phenomena of welfare 
chauvinism and emerging politics of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Put 
simply, this chapter is set to examine the interplay between ideas of national culture, 
as cues for national specificity, and welfare chauvinist proposals, aimed at restrict-
ing welfare provision to a narrowly defined ethnic group, in the context of emerging 
restrictive migration policies in right-wing populist discourses in Central and 
Eastern Europe. For this purpose, we suggest a comparative framework to account 
for the various positions that such parties occupy in national politics in the region. 
Our analysis deals with the case of a right-wing populist party as the main govern-
ing force, such as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter 
PiS) in Poland; the case of a right-wing populist party as a key opposition force, 
such as the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 
Jobbik) in Hungary; and thirdly, the case of an unsuccessful right-wing populist 
party, such as the United Romania Party (Partidul România Unită, PRU) in Romania. 
Our qualitative analysis draws on official discourses, reflective of the various 
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political strategies to acquiring power, as articulated by these parties. We chose 
2015 as a starting point for data collection because it marks the beginning of what 
has come to be referred to as the “European refugee crisis” by politicians, media, 
and researchers alike. As such, we aim to map out the various party strategies 
employed, which juxtapose appeals to protecting the cultural specificity of the eth-
nic majorities in each country and welfare chauvinist proposals, and consequently 
shed light onto the culture, welfare, and migration nexus in the Central and Eastern 
European context.
This chapter is structured in five sections. After some methodological clarifica-
tions of our approach to the empirical material, the following section provides a 
theoretical discussion that situates the concept of welfare chauvinism in the context 
of the economic concerns exacerbated by the ongoing global economic crisis, which 
started in 2008. These concerns were incorporated in a particular way by radical- 
right populist parties, drawing on claims about a racially and ethnonationally 
homogenous “people”, pitted against un-deserving “others” (be them ethnic minori-
ties or migrants). The chapter discusses then the three cases in the context of histori-
cally embedded nationalist discourses, which facilitate this incorporation of 
welfare chauvinist appeals. The following section examines the political discourses 
of each of the three parties (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). It focuses primarily on the por-
trayal of minorities as racially and culturally different groups that fail to share the 
values and work ethics of the “authentic people” represented by the ethnic majori-
ties in each country, and to advance proposals that restrict access to welfare provi-
sion on such basis. In the final part, the study draws together these findings and 
concludes by suggesting that welfare chauvinism provides right-wing populist par-
ties with an additional dimension for exclusion. It also highlights the fact that in 
Central and Eastern Europe, besides the exclusion of migrants on these grounds 
which is an aspect of more recent date (primarily emerged in the context of the 
recent refugee reception crisis), there exists another level of exclusions, unlike in 
North and Western Europe, directed at those who constitute the internal “others”.
4.1.1  Methodological Notes
We argue that the post-communist context provides a solid basis for construct equiv-
alence in this cross-national comparison (on construct equivalence, see van de 
Vijver and Leung 1997; Moors 2004). In fact, it is precisely the difference between 
the parties listed above in terms of their relevance in their respective political sys-
tems that determined their selection. When judged according to the now classic 
differentiation of parties according to their relevance in determining a party system 
(Sartori 2005), we argue, PiS and Jobbik fit into the category of relevant parties. In 
turn, at least for the time being, PRU rather fits within the irrelevant party category.
Keeping with this classification of parties in terms of their size, and more impor-
tantly political strength, PiS can arguably be considered an appropriate illustration 
of a right-wing populist party whose relevance is granted and enforced by its 
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governing or coalition potential (Sartori 2005, pp. 107–108). PiS has consolidated 
its position in Polish politics in the aftermath of 2005 parliamentary elections that 
positioned the party in the first place (26.99% of the votes) and crafted a governing 
coalition with other right of center and conservative political forces that appealed to 
“the anxieties of transition” (Stanley 2016, p. 110). These parties were the agrarian- 
populist and nationalist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO) (11.41%) and traditionalist and right-wing nationalist 
League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) (7.97%). The coalition 
agreement addressed four key areas: reforming the state; designing a firmer foreign 
policy; pursuing a moral and cultural rejuvenation; and enforcing a more socially 
sensitive economic policy (Stanley 2016, p. 119). After a setback in the 2011 elec-
tions, PiS returned to power following the 2015 elections (37.58%), securing a 
majority in the Polish parliament. It secured its position as the largest party in the 
2019 elections (43.59%), but lost control of the chambers.
In turn, Jobbik fits another criterion that positions the party as a relevant political 
force in Hungarian politics, namely its blackmail potential. This refers to the party’s 
potential to change the tactics or direction of party competition within a given polity 
(Sartori 2005, p. 108). Founded in early 2000s, Jobbik contested the first national 
elections in 2006 as part of the MIÉP-Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties (MIÉP–
Jobbik a Harmadik Út). The results were disappointing (2.2%), and Jobbik left the 
alliance. The following election cycles witnessed the significant improvement of 
Jobbik’s electoral fortunes. The party became the third political force in the after-
math of 2010 elections (14.47%) and consolidated further its position after the 2014 
elections (20.22%). After these elections, Jobbik became the main opposition force 
in part because of the center left’s political implosion (Ádám and Bozóki 2016, 
pp. 130–135). This position was confirmed in the aftermath of 2018 elections, the 
party becoming the second largest parliamentary party (19.06%). This notwith-
standing, the size itself was not the most important aspect for selecting Jobbik as a 
case of relevance. Rather, it is the party’s ability to influence the ideological posi-
tioning, strategies, and direction of the main governing force, namely the Alliance 
of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–
Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz). Indeed, there seems to be a rather ambivalent 
relationship between the two parties, both in terms of how Fidesz is presenting itself 
as the only political actor capable to prevent the right-wing populists to accede to 
power, but also in the manner in which Fidesz attempts to hamper Jobbik’s electoral 
growth by adopting growingly radical and conservative stances. At the same time, 
Jobbik claims to move towards “modern conservatism,” and a more centrist position 
(néppártosodás) (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Norocel et  al. 2017; Norocel and 
Szabó 2019; Pirro 2015; Pytlas and Kossack 2015).
Finally, the PRU falls into the category of irrelevant parties, having failed to 
secure representation in the Romanian parliament in the 2016 elections and in the 
European Parliament in the 2019 elections. Based on these performances, the party 
is unlikely to enhance its position any time soon. It is, nonetheless, reflective of the 
“phoenix populist” tendencies visible in Romania, whereby right-wing populist par-
ties tend to reemerge periodically in a partially renewed form (Soare and Tufiş 2019).
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The inclusion of the three parties in the analysis aims to offer broad spectrum 
examination of the potential welfare-chauvinist narratives have in exploiting fertile 
right-wing populist grounds in different political contexts, and function as a plat-
form for consolidation in the case of successful political parties (PiS and Jobbik), 
and for entering the political arena in the case of smaller newly-formed par-
ties (PRU).
This contribution draws on data drawn from party programs and manifestos, and 
from public statements made in electoral contexts by prominent members of the 
parties by means of a qualitative approach embedded in Political Discourse Theory 
(PDT) (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2016). The main 
focus is on the construction of the minorities as ethno-nationally and racially differ-
ent as a basis for justifying the need for restrictive welfare policies targeting these 
groups. The analysis identifies the similar patterns of exclusion that characterize the 
strategies and discourses employed by the three parties in order to articulate suc-
cessfully the nationalist and welfare nexus.
4.2  Conceptual Discussion: Nationalism 
and Welfare Chauvinism
This chapter is concerned with the modern articulation of right-wing populist ideol-
ogy, which employs nationalism as the central tenet for group membership, high-
lighting the congruence between demos and nation. The latter is presented as 
ethnically and culturally homogenous, and the idea of belonging is expressed 
through “radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion”, which pit the in-group 
against the out-group (Minkenberg 2017, p. 14). Concerning the basis for national-
ist mobilization, we draw upon modernization theory, which highlights in its 
explanatory framework for social change the role of transition from agrarian to 
industrial societies, from dynastic to popular rule, and the growing importance of 
individual autonomy and of rational thought. These prompted significant transfor-
mations with regards to social organization and made it possible for people to 
“imagine” themselves as part of larger, national communities (Anderson 1991; 
Gellner 1983). In this context, right-wing populist ideology is associated with “the 
right turn”. Already an intrinsic part of nationalist ideology (derived from its inher-
ently exclusionary articulation of the nation), the “radicalized notion of national 
homogeneity” informs the right-wing populist drive towards a nostalgic and roman-
ticized notion of regained national grandeur, traditional family values, intertwined 
with propensity to rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian charismatic male leader-
ship (Minkenberg 2017, pp. 13–16; Norocel 2013, pp. 164–178).
While these elements are useful in explaining the emergence of right-wing popu-
list ideology within the context of contemporary rejuvenation of nationalist fervor, 
to understand its mobilizing power it is necessary to add another aspect: that of 
economic cleavages generated by late modernity. Rapid and uneven social 
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transformations, accompanied by the cyclicity of crises, all constitutive elements of 
unleashed globalization, lead to large groups being left out as social and economic 
losers out of these processes. It is these people that are likely to be mobilized by the 
radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion highlighted above (Loch and Norocel 
2015; Minkenberg 2000, 2015).
The growing importance of these economic elements in the right-wing populist 
ideology has increasingly attracted scholarly attention more recently. Earlier 
research on public opinion toward immigration reform in the US (Citrin et al. 1997), 
for instance, had already evidenced high level of support for policies that condi-
tioned welfare provision for immigrants upon criteria to do with length of residency 
in the country. In the European context, then, research pointed out the nexus between 
the integration of European Union (EU) social security system, and national welfare 
policies (Martinsen 2005). The prohibition on discriminating against EU member 
states citizens in national welfare policy has become a bone of contention for those 
political forces conceiving of welfare provision as the proprietary right of the nation, 
whereby ethno-cultural and racializing criteria determine in-group membership. 
This enabled framing increasingly aggressive anti-immigration stances in economic 
terms, militating for preferential if not exclusive access to welfare provision for the 
in-group, which is conceptually labelled welfare chauvinism.
Welfare chauvinism, as a specific tenet of right-wing populist ideology in Europe 
(though it has permeated the vocabulary of mainstream parties as well), has gained 
saliency in the context of 2008 global financial crisis, and became exacerbated by 
the 2015 “refugee (reception) crisis” (Keskinen 2016; Loch and Norocel 2015; 
Norocel 2016). This notwithstanding, the use of welfare chauvinist appeals by 
right-wing populist parties has so far been mainly researched in North and Western 
European countries. This is partly understandable for two reasons. First, these coun-
tries have higher immigration levels, and the exclusionary rhetoric focusing on wel-
fare matters becomes politically expedient, as racialized out-groups are easier to 
scapegoat. Second, as it is the case particularly in Northern Europe, the welfare 
system is an important marker of national identity, which makes it a preferred target 
of right-wing populist parties (Hellström 2016; Keskinen 2016; Norocel 2016; see 
also Hellström and Tawat Chap. 2, and Pettersson Chap. 3, in this volume).
4.3  Markers of National Identity and Belonging in Poland, 
Hungary and Romania
This section provides an overview of the central themes in the wider nationalist 
discourses, which facilitate right-wing populist mobilization. What characterizes all 
three cases, we argue, is the master frame of nostalgia underpinned by fantasmatic 
restorative nationalism, which demands a return to an alleged state of moral purity 
of nationhood that can only be attained by means of safeguarding the ethnic and 
cultural purity of the nation.
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In Poland, the basis of nationalist discourse is formed by a nostalgic reinterpreta-
tion of Polish identity, which adds a mythological layer to historical events. This is 
not necessarily expressed through overt references to a homeland with clearly defin-
able boundaries. Instead, the homeland is invested a symbolic value, which enabled 
the Polish nation to survive through periods of statelessness during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and later the WWII devastations. The emphasis is thus put 
on the link between Polish ethnic identity and Catholicism, distilled in the figure of 
“Pole-Catholic” (Polak-katolik), for long perceived as a means to overcome “the 
absence of ‘national’ territorial boundaries and political sovereignty” (Zubrzycki 
2014, p. 204).
The Pole-Catholic served to confirm the ethnic superiority of Poles in interwar 
Poland, particularly in relation to the Jewish population, and to justify state- 
sanctioned anti-Semitism. In the aftermath of WWII, which witnessed genocide and 
ethnic cleansing, the borders of Poland shifted once more, though the country was 
then characterized by a much greater ethnic homogeneity than before. In the new 
context, the Pole-Catholic came to epitomize the authenticity and legitimacy of eth-
nic Poles as opposed to the illegitimate Soviet-groomed elites. The role played by 
the Catholic Church in opposing the Soviet-backed regime entrenched its position 
as a key component of the ethno-cultural landscape that defines Polish national 
identity (Stanley 2016, p. 112).
In the post-1989 context, the initially jubilant rediscovery of the European aspect 
of Polish identity, and the pursuit of EU membership have been gradually replaced 
in recent years by a critical and outright reactionary stance towards “Brussels”, a 
shorthand for the complex EU institutional architecture. The Pole-Catholic came to 
play a key role in the right-wing populist discourse of PiS, opposing a highly moral 
and ethnically pure popular majority to a Western-oriented liberal elite that enforced 
Brussels “corrosive influence” onto the Polish nation.
In Hungary, nostalgic nationalism pertains to both territorial contours, and mem-
bership in the Hungarian nation. With regards to the former, the territorial loses 
Hungary sustained following the Treaty of Trianon (1920) remain a recurring theme 
in everyday manifestations of nationalism (Korkut 2012). The contours of “Greater 
Hungary”, marking the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Austrian- 
Hungary Monarchy before WWI, are now a rather ubiquitous occurrence on car 
stickers, something that just a few years ago would have been frowned upon (Molnár 
2016, p. 174). The Hungarian irredentism linked to the territorial losses in the after-
math of WWI is also reading and reinterpreting historical episodes in a mythologi-
cal key. This aims to provide a sense of historical continuity and greatness despite 
Hungarian defeat. This is reinforced though such symbols as the mythological bird 
of prey omnipresent on coats of arms and monuments (turul), and the red and white 
stripes of the House of Árpád, the first dynastic rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary.
Closely linked to the territorial issue, the second aspect of the restorative dimen-
sion of Hungarian nationalism concerns the notion of kin-state responsibility 
towards the recognition and protection of the cultural identity of Hungarian minori-
ties that in the post-Trianon context found themselves outside Hungarian borders. 
Indeed, significant Hungarian minorities are present in the neighboring countries, 
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particularly in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; 
Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Udrea 2014).
The nostalgic revisionist-revivalist issue, which incorporates both the physical 
territorial aspect, and membership into the ethno-cultural nation irrespective of the 
borders, is accompanied by a religious grounding for belonging in the traditional 
Christian Churches, namely the Catholic Church and the Hungarian Calvinist 
Church. This combination brings about another central marker of the articulation of 
Hungarian national identity: fantasmatic anti-modernism. This manifests specifi-
cally in anti-EU feelings and more broadly in the belief that Hungary needs to turn 
its back on Europe’s decadence, and instead recover its former glory, a view which 
is shared by both Fidesz and Jobbik (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Krekó and Mayer 
2015; see also Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume).
Finally, in Romania, nostalgic nationalism appears to be highly resilient, although 
the right-wing populist forces have been on retreat the past decade (Cinpoeş 2010, 
2015; Norocel 2013; Norocel et al. 2017; Szabó et al. 2019). The history is read in 
a mythological key with regard to Romanian language, origins and ancestry, conti-
nuity over the territory, and Christian Orthodox tradition. These, in turn, articulate 
the sense of cultural specificity along which the Romanian ethnic majority is struc-
tured and position against “other” ethic communities (particularly the Roma, the 
Jews, and the Hungarian minority). The strength of the nationalist discourse is 
enhanced by its successful use, rehearsal, and transmission over time by very differ-
ent political actors: from early nationalists of the nineteenth century, interwar fas-
cists, Ceauşescu dictatorial regime, through the post-1989 context (Cinpoeş 
2010, 2015).
Much like in the case of Hungary, the ethnic and cultural continuity, which draws 
its strength from religious tradition, and the promise of territorial aggrandizement 
constitute key elements in the Romanian nationalist discourse. Unlike Hungary, 
however, Romania emerged as a net beneficiary from the WWI, with its territory 
nearly doubled in size compared to the start of the war. The short-lived existence of 
Greater Romania, incorporating besides the Old Kingdom the historical regions 
inhabited by Romanians (Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina) remains the 
zenith of Romanian nationalism (Cinpoeş 2010). The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 
and the subsequent annexation of several territories by Soviet Union represent the 
equivalent of the Treaty of Trianon for the Romanian nationalist discourse, and its 
key argument for modern irredentist claims towards the Republic of Moldova. 
Similar to Hungary, Romania has a kin-state approach towards ethnic Romanians in 
the neighboring states.
Within the post-1989 context, EU membership was presented as the country’s 
“rightful return to Europe”. It built on a selective reading of the nationalist project, 
which emphasized Romanian representing “an island of Latinity in the East”, and 
Romanians being “steadfast defenders of the European borders”. This notwith-
standing, in the aftermath of 2007 EU accession, and particularly with the onset of 
2008 financial crisis, Euroscepticism was fueled by growing unease regarding what 
was perceived as subordination to, and economic dependency on “Brussels”, and 
other international institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund). Like in 
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Poland and Hungary, in Romania too the appeals to rediscover national pride, 
underpinned by history, tradition, and Christianity, and restore “traditional Romanian 
moral values” (focused on the traditional heterosexual family) constitute the core 
elements of anti-EU mobilization.
4.4  Right-Wing Populist Parties, National Identity, Welfare 
Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties
This section examines the discourses of selected right-wing populist parties to flesh 
out in what manner they exploit the interplay between ethno-cultural articulations 
of the national community, and appeals for preferential, if not exclusive access to 
welfare provision based on national belonging. There are two main issues at stake 
here. First, while welfare chauvinism is not a new phenomenon, it is less clear 
whether there is some degree of alignment of Central and Eastern European right- 
wing populist discourses, and those in North and Western Europe, given the diverg-
ing migration contexts of these regions. Second, looking closer at the level of 
consistency between the three cases, this reflects the varying party strategies for 
including welfare chauvinism in their discourses for acquiring power.
Among the most successful right-wing populist parties in the region, PiS polled 
37.58% of the votes the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections, becoming the govern-
ing party. A significant part of PiS electoral success appears to be due to its social 
and economic program, which envisioned several welfare policies that appealed 
both to its working-class support base and more widely. It included among others, a 
VAT rate cut, a pro-natalist tax rebate based on the number of children in the family, 
and a general opposition to cuts on public spending.
Internally-focused welfare chauvinism is not articulated, since the country’s eth-
nic homogeneity, with nearly 95% ethnic Poles and no other ethnic group exceeding 
1% of the population, makes scapegoating an internal group on ethnic grounds 
rather difficult. As a result, the right-wing populist exclusionary discourse is directed 
against an exterior “other”, which is somewhat paradoxical given that Poland took 
in thousands of Chechen refuges of Islamic faith in the past two decades (Bustikova 
and Guasti 2017, p. 171). In the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, PiS positioned 
itself in the starkest opposition to the EU resettlement quota proposal, both in the 
run-up to the 2016 elections and subsequently. Used as an electoral asset in its cam-
paign, PiS channelized the anger at the outgoing liberal government, which had 
agreed to the refugee quotas, increasing its support among center-right voters who 
feared the social and economic costs of taking in refugees (Bustikova and Guasti 
2017, p. 172; see also Stanley 2016, p. 123).
A quasi-apocalyptic fantasmatic logic  (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 
et al. 2016) was employed by high ranked PiS politicians in addressing the refugee 
matter. Displaying overtly racist tones it positioned people fleeing violence and con-
flict in a position of fundamental difference to the Polish, and Europeans more 
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broadly. PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, for example, warned against the health 
threat that refugees represent, carrying “very dangerous diseases long absent from 
Europe” besides “all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which […] while not danger-
ous in the organisms of these people, could be dangerous here” (Cienski 2015). 
Consequently, upon winning elections, PiS reneged on the previous government’s 
promise to take in refugees. The justifications officially provided conflated, as in 
Hungary, security concerns with emerging expressions of welfare chauvinism.
Articulating the new political line, then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated in an 
unequivocal manner that the Polish government’s main responsibility is “to ensure 
the security of our fellow citizens” from the apparent threat posited by “thousands 
of migrants who come here only to improve their living conditions”, and amongst 
whom allegedly “there are also terrorists” (DW 2016). Referring to people seeking 
refuge as “migrants” signals a suspicious skepticism towards their “true” intentions: 
either freeloading onto or bringing terror to their unware hosts. In this context, we 
argue, PiS makes use of welfare chauvinism to consolidate Pole-Catholic nationalist 
discourse and add new layers to the metaphorical depiction of Poland as “Christ of 
Nations” (Polska Chrystusem Narodów), which emphasizes “Poland’s suffering at 
the hands of other countries and its redemptive rebirth.” (Stanley 2016, p. 119).
Jobbik, in turn, polled 19.06% of the votes in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary 
elections and secured its position as the largest opposition party. Besides its outspo-
ken anti-Semitism, Jobbik has a well-documented anti-Roma rhetoric (Ádám and 
Bozóki 2016; Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Montgomery 2015). Jobbik’s 
policy section concerning the status of ethnic minorities in Hungary deals almost 
exclusively with the Roma, solely referred to by their derogative appellation Gypsies 
(cigány). Moreover, the “jobs instead of benefits” welfare policy is expressly tied to 
the Roma. Despite the positive framing, which argues that “the real interest of the 
Gypsy community lies in a rapid social integration rather than affirmative action, 
the benefits of which the Gypsy community cannot really utilize in its current situ-
ation”, the policy is clear in its discriminatory interpretation to access to welfare 
provision, specifically targeting Roma and identifying them as criminals leading 
lives “incompatible with the law” (Jobbik n.d.). This attitude is echoed in the party’s 
electoral program, which allocated a whole section to the issue of “Hungarian- 
Gypsy coexistence” (Jobbik 2014, pp. 30–31). Even more so, the same electoral 
program reveals an anxious fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 
et al. 2016) pertaining to the failing birth rate of ethnic Hungarians, juxtaposed to 
the “explosive increase of Gypsy population”, which is intensely discussed in the 
section addressing Jobbik’s demographic policy (Jobbik 2014, p. 28).
If Jobbik had previously employed pro-Islam rhetoric to make its anti-Semitism 
more palatable, with the onset of the refugee (reception) crisis in 2015 the party 
turned on its heels. While Islam as a state religion was praised in the Middle Eastern 
context as a counterforce to Israel, it became problematic as the religious affiliation 
of people seeking to cross the Hungarian borders (Thorleifsson 2017, p.  324). 
Consequently, Islamophobia gained a prominent role in Jobbik’s discourse, often 
justified by the alleged security threat the refugees pose, either in terms of terrorist 
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activity, criminal behavior, or harassment of the Hungarian population. As the refu-
gee crisis unfolded, Jobbik articulated a distinctive welfare chauvinist perspective, 
exploiting social anxieties in deprived working-class towns and poor rural areas. It 
argued about the potentially negative impact that the costs of integrating the refu-
gees could have onto access to welfare provision by disadvantaged ethnic 
Hungarians, reminding that “also Hungarians are poor”. In this regard, Jobbik rep-
licated Fidezs’ anti-immigration discourse by juxtaposing cultural nationalist and 
economic arguments “thus catering to multiple audiences, from those fearing labor 
competition to those fearing cultural contamination” (Thorleifsson 2017, p. 326).
By far the weakest in terms of electoral performance, in the 2016 Romanian 
parliamentary elections PRU polled 2.79% for the Lower Chamber, and 2.95% for 
the Senate. These results were well under the electoral threshold. In turn, the estab-
lished right-wing populist party emphatically named Greater Romania Party 
(Partidul România Mare, PRM) had just lost its long-serving leader in 2015. 
Without him, PRM polled even less than PRU (1.04%, respectively 1.18%), so 
entering a right-wing populist alliance under PRU leadership seems a final attempt 
at maintaining political relevance. Ideologically, PRU defines itself as a nationalist 
party, whose aim is to “regain Romania for Romanians”.
Its egalitarian economic policy is somewhat reminiscent of that of PRM, particu-
larly regarding its selective egalitarianism (Norocel 2013). The envisaged welfare 
reform seems to be based on an exclusionary approach to the national community. 
Indeed, despite this apparent concern with inequality and poverty, the PRU leader 
Cristian Diaconu expressed derogative views about people receiving unemployment 
benefits. His stance echoes strongly with the wider negative connotations that large 
segments of the right-leaning younger, urban population associate to welfare provi-
sion. Particularly the term referring to a recipient welfare provision as a (socially) 
assisted (person) (asistat) is used as a slur, with the implicit suggestion that such 
people are lazy, unwilling to work, and generally a burden onto the hardworking 
taxpayers.
In Diaconu’s use of “the assisted (people)”, it pertains the Roma, solely referred 
to as Gypsies (ţigani). Employing the fantasmatic logic in a negative key (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007; Howarth et al. 2016), Diaconu argued their fundamental differ-
ence from the ethnic majority: “Perhaps Romanians have had enough of these 
assisted [people], whose only illness is not wanting to work, of these minorities who 
want to rule the country, to have a state within a state”. Making reference to a period 
of oppression that ethnic Romanians experienced under the Austro-Hungarian dual 
monarchy as a lower status populace, Diaconu then added “now we are heading to 
a similar situation, but this time we have the Gypsies [to oppress us]” (Tudor 2015).
In preparation for the 2016 elections, PRU launched a 10-point electoral mani-
festo that began by promising to increase the minimum wage, and among others, 
included protectionist economic promises (such as subsidies restricted to “Romanian 
companies”, and defense of “Romanian capital” against excessive state control) 
(Tudor 2016). This reflected the wider cleavage in Romanian politics. This pitted 
the center-left, which promised fiscal and welfare reforms aimed at alleviating pov-
erty and reducing inequality, against the conservative center-right and neoliberal 
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newcomers, which maintained the line of fiscal restraint and stimulation of capital 
that was agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the aftermath of 
2008 economic crisis. As such, while formally proclaiming a preoccupation for wel-
fare issues, PRU positioned itself against those socially most vulnerable, adding a 
racializing aspect to their depiction, and embraced welfare chauvinism.
In a similar manner, although Romania was not on the European migratory route, 
PRU denounced the EU solidarity agreement arguing against “colonizing Romania 
with refugees” (Tudor 2016). The fantasmatic logic of Romania being “colonized” 
by refugees was taken to an extreme by Diaconu who argued that “being an EU 
Member State […] does not entail an obligation for us to become either an Asian 
state, or an African state, and most definitely not a Muslim state.” (BZI 2015) 
Welfare chauvinist arguments were added to this, as “Romania cannot afford waves 
of immigrants from Africa and Asia”, and warned that “no one has the right to push 
these dangerous immigrants down our throats, because we lack both the resources 
and capacity to integrate them, particularly as they are themselves against it” 
(BZI 2015).
4.5  Conclusions
This chapter explored the interplay between claims of national culture and ethnic 
specificity, and welfare chauvinist appeals in the right-wing populist discourses in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It analyzed three right-wing populist parties, consider-
ing their relevance in their respective party system (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). The 
similarities in the discursive articulations of national identity and belonging in the 
three countries, which appeal to such aspects as history, tradition, territorial conti-
nuity, and religion, and are positioned against such globalizing forces as the EU (a 
trend that, by and large, characterize the entire region) (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; 
Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Stanley 2016) were matched to a large extent by simi-
larities in the way welfare chauvinism is integrated in the rhetoric of right-wing 
populist parties.
Despite being countries of emigration, which have not experienced directly a 
substantial immigrant presence (with the recent exception of the sudden surge of the 
migrant population in Hungary), all three cases display incipient patterns of welfare 
chauvinism directed at external “others” understood in an apocalyptic fantasmatic 
logic: the immigrant communities are depicted as “soon to be flooding,” “deceitful 
parasites” that pose a threat to, and require the protection of the national/religious 
specificity of the “people”. In this sense, the cases show an alignment with patterns 
of exclusion that characterize North and Western Europe (Keskinen 2016; Hellström 
2016; Norocel 2016). These similarities notwithstanding, the case of Jobbik and 
PRU also reveals what can potentially constitute a Central and Eastern European 
specificity. While welfare chauvinism targeting external “others” appears to be a 
recent phenomenon, the one directed at the “other within”, at the ethnic minorities 
(predominantly the Roma), constitutes a historical aspect that has much salience in 
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the rhetoric of right-wing populist parties. Welfare chauvinism adds a new dimen-
sion to the thinly-veiled xenophobia, and widespread demographic anxieties con-
cerning the relationship between national ethnic majorities and historical ethnic 
minorities in these countries. On this matter, PiS can be considered an exception to 
this regional pattern, largely due to Poland’s much more homogenous population, 
which precludes the clear identification of an internal scapegoat.
Finally, despite the different degrees of electoral success the three parties in 
terms display two interrelated points emerge. In terms of the snapshot picture, it 
may appear that the culture-welfare nexus provides a stronger mobilizing ground 
for right-wing populism in Poland and Hungary than in Romania. In terms of the 
broader picture, however, the fact that a newly established party such as the PRU 
was able to immediately latch onto this type of discourse shows its potential to be 
employed more successfully by newly emerging populist parties, or by established 
parties positioned closer to the mainstream. Together, these dimensions show the 
potential strength these issues have to be exploited effectively in the region (despite 
the current uneven electoral success).
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Chapter 5
What Makes Turkey and Turkish 
Immigrants a Cultural Polarization Issue 




Turkey first expressed its intention to become a member of the European Union 
(EU) in 1959 by applying to the European Economic Community. Subsequently, it 
signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 1963, applied for full membership 
in 1987, and completed the Customs Union process in 1996. It was officially recog-
nized as a candidate country for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, 
and the membership negotiations were initiated in 2005. In spite of Turkey’s long 
history of candidacy to EU membership, intense trade relations with European 
countries, and the presence of Turks as one of the largest minority ethnic groups in 
Europe, Turkey and Turkish immigrants have still been instrumentalized as politi-
cally polarizing issues in European societies. Turkish immigration to European 
countries continued to increase even after the shocks of the Oil Crisis in the 1970s, 
in particular, through family reunification. However, while trade and economic rela-
tions have intensified, culture and identity issues remain a challenge in EU-Turkey 
relations. The recent financial and “refugee (reception) crisis” that the European 
continent witnessed have deepened these challenges. Consequently, Turkish pres-
ence in Europe, compatibility of Turkish identity to European identity, Turkey’s 
“Europeanness” and EU membership process have been re-questioned by some 
actors, mostly by the ones that aim to revitalize the nostalgia of “pure Europeanness” 
by scapegoating “others” through exploiting economic, social, and cultural anxieties.
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In this regard, the interplay between politics of culture, welfare, and migration, 
which are the key focus of the present volume, were employed in the discourse of 
the populist actors in Europe as a tool for framing and excluding Turkish immi-
grants and Turkey. On the one hand, as Neumann (1998) underlines, the “otherness” 
of Turks has been an identifying element of Europeanness for long. On the other 
hand, Turkey has long been perceived as a “bridge country”, particularly in the 
2000s and after Turkey was given an official candidate status. Turkey has been 
framed as an important neighbor and a crucial partner for the EU (Öner 2011). 
However, the “otherness” was brought again onto the political agenda of several 
European countries by the latest series of crises.
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of this instrumentalization process 
in European politics by asking how Turkish immigrants and Turkey are presented as 
a culturally polarizing issue within the framework of “cultural security” (Guild 
2005; Tardif 2002). It addresses cultural elements of “Turco-skeptic” policies in 
European right-wing populist parties’ discourse. A descriptive analysis based on 
three specific cases is performed, and its findings lend support to our claims about 
the existence of anxieties due to cultural security concerns in European right-wing 
policies, and helps us identify the cultural elements within these policies. The mate-
rial selection, which the descriptive analysis is built on, is more ad-hoc based than 
systematically conducted. However, the emphasis is put on the speeches of the lead-
ing political actors within the related political processes and campaigns, campaign 
posters and party broadcasts in the conventional media are used as the resources for 
materials. The selected cases are assessed within a historical framework, also by 
referring to the previous discourses and policies of the major political actors in each 
of them. The first case is the Brexit referendum process in the United Kingdom 
(UK), specifically the Vote Leave campaign. The second case is the instrumentaliza-
tion of Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s accession to the EU in Austrian domestic 
politics particularly after the “refugee (reception) crisis” and during the campaign 
for the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections. The third case is the instrumentaliza-
tion of Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s accession to the EU in German politics, 
particularly the rise of Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), 
and its entrance into German federal parliament in the aftermath of 2017 elections.
These cases are analyzed within the framework of the nexus between Turks in 
Europe and European cultural cleavages. This is done by focusing on what sort of 
cultural arguments regarding Turkey appear in political discourses, the underlying 
cultural elements of these actors’ discourse on Turkish immigrants, and the cultural- 
historical reasons for the success of these discourses in each selected case, and their 
crucial influence on the domestic politics of various European countries. Meanwhile, 
the “cultural security” theme is presented as the theoretical background of the study.
G. Özerim and S. Öner
69
5.2  Cultural Security as an Instrument 
of Right-Wing Populism
Against this background, seeking the traces of cultural security in the Turco-skeptic 
discourse of European right-wing populist parties may provide valuable insights on 
the instrumentalization of Turkish migrants for the sake of voter mobilization. 
“Cultural security” can be defined as the “protection of original values (such as 
tradition, language, religion, customs, etc.) and characteristics of a society against 
existing conditions and potential threats” (Tardif 2002). Guild investigates the use 
and influence of culture as a security theme by asking this important question: 
“What is the link between culture and identity in terms of ‘nationality’ and ‘sover-
eignty’?” (Guild 2005, p.101). Building on this, one can also ask whether culture 
and identity are the tools, or symbols of national sovereignty. The answer to these 
questions also plays a decisive role in the framing of immigrants in contemporary 
European host societies. From a cultural point of view, the answer to this question 
by right-wing populist parties seems to be “yes, absolutely”. More importantly, 
these parties limit the notion of culture to the “indigenous” citizens of their country 
and classify it as an “entity” that has already reached its highest point, which conse-
quently need not be enlarged or expanded anymore (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel, 
Chap. 4; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in this volume). This protectionist percep-
tion of culture frames migrants as a threat to cultural security.
For many right-wing populist parties, the “native” citizens of a country are 
accepted as the sole originators, and rightful owners of the country’s culture. 
Accordingly, culture must have a specific definition, and it should be isolated from 
“foreign” elements. This perception directly plays to the “cultural security” theme 
and frames migrants as a threat to the host country’s “local culture”, and the lifestyle 
of “native” citizens. In this respect, the anti-immigration discourse of these parties 
promotes the idea that migrant populations will in time destroy the homogeneous 
and unique structure of national culture. In response, right-wing populist parties 
advocate for restrictive regulations against migration, and demonize those policies 
promoting multiculturalism and the integration of migrants (Williams 2006, p. 70). 
They do not only defend the national culture of the host country. Rather, they also 
refer to European culture when claiming the necessity of protecting it from the “raid 
of foreigners” and waves of globalization (Betz 2001, p. 394). Based on these exclu-
sivist and identity-based policies, they fuse the concepts of non-citizens and “oth-
ers” (Kaya 2009, p. 9).
Berezin defines modern nation-states as a marriage of culture and structure, 
which resembles a two-atom molecule, bounded by “territorial consolidation” on 
the one hand, and “cultural consolidation” on the other (Berezin 2009, pp. 53–54). 
In light of Berezin’s example, the issue of cultural security can also be considered 
the definition of the state in Weberian terms. According to Weber, the political com-
munity is a phenomenon that is shaped around ethnic pride, feelings of similarity, 
and common group beliefs stemming from the same culture and solidarity (Berezin 
2009, p. 52). This definition necessitates “cultural consolidation” as a core value of 
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the modern state. The discourse based on “cultural security”, which mostly addresses 
these “core values”, may find a stronger public response than one might expect. 
Anti-immigration discourses drawing on cultural security concerns do not manifest 
themselves only in calls to reduce, or halt migration. They also aim to shape the 
policies and practices of integration for those who have already immigrated. 
However, the efforts of right-wing populist parties stem from the ambition to protect 
the national language as a critical element of culture rather than from a desire to 
support the integration of immigrants.
Eventually, the distinction between “us” and “them” creates symbolic boundar-
ies in addition to existing boundaries. There can be symbolic boundaries within 
social identity, as well as physical boundaries between countries, and in fact, these 
boundaries are created using a set of sub-themes, such as religion and language 
(Bail 2008). Apart from this, liberal values such as LGBT rights, equality between 
women and men, and other freedoms are also regarded as part of European culture, 
and immigrants are portrayed as a threat to these values (Hellström 2016; Norocel 
2017). Accordingly, these values must be protected. This discourse of right-wing 
populist parties is framed alongside religious differences, and as a result, “othering 
by religion” is an important element of cultural security discourse. Consequently, 
Islamophobia comprises a significant component of anti-immigration sentiment and 
“nativism” in Europe, which also makes it a tool of populist discourse. From this 
point of view, anti-Islamism functions as a significant mobilizer for right-wing pop-
ulist party voters.
5.3  The Turkish Community in Europe 
and Cultural Cleavages
Turkish immigrants and co-ethnic Turks in Europe constitute one of the major ele-
ments of the relationship between Turkey and Europe. After the end of World War 
II, Turkish immigrants provided an essential labor contribution to the reconstruction 
of European economies. The Turkish government signed bilateral recruitment 
agreements with Germany in 1961, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium in 1964, 
France in 1965, and with Sweden in 1967. These bilateral agreements, which were 
initially framed as temporary “guest worker” schemes, unexpectedly resulted in 
many permanent stays. Consequently, nearly 800,000 Turks became citizens in the 
host country in which they worked, and Turkish immigrants and their families 
became “the largest group of non-nationals resident in the EU” (İçduygu 2011, 
p. 9). Even as European countries were focusing on more restrictive immigration 
policies following the Oil Crisis of 1973, family reunification allowed for continued 
Turkish migration into Europe. In addition to labor migration, the conflicts of the 
1970s and the 1980 military coup in Turkey added increasing numbers of Turkish 
asylum seekers to the picture (Sirkeci and Esipova 2013, p. 3). As a result, around 
5.5 million Turks live in West European countries, mainly in Germany, the 
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Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Austria (Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2018).
In the meantime, “Turco-skepticism” has become a political card for the new 
wave of right-wing populism in Europe. Some researchers argue that, for a number 
of reasons Turkey has become a flash point for the rising xenophobic movements in 
Europe after the 2000s. One of the most prominent reasons seems to be the “exis-
tence of a large cohort of Turkish population” in Europe (Kirişçi 2003, p.  79). 
Right-wing populist parties using neo-nationalist and anti-immigrant discourse are 
on the rise in almost all the European countries, which have received Turkish immi-
grants as part of guest worker schemes in the 1960s and 1970s. The existence of 
Turkish immigrant communities in European countries, and particularly their inte-
gration problems are generally considered as one of the main reasons for the devel-
opment of Turco-skepticism in Europe (European Commission 2016, p. 3).
However, it should be noted that the Turkish community in Europe originated 
primarily from economic immigration rather than asylum seeking. As a result, the 
“economic burden” and “welfare” based anti-immigrant discourse used by European 
right-wing populist parties does not have a strong base, as Turkish immigrants actu-
ally contributed positively to the economies of many of European host societies. In 
fact, the Central and Eastern enlargements of the EU invalidate the economic argu-
ments against Turkey’s EU membership, due to the relatively poor economic condi-
tions of these countries at the time they gained membership (Bozdaglioglu 2004, 
p. 93). As a result, culture and identity-based arguments have become important for 
Turkey’s EU accession process, and for the presence of Turkish communities across 
Europe. Therefore, contrary to general wisdom, major themes of European Turco- 
skeptic rhetoric rely not on economic anxieties but on cultural cleavages that are 
fueled by a wide spectrum of arguments. Although religious differences are one of 
the factors underlying these cultural arguments, the instrumentalization of Turkish 
immigrants by right-wing populist parties is not limited to this subtheme. It also 
draws on a fear of threats to the liberal values of Europe, democracy and the life-
style of European countries.
These cultural cleavages overshadow even economic anxieties and have become 
an agenda item in the contemporary political debates of European countries. This 
effect is not limited to countries with a high number of immigrants of Turkish ori-
gin, such as Germany and Austria. Similar debates were observed in the UK during 
the Brexit referendum campaign, despite the fact that the UK has fewer Turkish 
immigrants and has had a relatively positive stance towards Turkey’s EU member-
ship for many years. Turkey’s potential EU membership appears to be one of the 
most prominent sources of identity and culture-based opposition to Turks (Yilmaz 
2007, p. 293). It is worthwhile to note that while opposition to Turkey’s EU mem-
bership has many sociological, geographical, historical, and political grounds in 
Europe, the debates on the triangle of culture, religion, and identity are remarkably 
fraught even in the countries that have been hosting large numbers of Turkish immi-
grants for decades. However, the history of contact between Turks and Europeans is 
not limited to post World War II labor migration and EU accession process. That 
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history extends to the previous relations with the Ottoman Empire, whereby Turks 
were framed as the “other” in European imagery (Bozdaglioglu 2004, p. 93).
5.3.1  Case 1: Vote Leave “Playing the Turkish Card” 
for Brexit
Turkish migration to the UK began in the late 1960s and continued during the early 
1970s due to labor migration. Following the war in Cyprus in 1974, Turkish- 
Cypriots began to immigrate in significant numbers and the population of Turkish- 
born immigrants in the UK increased (Küçükcan 1999, p.  61). After the 1980 
military intervention in Turkey, the UK became one of the main destinations for 
Turkish asylum seekers, in addition to a continued inflow of economic migrants. 
According to the statistics (Office for National Statistics 2017), there were around 
73,000 Turks in the UK. In terms of population density, Turks are not among the top 
five countries with the largest “overseas born population resident in the UK”. 
However, Turkey and Turkish identity constituted one of the hot-button points in the 
Vote Leave Campaign of the June 2016 referendum.
The hostile rhetoric used throughout the campaign centered primarily on Turkey’s 
possible EU membership by asking voters whether they want to be in an EU that 
includes Turkey. The question was imbibed with fear mongering and misinforma-
tion. For example, the Vote Leave block released a campaign poster bearing only the 
line, “Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU”. The implication was that 
Turkey’s accession would lead to mass migration to the UK and might result in 
increased security challenges in the EU. One of the prominent figures of the Vote 
Leave campaign, Penny Mordaunt, former British Armed Forces Minister, and 
recently Minister of State at the Department for Work and Pensions, claimed that 
Britain would be “unable to stop Turkey joining the EU”. She claimed, “a million 
Turks could potentially come to the UK within eight years of joining, a scale of 
migration that would run the risk of enabling murderers, terrorists, and kidnappers 
to enter the country” (BBC 2016). Former UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader 
Nigel Farage, another important figure of the Leave Campaign, supported this dis-
course, stating, “the referendum is very quickly becoming a vote on whether we 
want to be in a political union with Turkey, which would open our borders to mil-
lions of Turks with all the security risks that would bring” (Wheeler and 
Giannangeli 2016).
UKIP also released a broadcast titled “The risks of staying in the EU: No. 1- 
Turkey joins in 2020?” The video claims that “as many as 15 million migrants could 
leave for Europe within the first 10 years of EU membership”. The video includes 
arguments emphasizing that only 3% of Turkish landmass is in Europe, while the 
rest is in Asia, and that a possible EU membership would make Turkey the most 
populous country in the EU, thereby allowing it supreme power in the EU institu-
tions and decision-making. Finally, it asserts that with Turkey’s membership, the 
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EU would become a neighbor to Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In fact, these are all well- 
known and popular arguments of opponents to Turkey’s EU membership (Müftüler- 
Bac 1998; Gerhards and Hans 2011). However, the broadcast also addresses freedom 
of press, women’s rights, the fact that rates of violence against women in Turkey are 
above the European average, the prevalence of marriage at an early age, and the 
decline of the Christian population in the country. In particular, a strong emphasis 
on Islam and the Muslim majority in Turkey was present prominently in UKIP’s 
Vote Leave Campaign. The mainstream media accused the party of “baseless scare-
mongering” many times during the Brexit campaign, as its discourse promoted a 
disguised but deeply rooted Islamophobia (Mason 2016).
Liberal values and freedoms were framed as part of European and British cul-
ture, as frequently seen throughout populist discourse that use the “cultural secu-
rity” theme. However, in the case of the Vote Leave campaigns, the idea of a “high 
level of criminality among Turkish citizens” was integrated into this theme. Instead 
of using only cultural themes, terrorism and crime were embedded into the dis-
course, which presented Turkey and Turkish immigrants as a threat to national secu-
rity (Boffey and Helm 2016). The cultural security-based campaign of Vote Leave 
was noted in the British media. The Independent, a popular daily newspaper in the 
UK, published an article titled “Vote Leave: Stop offending Turkish people to fur-
ther your own agenda”. The piece criticized another popular daily newspaper, the 
Express, for intentionally using the image “of a woman in a burqa fashioned from 
the EU flag” while reporting on a survey, which claimed that Turkey’s EU member-
ship would encourage a third of Britons to vote for leaving the EU (Wheeler and 
Giannangeli 2016).
In addition, part of the Vote Leave campaign discourse presented Turkey as part 
of a possible Balkan enlargement. It was claimed “a vote of stay would allow people 
from Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey to immigrate to UK 
freely when they join the EU soon” (Lister 2016). As such, the theme of cultural 
security morphed into a matter of “internal security” (Mandacı and Özerim 2013). 
Such a stance was built on misinformation or manufactured information, since the 
UK was not even within the Schengen area agreement, which makes a rapid and an 
uncontrolled mass migration from any of these potential new EU member countries 
almost impossible.
UKIP also shared videos of David Cameron, who had previously defended 
Turkey’s EU membership bid. However, Cameron’s stance in favor of Turkey’s EU 
membership was keeping with the traditional stance of the British government, 
which has been one of the strongest advocates for membership for many years. 
Regardless, right-wing populist rhetoric instrumentalized Turks and Turkish iden-
tity in order to disseminate fear, mobilize voters, and strengthen its anti- establishment 
stance against traditional British politics. Moreover, Boris Johnson, who had tar-
geted Turkey’s potential EU membership during the Vote Leave campaigns, declared 
in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum that he would support Turkey’s EU bid. 
This is but an example of the hypocrisy of right-wing populist politicians, who 
instrumentalized certain issues for short-term purposes.
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5.3.2  Case 2: Instrumentalization of Turkey and Turkish 
Immigrants in Austrian Politics
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, assimilation has been the major strat-
egy for cultural and linguistic minorities in Austria. These groups, including Turkish 
immigrants, remain marginalized and segregated, and even the third-generations 
tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and less educational success 
than Austrians on average. Moreover, the rise of right-wing populism in Austria has 
influenced negatively immigration policies (Wets 2006, pp. 92–93).
The main narrative about Turkey in Austria is a typical example of a cultural 
“other”. The Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 are two crucial events that 
are reported in Austrian history textbooks (Gavenda 2017). These historical refer-
ences about Ottoman Empire have been used frequently in Austrian domestic poli-
tics. Another crucial theme is immigration, especially with regards to Turkey-EU 
relations. In the early 1960s, more workers were required to meet the demands of a 
growing economy. From the beginning of 1960s until the mid-1970s, guest workers 
were recruited mainly from Turkey and former Yugoslavia. The bilateral agreement 
between Turkey and Austria regulating short-term immigration of Turkish workers 
was signed in 1964. By the early 1970s it became clear that the Turkish communi-
ty’s presence had become permanent. Indeed, the largest groups of non-EU foreign-
ers in Austria are the nationals from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Turks are 
often represented as the least integrated group of immigrants (Wets 2006, pp. 85–89). 
In 2017, it was estimated that the number of Austrian residents of Turkish origin 
was of around 260,000 (Gavenda 2017).
Even previously, there were particularly high levels of skepticism about Turkey’s 
EU membership, especially in Austria and Germany, where there are large numbers 
of Turkish immigrants. Before the financial crisis and the Brexit referendum, 
Turkey’s EU membership had been used frequently for domestic political gains 
before the elections, especially by right-wing populist parties, as well as by main-
stream parties, such as the Christian Democrats (Yabancı 2016). The survival of a 
European culture against the threat posed by the “Muslim other” is a recurring 
theme in right-wing populist rhetoric (Ajanovic et al. 2016, p. 143).
More recently, Austria opposed a revitalization of membership talks between 
Turkey and the EU and even called for their suspension. In November 2016, all six 
parties from the federal parliament issued a joint statement that condemned the 
human rights situation in Turkey and called on the EU to suspend the negotiations. 
Former foreign minister, currently the Chancellor Sebastian Kurz demanded a 
freeze to accession negotiations at the EU Council meeting, though this call was not 
supported by the foreign ministers of most of the other member states (Gavenda 2017).
As a distinctive example, the right-wing populist party “Freedom Party of 
Austria” (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) claims that the living standards for 
Austrian citizens are in need of protection, and that immigrants who are unwilling 
to integrate should be forced to leave the country (Dennison and Pardijs 2016, p. 7). 
But this stance has a longer history. Already in the 2005 campaign for the municipal 
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elections in Vienna, the FPÖ electoral slogan was “Vienna must not become 
Istanbul” (Gavenda 2017). In recent decades, the FPÖ pioneered many rhetorical 
strategies of populist movements across Europe and also played a “key role in cast-
ing Islam as an existential threat to European identity and values”, which has cru-
cially influenced its German counterpart, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative 
für Deutschland, AfD) (Politico 2016). “Catholic Austria, which fought back two 
Ottoman sieges during the Hapsburg Empire, was again under assault” FPÖ claimed 
in response to the refugee (reception) crisis, and the terrorist threats facing Europe 
in the last few years (Politico 2016).
In the aftermath of the refugee (reception) crisis, FPÖ positioned itself as a pro-
tector of Austria’s heritage and borders against the influx of immigrants. FPÖ sees 
a lack of solidarity and unity between EU Member States as the main cause of the 
series of crisis (financial, Euro-zone, and humanitarian) that have recently shaken 
the EU. Moreover, FPÖ perceives the “refugee deal” between Turkey and the EU as 
a disaster since it is against any alignment of the EU with Turkey (Dennison and 
Pardijs 2016, p.7). This is by no means a singular position; Sebastian Kurz, while 
still minister of foreign affairs stated that “it is crucial that we do not surrender to 
Turkey or become dependent on them. Europe has to protect its own borders” 
(Siebenhaar and Stehle 2016). This notwithstanding, the Austrian government 
stated its commitment to the refugee deal.
In the Austrian presidential elections in December 2016, the FPÖ candidate, 
Norbert Hofer gained a plurality of votes, coming in first with about 35% of the 
votes in the first round (Vieten and Poynting 2016, p. 534). During the presidential 
election campaign, he promised to take Austria out of the EU if Turkey is allowed 
to join (Agerholm 2016). He was narrowly defeated in the run-up, which was in part 
influenced by the public reaction to the refugee (reception) crisis; the one to win the 
presidential race was Alexander Van der Bellen, from the Greens. For the first time 
Austria witnessed a second round of the presidential elections, and now a president 
coming from outside the two dominating political forces, the Social Democrats and 
the Christian Democrats (Politico 2016).
In 2017 parliamentary elections, the Christian Democrats, rebranded as the new 
People’s Party (Die neue Volkspartei) won 31.5% of the votes under the leadership 
of Sebastian Kurz. It formed a coalition with FPÖ, which aimed to limit immigra-
tion; to decrease welfare benefits to non-Austrians; and to prevent the influence of 
political Islam (New York Times 2016). Thus, Austria became one of the few West 
European countries to have a right-wing populist party in a governing coalition in 
power. As such, it seems Austria’s policy towards Turkey’s EU membership bid 
would remain skeptical for the foreseeable future. In addition, Turkish immigrants 
and Turkey’s accession process may continue to be used in political confrontations 
as a culturally polarizing issue particularly before elections, by both center-right 
and especially by right-wing populist parties.
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5.3.3  Case 3: Instrumentalization of Turkey and Turkish 
Immigrants in German Politics and the Rise of AfD
Germany, as the main destination country for many Syrians coming through Turkey 
and Greece, has experienced first-hand the effect of the refugee (reception) crisis. 
Consequently, one of the main themes in German politics, especially in recent years, 
has been immigration. Turkish immigrants are the largest minority group in 
Germany. Germany signed a bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey on 30 
October 1961 because of the shortages in its labor market. Although the recruitment 
of guest workers was initially intended to be temporary, Turkish immigrants have 
become a permanent component of German society. However, despite a long history 
of immigration, Germany insisted on not being a country of immigration 
(Senay 2017).
The recent refugee (reception) crisis has been one of the most important issues to 
influence German politics recently, and it has revealed deep divisions within German 
society. Chancellor Angela Merkel stated at the end of August 2015 that there were 
no limits to the number of refugees Germany would accept; her famous phrase was 
“we can handle this”. Moreover, Germany was the pioneering country, which 
pushed for the solidarity principle across the EU for sharing the burden of accom-
modating all the incoming refugees. However, this system would not function 
because of the resistance of several countries. On 19 September 2016, Merkel 
admitted that errors had been made with regard to the refugee policy. In the after-
math of the crisis, Germany made significant investments for integrating immigrants 
in German society, and in May 2016 the government agreed on a new integra-
tion law.
At the Congress of the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union (Christlich- 
Soziale Union, CSU) in September 2016, there was a demand for a clear change of 
“Berlin’s asylum politics”. There were requests for introducing an upper limit of 
200,000 asylum seekers per year; the abolition of dual citizenship (which had been 
introduced in order to better integrate Turkish immigrants); and the immediate 
deportation of immigrants with rejected asylum applications. In addition, a perma-
nent federal ban on the burka, and the development of a general law to limit immi-
gration were listed among the main requests for further cooperation between CSU 
and Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands, CDU) for the period between October 2016 up to fall 2017, when 
federal elections were held.
The radical right National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, NPD) had a marginal influence contained to the sub-federal level, 
while the AfD, which was established in 2013, had a surprising ascension into 
German politics in the aftermath of the economic and refugee (reception) crises, 
even entering the federal parliament after the 2017 elections. AfD was founded as a 
single issue-party focused on opposing the Euro and the Eurozone bailouts, but in 
2015, after a split, the party’s new leader transformed it into an anti-immigration 
and anti-Islam party (Dennison and Pardijs 2016, p.17). AfD exhibits 
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ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and nativism, which is a combination of xenophobia 
and ethnic nationalism and it claims that the “homogeneous nation” is under threat 
(Schelter et al. 2016, pp. 440–441). AfD also shares some similar concerns against 
immigration with PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer Gegen Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes, see Önnerfors, Chap. 9 in this volume), which would gather popular 
support, especially in Dresden, in late 2014 and early 2015 as a radical right and 
xenophobic social movement. While German mainstream parties condemned 
PEGIDA for its xenophobia and Islamophobia, AfD views PEGIDA more favor-
ably. AfD’s main “others” are the Muslim refugees and immigrants. Illustratively, 
during the AfD campaign for the Berlin state parliament, campaign placards were 
printed in both Russian and Polish, besides German. However, there were no posters 
in Turkish, despite that Turks are the largest minority group in Berlin (Zeller 2016). 
Some of its leading politicians, such as Alexander Gauland, expressed racist opin-
ions about Germans of foreign origin (Benedikter and Karolewski 2016, 
pp. 425–426). AfD’s slogan is “Asylum Requires Borders – Red Card for Merkel”; 
it perceives the refugee (reception) crisis and the subsequent integration of immi-
grants and refugees as the biggest threat facing Europe.
In the aftermath of economic and financial crises of the Eurozone, which were 
followed shortly by the European refugee (reception) crisis, Germany’s leadership 
role within the EU has become stronger, and Germany wields crucial influence in 
defining strategic relations with Turkey (Turhan 2016, p. 29). In this context, AfD 
opposes Turkey’s EU membership bid because of ethno-cultural differences (Grimm 
2015, p. 273). The AfD policy towards Turkey’s EU membership was made explicit 
in the party program for the 2014 EU parliamentary elections. It advocated, “first 
consolidation, then expansion: EU accession negotiations with Turkey are to be 
stopped. The accession of additional countries requires their fulfillment of all entry 
criteria”. In the field of immigration and asylum policy, it was emphasized that: 
“Immigration to gain free access to the German social systems must be prevented 
[…]” (AfD Party Program 2014). More recently, the AfD’s policy platform reads 
“Islam does not belong to Germany” and calls for a ban on the construction of 
mosques (New York Times 2016), declaring Islam incompatible with German cul-
ture (Sky News 2017).
The attitude towards Turkish immigrants seems to be ambivalent (Senay 2017). 
On the one hand, Wolfgang Kaschuba, the director of the Berlin Institute for 
Integration and Migration Research, argues “the new [Syrian] migrants occupy the 
outermost position of the German social order while those with an immigrant back-
ground, who have already been in Germany for a long time move to the center” 
(Kaschuba in Senay 2017). As a result, the recent refugee (reception) crisis has 
contributed to intensified exchanges between the Turkish minority and the German 
majority. Moreover, it has increased the need of German authorities to cooperate 
with the Turkish minority on this matter. On the other hand, this “crisis” has led to 
rising anti-immigrant sentiments and discourses, which have negative implications 
for the German Turks as well. The Cologne sexual assaults on New Year’s Eve in 
December 2015 (see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this volume) were particularly 
potent in triggering a highly controversial debate about refugees, as well as Islamic 
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culture more broadly, with wider negative implications for Germany’s Muslim pop-
ulation, including the Turkish minority (Senay 2017).
Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s EU membership bid have been a popular 
debate in German domestic politics for many years, in particular due to the dis-
course and politics of CDU and CSU. Following the same path, the AfD instrumen-
talized problems associated with refugees and emphasized the cultural security 
theme in its discourse with regard to the incoming refugees, the integration of the 
Turkish minority in Germany, and Turkey’s EU membership. This approach has 
proven successful even in ensuring AfD’s entrance into the German federal 
parliament.
5.4  Conclusions
Socio-economic turbulences like financial and economic crises, and forced migra-
tion create a favorable environment for the rise of right-wing populist parties 
(Dudasova 2016, p. 327). In this context, adopting a stance against Turkey’s EU 
membership, and the presence of Turkish immigrants in Europe can be observed as 
one of the remarkable arguments of these parties to strengthen their roles by galva-
nizing support. This notwithstanding, many right-wing populist parties do not have 
yet a significant presence in their respective parliaments. However, they may influ-
ence mainstream parties’ discourses and policies, particularly related to politics of 
migration (Akkerman 2018). For instance, UKIP won only one seat in the May 
2015 elections but its populist rhetoric has nonetheless triggered anti-immigrant and 
anti-EU sentiments in the UK, which eventually determined the Conservatives to 
call for the Brexit referendum (Inglehart and Norris 2016, p. 6). Therefore, the dis-
course of these parties against Turkey and Turkish immigrants may bring long last-
ing side effects beyond mobilizing their voters at election time or for referendums.
As this chapter unveiled, right-wing populist actors in Europe resort to the use of 
Turkish migrants and Turkey (in particular, its EU membership process) as an “oth-
ering” element and culturally polarizing issue within European societies, by 
employing the theme of cultural security. In the case of Germany, Turkey’s EU 
membership process and the existence of Turkish minority in the country have been 
frequently used in domestic politics by CDU for many years. However, after the 
financial crisis and the refugee (reception) crisis, AfD started to employ these ele-
ments more strongly as a culturally polarizing issue and promoted them as part of 
cultural security threats, which contributed to its rise and entrance to German fed-
eral parliament. In fact, AfD became the first right-wing populist party with a radi-
cal agenda to enter the federal parliament after the World War II. Similarly, these 
elements have been intensively used also in Austrian right-wing politics for several 
years. FPÖ, which became the junior partner in the coalition government after 2017, 
has been using them more strongly as a culturally polarizing issue in recent years, 
especially with the rise of refugee (reception) crisis-based populism in Europe.
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The Brexit referendum in the UK is a distinctive case. It shows that political 
actors may combine the cultural security theme with other issues, such as criminal-
ization and alleged mass migration, to strengthen their discourse and to mobilize 
more voters. The instrumentalization of Turks is not unexpected in German and 
Austrian right-wing politics since there have been already high levels of skepticism 
towards Turkey’s EU membership in these countries and they have significant 
Turkish communities too. However, Vote Leave campaign and the Brexit process 
overall showed that right-wing populist discourse may instrumentalize Turkey and 
Turks as a cultural security issue even in a country, which is relatively more sup-
portive of Turkey’s EU membership and which does not have a remarkable Turkish 
immigrant community experience. Meanwhile, the resurgence of negative discourse 
on immigrants and refugees, as observed in the cases of Austria and Germany, 
maintain and even strengthen the cultural boundaries separating the Turkish immi-
grants from their host European societies. Such a stance may prove to have a nega-
tive impact on the long run, not only by slowing down and endangering the 
integration process of Turkish immigrants but also by preventing social cohesion in 
European societies.
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On October 20, 2012, 70 activists from the new right youth organization Generation 
Identity (Génération Identitaire, GI) rallied on the roof of a newly constructed 
mosque in the French town of Poitiers. Mobilizing near the historical grounds where 
Charles Martell’s army had fought off the Ottomans in 732, the activists evoked the 
imagery of a protracted conflict between Christian Europe and its Muslim other. In 
a similar register of battle, GI France’s YouTube video posted a few months prior, 
entitled “Declaration of War” (Déclaration de Guerre),1 showed the French activists 
urgently describing the hardships of European youth, betrayed by the ideals of the 
generation of 1968 and its embrace of multiculturalism. The video quickly spread 
across Europe, and within a few months, GI Facebook groups appeared in several 
other European countries, where far-right activists adopted both the group’s logo 
and view of the world (Eckes 2016; Bruns et al. 2017).
At the time of writing, national GI groups exist in 12 European countries. Among 
these, the French, Austrian, and German groups are by far the most active in terms 
of street activism, strategy, and intra-organizational communication and integration 
(Bruns et al. 2017). On the transnational level, the GI network assembles under a set 
of overarching concepts, aiming at the preservation of a European identity against 
the threat of a foreign “invasion”. Within the common framework, however, the 
groups mobilize autonomously at the domestic level. Since the movement’s 
establishment in 2012, domestic activities have been combined with joint transna-
tional events, including European campaigns, transnational demonstrations, the 
1 The video with English subtitles: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqybsUqkOWs
A. Nissen (*) 
Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
e-mail: nissen_anita@hotmail.com
86
annual Summer University in France2 (with European participation since 2014), 
various cross-national seminars and exchanges, and most famously, the 2017 
“Defend Europe” boats mission in the Mediterranean.
Despite different domestic grievances, constraints, identifications, and historical 
trajectories, the GI activists have managed to construct and maintain a common 
identity as members of a distinctly European community. This chapter explores GI 
at the level of transnational movement activism, using frame analysis to interpret 
how they achieve a common European identity through the attribution of protago-
nist and antagonist positions in the midst of the allegedly on-going “Great 
Replacement”. Transnational identity construction appears rather paradoxical in 
relation to far-right nationalists, making it a rarely explored far-right phenomenon 
(see Zúquete 2015). The chapter aims at closing this empirical gap, by explaining 
how the GI groups expand the borders of the “heartland” to the entire European 
continent (Taggart 2004), while simultaneously emphasizing their own national 
identities. At the same time, the chapter focuses on the GI groups’ expressions of 
anti-liberal sentiments during the “refugee crisis”, framed in the form of blame 
attributions regarding the mainstream politicians’ lack of protection of the European 
welfare and culture. The GI activists jointly construct a conservative and protection-
ist “us” in juxtaposition to a progressive and social-liberal “them,” with the hope of 
sowing public distrust in policies promoting multiculturalism, and, in the long term, 
claiming societal hegemony. To further this goal, they forge a transnational alliance 
around the safeguarding of the European culture, identity, and welfare provisions. 
Hence, the analysis will show that the various GI groups present themselves as the 
last bastion in the defense of Europe, fighting simultaneously against Muslim “oth-
ers” and European proponents of liberalist ideals. While they present the prior as an 
“invading” force, they villainize the latter for permitting the pending societal rup-
ture and combat them at the meta-political level.
6.1.1  Framing Transnational Collective Identities
In social movement studies, there is much debate about the conceptualization of 
“collective identity” (Flescher Fominaya 2010). Most scholars agree that some 
determining characteristics need to be present in order to foster a group’s cohesion 
and ability to act in unison (Melucci 1995). This creation of a collective sense of 
“we”-ness also forms a basis for collective action, and acts as a way to organize 
loyalties. Movement organizers must then create a group consciousness by con-
structing an identity around which the activists can unite (Tilly 2005). These shared 
attributes do not emerge naturally from movements. Instead, movement activists 
2 GI France and The Identitarians (Les Identitaires, BI’s new name since August 2016) organize the 
Summer University. It involves seminars around new right ideology, communication strategies, 
and combat training (for a detailed account, see Bouron 2014).
A. Nissen
87
must strategically frame their understandings of self and of the “other”, in order to 
make them both communicable.
The concept of framing refers to “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and 
condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, 
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or 
past environments” (Snow and Benford 1992, p.  137). Movement entrepreneurs 
frequently employ “collective action frames” as a means to garner support and “to 
demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198). These collective action 
frames perform three “core framing tasks”, a diagnostic (what is wrong), prognostic 
(what should be done about it), and motivational action (why people should act) 
(Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198).
Hunt et al. (1994) combine the concepts of framing and collective identity in the 
concept of “identity field”. Identity fields have three dimensions: protagonists, 
antagonists and audiences. The “protagonist” identity field consists of the “we” that 
advocates, sympathizes with, or benefits from the movement’s overall values, ambi-
tions and strategies. It also involves claims about the movement and its actors, allies, 
and constituents. The antagonist field, on the other hand, is comprised of the “cul-
pable agents” for a given problem, which “are viewed as having ‘caused’ or exacer-
bated the problem” and which are ascribed with “traits and motives” for these 
actions (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 191). Thus, protagonist and antagonist fields relate to 
the general diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames.
6.1.2  Data Collection
The chapter draws on material from GI groups in France (Génération Identitaire), 
Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich), Germany (Identitäre Bewegung 
Deutschland), Italy (Generazione Identitaria), the Czech Republic (Generace 
Identity), Hungary (Identitás Generáció) and Slovenia (Generacija Identitete). 
These represent some of the most active GI groups in the period under scrutiny 
(2015–2017).3 The primary data consists of written materials from the individual 
groups’ webpages and Facebook accounts,4 produced in relation to protests against 
their political opponents.5 The relevant Facebook posts were identified via a key-
word search of protest terms in the seven national GI groups’ Facebook posts in the 
3 Even though GI Hungary and GI Slovenia both only started protest activities in 2016. For a closer 
look at GI Hungary, see Kondor and Littler, Chap. 8 in this volume.
4 In April 2018, when writing this chapter, the Facebook accounts of the GI groups were still acces-
sible. However, in June 2018, Facebook decided to shut down all GI-related pages across Europe 
(for details, see Bailey 2018). This chapter will still refer to the date of the Facebook-posts cited. 
Please contact the author if you are interested in consulting the exact post-dataset (retrieved using 
NetVizz).
5 Please contact the author for more information about the protest event data.
6 The Trans-European Mobilization of “Generation Identity”
88
period 2015–2017 (involving 6322 posts in total).6 The protest data was collected 
via the method of protest event analysis (see Hutter 2014 for more on this approach), 
and includes data on both regular protest events (such as demonstrations, banner- 
drops, campaigns, street theatre performances, solidarity actions, etc.) and transna-
tional GI meetings and conferences. As the focus in this chapter is upon the 
transnational construction of identity, only the protest events with a transnational 
aspect have been included. For this chapter’s purposes, this involves protest events 
or meetings involving the participation of several national GI groups, and events or 
activities that have diffused from one national GI group to more than two others. 
Secondary sources consisting of previous scholarly contributions on their activities, 
history, and viewpoints are also included, particularly in the first two sections, 
which focus on Generation Identity as a movement, and its conception of “identity”.7
6.2  Introducing Generation Identity: New Right 
Counter- Culture with Left-Wing Means
GI France was created as the youth branch of the French new right political associa-
tion Identity Block (Bloc Identitaire, BI) (created in 2002), which has its anteced-
ents in Radical Unity (Unité Radicale), a neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic organization 
disbanded by the French authorities (Winkler 2017). Identity Block is “known for 
its radical positions vis-à-vis immigration, Islam, and for its defense of the European 
civilization and the Europeans” (François 2009), a legacy GI has continued. Inspired 
by the work of left-wing intellectual Antonio Gramsci, both BI and GI aim to change 
the discourse in the pre-political and cultural space, in order to attain cultural hege-
mony (Eckes 2016). Consequently, GI utilizes a professional communication strat-
egy, especially on social media, where the activists combine pop cultural symbolism 
with radical viewpoints (Weiß 2017). Heavily inspired by the Italian neo-Fascist 
movement CasaPound, GI’s action repertoire also draws heavily on the activities of 
left-wing movements (Bruns et al. 2017), including meeting interruptions, banner- 
drops, and site occupations. This unconventional strategy of public space penetra-
tion requires only a small number of activists, while the choices of place, timing, 
and banner statements often still lead to high media coverage.
In terms of GI’s ideology, the movement largely draws on the work of French, 
German and Italian “new right” actors, especially the German Conservative 
Revolution (Konservative Revolution) of the 1920s, and the French Research and 
Study Group for European Civilization (Groupement de recherche et d’études pour 
la civilisation européenne, or GRECE), formed in 1968. The post-World War II new 
6 The 6322 posts are divided accordingly amongst the national GI groups: GI France (1508 posts); 
GI Austria (1186); GI Germany (1677); GI Italy (1241); GI Czech Republic (291); and GI Hungary 
(419). In the latter two cases, it was only possible to retrieve data from August 2016 and September 
2016 respectively, while GI Slovenia’s Facebook account was blocked at the time of data retrieval.
7 The author has translated the quotes that were not originally in English.
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right seeks respectability by strongly rejecting fascism and nationalism. It attempts 
to create a counter-discourse to the 1968 generation by appropriating exactly these 
actors’ strategies and claims to a right-wing discourse of ethnic homogeneity and 
“discrimination against all things ‘foreign’” (Minkenberg 2000, pp. 179–180). The 
political current has inspired several of today’s far-right parties (Minkenberg 2000). 
As the following section shows, the GI’s conception of “identity” draws heavily on 
the “new right” understandings of the term.
6.3  Identity: Regional, National and European-But 
Not Egalitarian
In order to understand GI’s protagonist and antagonist identity construction, one 
must first grasp how the transnational movement perceives the concept of “iden-
tity”. The GI activists see their identity and culture as consisting of three interdepen-
dent layers: the regional, national, and European, and use the image of a matryoshka 
to explain this view. You cannot be German without also being e.g. Bavarian and 
European, and you cannot be European without a corresponding national and 
regional identity. Yet, merely being a citizen of a European country is not sufficient 
to make you truly European (Robert in Weiß 2017, p. 105).
According to GI, the “pure” European identities are currently under threat from 
multiculturalism, egalitarianism, and individualism, leading to the autochthonous 
population experiencing an existential crisis (Willinger 2013). In GI’s interpreta-
tion, individualism has replaced social bonds and communitarian ties, creating 
autochthonous Europeans deprived of roots and identity, and thus suffering decline, 
loss and alienation. This reading is based on the new right understanding that 
humans are “lost and unsettled without community, fixed structures and hierar-
chies” (Bruns et al. 2017, p. 226). Against individualism, GI demands the return to 
a collective, communitarian, and heritage-based human “we” built on national 
ancestry. Accordingly, GI hopes for a societal return to the origins, as they “discov-
ered that [they] have roots and ancestors–and thus a future” (Morgan 2013, p. 10). 
In this reading, the world should consist of separate, ethnically homogenous com-
munities, clearing the way for a “bright future of the past” (Weiß 2017, p. 99). The 
GI activists thus wish to restore the “world as it ‘was’” (Taggart 2004, p. 274), by 
re-establishing the imaginary ethnically “pure” societies of the past, which have 
been corrupted by foreign influences, especially globalization, and third-country 
immigration. As the GI Manifesto states: “We are the rightful heirs to this continent, 
and we will not give up our inheritance” (Willinger 2013, p. 38).
GI’s wish to protect the European civilizational identity against “foreign” influ-
ences is based on the notion of “ethnopluralism”. Along similar lines as Huntington’s 
(1993) argument, the movement considers the world’s different civilizations too 
distinct to live side by side peacefully, and they are instead destined to wage war 
against each other. This forms the basis for GI’s statement that “We are the 
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generation of ethnic fracture, of the total failure of integration, the generation of 
forced crossbreeding” (Morgan 2013, p. 9). The argument draws on the French new 
right intellectual Alain de Benoist’s aforementioned term ethnopluralism. He argues 
that ethnically and culturally heterogeneous people are hierarchically equal, yet, 
they cannot coexist in the same geographical space, without this leading to ethnic 
conflict. At its core, the concept aims to strengthen natural borders, producing a 
global apartheid of ethnically segregated states, as the only way to ensure ethnic 
diversity is through the geographical segregation of cultures (Minkenberg 2000). GI 
in this way understands identity as ethnocultural and organic, as culture and identity 
are considered static, essentialist and nativist (Mense 2017). The argument is then 
only a linguistic turn away from explicit racism, as the term “race” solely has been 
replaced by “culture”, thereby upholding the differentialist racism (Eckes 2016) and 
totalitarian worldview of the past (Mense 2017). This ethnic distinction mainly tar-
gets one particular “other”, namely Islam and its adherents, who are considered the 
greatest visible threat currently facing the identity and culture of Europe’s autoch-
thonous population.
While GI maintains that there are regional and national distinctions between the 
autochthonous European populations, the activists consider all to belong to the 
same overarching cultural sphere. In the new right conception, the Europeans are 
bound by a “community of fate”, entailing a predestined need to defend the conti-
nent together (Bruns et al. 2017, p. 236). This makes the GI activists believe that a 
pan-European alliance is the best means to protect their identity and civilization. 
Yet, the further characterization of this “European civilization” is remarkably vague, 
as the description does not reach much beyond shared cultural and traditional traits. 
The three-layered identity-conception permits the groups to place their focus differ-
ently in terms of regionalism, nationalism and Europeanism. The Austrian and 
German GI groups for instance emphasize the völkisch nationalism, while the 
French and Italian groups mainly focus on the regions and Europe (Bruns et al. 2017).
Despite differences between the various GI groups, they unite around the asser-
tion that the battle against mass-immigration and “Islamization” (i.e. the gradual 
take-over of Muslim law and culture in Europe) “is the battle of our generation” (GI 
Austria 2017). Consequently, while the GI groups also mobilize against other 
identity- related issues, such as LGBT and gender policies, Muslim immigration is 
the main object of their joint mobilization. As will be shown in the following frame 
analysis, this became particularly evident during the so-called refugee crisis, where 




6.4  “Defend Europe”: GI and the European 
“Refugee Crisis”
All of the national GI groups under study increased their mobilization frequencies 
during the pan-European refugee (reception) crisis (2015–2017),8 albeit to varied 
extents, with GI Germany, GI Austria, and GI France by far organizing the most 
protest actions in their respective countries. Moreover, except for the larger focus on 
refugees and asylum seekers in the 2015–2017 period, the overarching collective 
action frames remained similar to the ones employed since the creation of GI France 
in 2012. GI France was already rather active on the streets from 2013 onwards, and 
especially GI Austria and GI Germany strongly increased their protest actions in the 
2015–2017 period. GI Hungary and GI Slovenia, on the other hand, only began car-
rying out protest actions in 2016, while GI Czech Republic and GI Italy have strug-
gled more to organize their own protest actions, mainly due to limited resources. In 
terms of protest forms, all GI groups mainly carried out demonstrative protests, 
most commonly in the form of banner-drops. Building occupations and disruptions 
of meetings have been recurring confrontational protest tactics, but before 2015, it 
was mainly GI France that employed confrontational protest forms to express its 
demands. Yet, from 2015 onwards, GI Austria and GI Germany also carried out 
numerous blockades of roads and entrances to buildings, such as refugee and 
migrant centers, and, in this way, radicalized their mobilization substantially.
Moreover, in the 2015–2017 period, Eastern and Western European groups 
joined forces at several transnational events, including numerous border protests, 
the 2016 “Summer of Resistance” demonstrations in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, 
street theatre performances against terrorism and Islamist violence, and “solidarity 
actions” for the autochthonous European population. The following section goes 
through GI’s four diagnoses in relation to these protests, namely that the refugees 
and immigrants pose a threat in cultural, demographic, economic, and security 
terms.9 This analysis also examines the movement’s antagonist and protagonist 
identity constructions.
8 While the refugee (reception) crisis was at its height in 2015–2016, many of the national and 
EU-responses to the situation were either only taking shape, or further developed during 2017, just 
as the migrant routes continued to be a topic of heated debate throughout that year.
9 Other European radical and extreme right populist movements and parties also commonly voice 
these four frames (see Lazaridis and Campani 2017).
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6.4.1  Cultural Threat: Loss of “European Identity” 
Through Islamization
Unsurprisingly, all GI groups strongly voice the frame of cultural threat. GI fears 
the erosion of a culturally and biologically based European identity through Muslim 
immigration and alleged Islamization, due to the conviction that the communitarian 
and homogenous “we” is in danger of disappearing through the mass-immigration 
of civilizational “others”. This view was expressed cohesively at GI’s 2016 “Summer 
of Resistance” demonstrations in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. The French demonstra-
tion, “This is Our Home” (On est chez nous), was joined by German and Austrian 
GI activists, and it was organized to “show our determination to continue living on 
our land according to our laws, our values, in the respect of our identity”.10 Similarly, 
in Vienna, at the annual European GI protest, this time under the motto “Defend 
Europe”, GI Austria demanded the “unconditional protection of the European cul-
ture and tradition” (GI Austria 2016).
To curb the cultural threat, GI suggests closing the borders, and promotes a pro-
cess of remigration. The call for so-called “remigration” of third-country immi-
grants is a term GI France has adopted from BI, referring to the (forced) returning 
of third-country immigrants to their home countries. As argued by Aftenberger 
(2017), this is merely a rewriting of the neo-Nazi calls for “Foreigners out” 
(Ausländer raus). At the protest events, the “remigration” demand is mainly directed 
towards “illegal” and “criminal” immigrants, as well as “economic refugees”. Yet, 
in reality, it relates to all third-country immigrants, as, in the words of GI Germany, 
there should be “a demographic tendency change towards remigration” (GI Germany 
n.d.-b).
6.4.2  Demographic Threat: Fearing the Great Replacement
The demographic threat frame revolves around the conviction that Europe is cur-
rently undergoing a Great Replacement process. Adopting Renaud Camus’11 con-
cept, GI argues that the European autochthonous population is gradually being 
“repressed and replaced” by non-European immigrants, due to the combination of 
falling birth rates, and the “growth of Islamic parallel societies and mass- 
immigration” (GI Germany n.d.-a). Particularly in Western Europe, activists fear 
becoming minorities in their own country within a few decades, and in this way 
turning into “the Indians of Europe” (Morgan 2013, p. 33). In reference to Eastern 
Europe, activists argue that once the West is “full”, the East will follow.12 This 
10 GI France Facebook post 15.5.2016. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
11 He published the book The Replacement of People (Le Changement de people) in 2013, outlin-
ing what he argued to be the ongoing Europe-wide “phenomenon”.
12 Speech by Jean-David Cattin, delivered at a GI Czech Republic meeting in 2014: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=JEdfEHCcPRo. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
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diagnosis is closely interlinked with the cultural threat outlined above, and it led the 
GI national groups to organize numerous protest events, such as the “Stop the Great 
Replacement” demonstration in Vienna in June 2015, which included GI activists 
from across Europe.13 Moreover, as part of the 2016 “Summer of Resistance” pro-
tests, GI Germany organized an “Uprising against the Injustice” (Aufstand gegen 
das Unrecht), stating that “We are in the frontline against the self-abolition14 and the 
Great Replacement” (GI Germany 2016c). Here, particularly GI Germany’s word- 
choice of “self-abolition” points to the existential threat that the non-European 
immigrants pose, and which should motivate people to act.
6.4.3  Economic Threat: Welfare for “Our Own People First”
Considering the economic threat, GI aligns with the welfare chauvinist frame shared 
by several radical right parties (see: Cinpoeş and Norocel, Chap. 4; Hellström and 
Tawat, Chap. 2 in the present volume) and considers third-country immigrants det-
rimental to the various European social systems (Morgan 2013). Yet, very similar to 
neo-fascist parties and organizations, such as Golden Dawn (Greece), Hogar Social 
(Spain) and CasaPound (Italy), the majority of the national GI groups take this 
welfare-protectionist stance to a further extreme through their so-called “Generation 
Solidarity”, or “Patriotic Solidarity” actions. They are based on the same claims as 
those of the radical right–that the migrants are offered better social benefits than the 
socially vulnerable autochthonous Europeans, who are considered “left behind” by 
the national governments and civil society organizations. Yet, by adhering to a sort 
of “ethnicized socialism” (François 2009), GI frames these direct social actions (cf. 
Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2016) as an instance of explicit anti-national racism 
(e.g. anti-French, anti-Italian), and carries out acts of resistance. Activists have, for 
instance, organized charity and assistance drives exclusively targeting “autochtho-
nous” groups of socioeconomically vulnerable individuals. In France, some of the 
local groups give donations and serve pork soup to the homeless every winter with 
the slogan “Ours before the others”. GI Austria similarly helps the people “who are 
let down by politics”, by providing the homeless with goulash soup (thus containing 
pork).15 GI Italy and GI Czech Republic, on the other hand, collect donations for 
national citizens, while GI Hungary and GI Germany distribute food to the poor.
13 GI Austria Facebook post 6.6.2015. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
14 A reference to the 2010 book Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab) by Thilo 
Sarrazin, a previous member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).
15 GI Austria Facebook post 8.10.2015. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
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6.4.4  Security Threat: Terrorists, Islamists 
and Criminal Immigrants
The security threat frame is based on the ethnopluralist premise that culturally dis-
tinct people cannot live in the same geographical place without this leading to eth-
nic strife, conflicts, and violence (instigated by the non-autochthonous residents). 
GI France has expressed this since 2012, carrying out several campaigns against 
criminal immigrants (the so-called “riff-raff”), who they accuse of acting violently 
against the autochthonous population, and GI Austria and GI Italy have conducted 
similar actions. During the refugee crisis, GI France’s blockade of the entrance to 
Calais in March 2016 (Dearden 2016), and GI Austria and GI Germany’s second 
border protest in Freilassing in January 2016 both highlighted the violent nature of 
refugees and immigrants. Referring to the events on New Year’s Eve in Cologne, GI 
Germany even referred to the “hundreds of thousands of criminals”, which the open 
borders had “flushed” into the country (GI Germany 2016a).
The rise in Islamist terrorist attacks on European soil in the period of 2015–2016 
added to the saliency of the security frame. One of the more explicit ways of dem-
onstrating the dangerous nature of Islamist terrorists was through public perfor-
mances of imitated terrorist attacks and/or ISIS killings. This particular type of 
protest event began in Austria in December 2015,16 and spread over to Prague (GI 
Germany 2016b), several German cities (see GI Germany 2017), and Budapest (GI 
Hungary 2017a). Some of the numerous border protests that took place in the period 
from June 2015–March 2016 also revolved around the protection against Islamist 
terrorists and/or criminal immigrants. Moreover, in both February 2016 and 
November 2017, GI France planned to organize a transnational demonstration 
against terrorism, the first in Molenbeek, in Brussels region (entitled “Expulsion of 
the terrorists”), and the second in Paris (“Facing Terrorists: Defend Europe!”). 
However, both of these demonstrations were forbidden by the authorities, due to 
fears of violence erupting between GI activists and counter-demonstrators. The 
most commonly voiced prognosis for the terrorist threat is again the return of the 
Muslim immigrants to their countries of origin (“remigration”), and the reinforce-
ment of the national and/or EU borders.
As has become visible from the analysis above, GI’s transnational protest activi-
ties during the refugee crisis were largely framed around the matter of safeguarding 
the European civilizational identity against non-European refugees and immigrants. 
The over-arching diagnostic frame identified by the various GI groups was that 
Muslim mass-immigration poses a threat to the European autochthonous popula-
tion, which is further divisible into cultural, demographic, economic, and security 
threat dimensions. While there are of course differences between the frames 
employed by the various GI groups, all of these frames are intrinsically linked. 
Moreover, at their core, they all lead to the same conclusion: Due to the existential 
16 ISIS-Enthauptung mitten in WIEN | Mariahilfer Straße 21.12.2015 (YouTube). https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=WwRV2bYGa5E. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
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threat that Muslim immigrants pose to the European autochthonous population, 
there should be no Muslim immigrants or refugees in Europe.
6.5  Protagonist Identity: A Fighting Community 
in the Defense of European Civilization
At its foundation in 2013, GI presented itself as a “fighting community” on its web-
site (Morgan 2013, p. 12). The GI groups preserve this sentiment in their frequent 
references to masculine warriors and portrayals of themselves as heroic knights, 
who will come to the rescue of Europe (Weiß 2017). While women should prefera-
bly play the role of “traditional homemakers”, the movement maintains a masculin-
ity ideal based on classical conceptions of the heterosexual, strong, warrior-like 
men (Blum 2017, p. 329). This, for instance, becomes visible in the frequent depic-
tions of, and participation in, combat sports, as both the male and female activists 
are offered combat skills training, for instance at GI camps or conferences (cf. Blum 
2017; Bruns et al. 2017). At the annual Summer Universities in France, the partici-
pants even wear the same clothes, symbolizing uniformity and order (Dupin 2017). 
The use of these symbols, practices, and frames should be seen in relation with GI 
France’s ambition “to prevent the civil war” in Europe (GI France leader, Pierre 
Larti cited in Dupin 2017, p. 45). The movement furthers this aim through its self- 
presentation as “the barricade upon which our youth are mounting in order to fight 
for their identity” (Morgan 2013, p. 12). GI thereby conjures an apocalyptic senti-
ment, portraying itself as the last bastion in the defense of the autochthonous ethni-
cally “pure” European population, fighting against egalitarianism, Islam, and mass 
immigration.
Besides the attributes outlined above, much of the group’s identity work revolves 
around historical war references, starting with the movement’s logo, the Greek letter 
Lambda, which refers to the shields of the outnumbered Spartan soldiers as depicted 
in the movie 300. As stated by a member of GI Czech Republic, the Lambda should 
be seen as “a symbol of determination and resilience” (GI Czech Republic 2015). 
This aligns with the frequent references to the shared history of battling Islam as a 
joint European venture. Through the “embellishment and reconstitution of relevant 
aspects of the past” (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 195), GI employs the glorification of the 
European past for a dual purpose. The movement provides a pan-European narrative 
for the ongoing battle against the culturally foreign oppressor, but also grounds this 
narrative in actual historical occurrences. GI France’s frequent mention of Charles 
Martel and his Poitiers victory is one example among many others, as each GI group 
refers to its own country’s historical figures and events. Historical battles are also 
discussed at the transnational GI level, for instance at the 2016 Summer University, 
which was entitled “From Covadonga to Calais”, in reference to the site of the first 
Christian victory over the Islamic Umuyyad Caliphate on the Iberian Peninsula 
in 722 AD.
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The symbolic “battle frame” also becomes visible through demonstrations, pro-
cessions, and other protest events commemorating historical European victories 
over the Ottomans. As examples, GI Hungary and GI Austria respectively organized 
a commemorative procession in the autumn of 2017, with participation by GI activ-
ists from abroad. Both marches referred to battles, where armies of European sol-
diers had fought off the Ottomans (Battle of Buda in 1686, and Battle of Vienna in 
1683 respectively) (GI Hungary 2017b; GI Austria 2017). GI’s highlighting of these 
battles can be considered allusions to a European “mythical Golden Age”, where the 
continent “allegedly experienced unity and glory, fullness and greatness” (Forchtner 
2016, p. 275), a period to which Europe should return.
Moreover, as the victories in these battles not only led to the liberation of the 
country in which the clash took place, but also several other states, the defense of 
Europe is not only a national matter. Rather, it becomes a pan-European project, as 
“if one state falls, the next ones will follow”. As mentioned earlier, GI also employs 
this way of framing the situation when explaining the Eastern European GI group’s 
strong mobilization against Islam, despite the comparatively low numbers of 
Muslim residents in that part of Europe.17 These pan-European framings of battling 
Islam should be seen in connection with GI’s call for a so-called Reconquista of 
Europe, i.e. the reconquering of the continent from the Muslim “invaders”,18 either 
to be perceived “metaphorically or more concrete…” (Les Identitaires n.d.). While 
the concrete is rather self-explanatory, the metaphorical sense refers to the battle for 
cultural hegemony, where GI is up against the proponents of today’s prevalent left- 
liberal societal discourse.
6.6  Antagonist Identities: The European Political 
Leadership, Pro-migrant Actors, 
and Muslim Immigrants
While GI frames immigrants as the most acute threat to the maintenance of European 
identity, the movement identifies national, and in some cases European, govern-
ments and the left-wing elite as the main culprits. The main antagonists, in other 
words, are those actors who, in their appeals to pluralism and egalitarianism, do not 
counter third-country immigration to Europe. They thus come in conflict with GI’s 
cause of preserving, or returning to, a Europe that is homogeneously ‘pure’. 
Particularly the economic threat diagnosis is very strongly blamed on the national 
politicians and pro-migrant and -minority organizations–proponents of pluralism 
17 See for instance the video of Jean-David Cattin’s speech at a GI Czech Republic meeting in 
2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEdfEHCcPRo. Accessed 25 Apr 2018.
18 In 2001, Faye introduced the term “Reconquista” in his call for a defense against the Muslim 
“colonization of Europe” (Weiß 2017). It derives from Spanish and Portuguese and refers to the 
reconquering of the Muslim kingdoms by the Christians on the Iberian Peninsula.
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and human rights. GI portrays these actors as lacking compassion for the autochtho-
nous population, who they see as being sidelined in favor of the foreign “other”. 
Moreover, GI also very clearly villainized pro-migrant and pro-refugee actors dur-
ing the so-called “Defend Europe” mission in the Mediterranean in 2017. The “mis-
sion” consisted of GI activists from Italy, France, Austria, and Germany, who set out 
in a boat to monitor the rescue missions at sea to ensure that they complied with the 
regulations. This was targeted at pro-migrant NGOs, which were accused of “human 
trafficking” and endangering the lives of the refugees (for an account of the “mis-
sion”, see Oppenheim 2017). Reversely, the GI activists attempted to frame them-
selves as the true humanitarians, unlike the NGOs, which were acting “under the 
guise of humanitarian rescue operations” (GI Germany n.d.-c).
At the same time, the national governments of particularly the Western European 
GI groups’ states were heavily criticized for their way of dealing with the refugee 
(reception) crisis, especially in terms of policy responses to the “open borders”. 
Each of the border protests for instance targeted the national, or European, politi-
cians for their irresponsible conduct, their lacking response, or their total loss of 
control of the refugee situation. Particularly the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
was blamed for her decision to keep the borders open, while especially Viktor Orbán 
was highlighted as the “good example” for devising policies to restrict further 
immigration, and in this way became “widely admired in all of Western Europe” for 
his patriotic conduct (Sellner 2017).
This strategy of blaming the politicians or pro-migrant actors has several pur-
poses. For one, it allows GI “to construct migrants, refugees or Muslims as prob-
lems, without explicitly naming them as such” (Lehner 2017, p. 150). Yet, more 
importantly, the villainization of the liberal actors’ responses is in reality an adop-
tion of the “decade-old” extreme right motif of constructing “a left-wing, anti- 
national hegemony” (Aftenberger 2017, p. 218). Hence, by drawing attention to its 
“unpatriotic” political opponents, who allegedly act against the will of the people, 
GI attempts to further its own ambition of reclaiming the cultural hegemony of 
society.
Finally, the third-country immigrants and refugees are also strongly antagonized, 
albeit not always directly. Besides the allegations of Muslims “Islamizing” European 
societies, and generally being predisposed to violence, the GI activists also villain-
ized the immigrants and refugees in more implicit ways. One of these was by con-
tinuously employing terms questioning the refugees and immigrants’ claims for 
residence in Europe. This delegitimization was done by putting inverted commas 
around the term refugee (i.e. “refugee”), by referring to them as “economic refu-
gees” (Wirtschaftsflüchlinge), or generally as “illegal” or “clandestine”. The strat-
egy strongly antagonizes the refugees, as they are attributed with the immoral 
agenda of false residence claims. Moreover, this discourse strongly objectifies the 
immigrants, as the actual agency primarily is given to the political elites of European 
society.
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6.7  Conclusions
This chapter analyzed the European new right youth movement Generation Identity’s 
construction of a pan-European collective identity. The analysis revealed that despite 
the national contextual and organizational differences between the various GI 
groups, they still agree upon, and jointly mobilize around, a shared conception of 
“identity”, based on ethno-pluralist principles. The movement thus hopes for a 
future return to an imagined past, where Europe will consist of ethnically homoge-
nous communities, all belonging to the European cultural sphere. In order to begin 
attaining this goal, the GI activists develop a two-tiered transnational collective 
identity based on both a civilizational adherence (European) and type of movement 
(self-ascribed “fighting community”), making them able to carry out transnational 
protest events together. They thus portray themselves as the last protectors of Europe, 
heroically coming to the defense of the European autochthonous population, whose 
communitarian identity is endangered by egalitarianism and liberal values.
GI considers the national governments and the proponents of pluralist policies 
the main antagonists. The organization expresses this by pointing to the faulty, or 
lacking, policy proposals and actions carried out by these actors, plus their unfair 
treatment of the European autochthonous populations. This is not only a means to 
gain support for GI’s immediate cause of curbing third-country immigration to 
Europe, but also for its main ambition of reclaiming the cultural hegemony within 
society. It is thus the Muslim “others”, who are framed as the main threat, and 
around which most of the mobilization takes place, while the blame is mainly attrib-
uted to the European elites. The Muslim immigrants are depicted as culturally for-
eign, criminal “invaders”, whose presence in Europe is to the detriment of especially 
the most vulnerable European autochthonous citizens, and who do not have a legal 
basis for their residence claims. To combat this threat, the GI activists symbolically 
defend the European borders (through border protests and blockades), but also 
attempt to give the European populations violent wake-up calls about the dangerous 
nature of the Muslim immigrants and draw attention to the age-old history of Europe 
battling Islam. In this way, the “othering” of the Muslim immigrants serves the dual 
purpose of creating discursive barriers between the homogenous European “us” and 
the foreign “other”, while also acting as an instrument to target the liberal elite.
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When Donald Trump motivated building a wall on the US southern border by the 
need to protect the country from Mexican rapists, not only did he reiterate a 
centuries- old racist mythology of sexually violent brown men; his statement also 
points at how the contemporary frenzy for strengthening borders is fueled by racial 
and sexual anxieties. Pointing at the role of nostalgia, Wendy Brown (2010) argues 
that the passion for walls we are currently witnessing across the world reflects a 
masculinist fantasy of restoring sovereignty and protective capacities in the face of 
uncontrolled outsiders threatening to invade the pure, feminized national body.
After reports of several hundred cases of sexual assault against women in 
Cologne on New Years’ Eve 2015, attacks which the German police said were com-
mitted by mostly “young men of North African and Middle Eastern origin”, the 
trope of “migrants’ sexual violence” became a key focus in European debates, func-
tioning as a “recited truth” that produces social facts through narrativization and 
repetition across contexts (Lentin and Titley 2011, p. 21). Ideas that had for long 
circulated in far-right discourse entered mainstream public spheres to an unprece-
dented extent. In Sweden too, the events sparked debate. Five days after the reports 
from Cologne, it was revealed that during the summers of 2014 and 2015, there had 
been many incidents of sexual harassment at a Swedish music festival arranged in 
Kungsträdgården in central Stockholm. According to the newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter, these events had not been reported to the media by the police due to fears 
of fueling anti-immigration sentiments, as many of the assaults were, the internal 
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police reports said, committed by “so called refugee youths primarily from 
Afghanistan” (Wierup and Bouvin 2016).
This chapter examines representations of “migrants’ sexual violence” in Swedish 
media reporting and political debates in the wake of these events, focusing on the 
supposed relation between immigration and gender equality. Whereas the actual 
events in Cologne and Kungsträdgården were unrelated (at least in any immediate 
sense), complex and differed in many ways, a starting point here is that in the 
Swedish context during early 2016, they formed the background to one single media 
event. Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry define media events as “certain situated, 
thickened, centering performances of mediated communication that are focused on 
a thematic core, cross different media products and reach a wide and diverse multi-
plicity of audiences and participants” (2010, p. 12). Thus, the focus of this chapter 
is the discursive function of the “migrants’ sexual violence” trope in the Swedish 
public sphere in the aftermath of Cologne and Kungsträdgården. On a theoretical 
level, by drawing on poststructural and feminist literature on borders, I examine in 
what specific ways gendered, sexualized and racialized boundary-making under-
writes border regimes.
In Sweden, national identity has for decades been tied to the idea that the Swedish 
welfare model has created a unique society based on equality, solidarity and mod-
ernism. Gender equality policies such as paid parental leave, individual taxation and 
free abortion (all introduced in the 1970s) are regarded as cornerstones of the 
Swedish welfare model, and Swedish politicians commonly describe the country as 
“the most gender equal country in the world” (Towns 2002). The “feminist foreign 
policy” introduced in 2014 thus continues a history of positioning Sweden as an 
international forerunner in gender equality (Agius and Edenborg 2019). In addition, 
a “generous” refugee policy has been seen as an external face of the Swedish wel-
fare regime (together with foreign aid policy, which is of less relevance to this chap-
ter). The rhetoric of Sweden as exceptionally gender equal and exceptionally 
welcoming to refugees have both been criticized by feminists and others, for gloss-
ing over circumstances that contradict the image of Sweden as a progressive ideal 
(Martinsson et  al. 2016; Mulinari 2016; Norocel 2017). From another angle, the 
idea of refugee reception as a component of the Swedish welfare model has been 
challenged by “welfare chauvinist” ideas, arguing that immigration undermines 
social protection of Swedish citizens (Norocel 2016; see also Hellström and Tawat, 
Chap. 2 in this volume). Arguably, the notion of Sweden as a liberal ideal in asylum 
policy was dealt a blow in November 2015, when the social democratic-green gov-
ernment made a turnabout on immigration, reintroducing border controls to 
Schengen countries and restricting the rules for admitting asylum-seekers down to 
minimum EU levels, a move described by the Swedish Migration Board as a neces-
sary “breathing space” after Sweden had received 80.000 asylum-seekers during the 
two preceding months (Åberg 2015). Whereas historically, the notions of being 
“women-friendly”, and “refugee-friendly” have often functioned together to bolster 
a narrative of the Swedish welfare model as uniquely progressive, the Cologne 
events were sometimes interpreted as illustrating a conflict between the two. This 
points to a broader tendency in European politics, where immigration is  increasingly 
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portrayed as endangering women’s rights, what Sara Farris (2017) describes as 
“femonationalism”.
I argue that in Sweden, the discursive circulation of the “migrants’ sexual vio-
lence” trope constituted a bordering practice (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012), 
retrospectively confirming (implicitly or explicitly) the necessity of the stricter bor-
der regime. The idea of endangered gender equality was an important part of a 
securitization process whereby immigration from countries supposedly character-
ized by patriarchal cultures was portrayed as an existential threat to the Swedish 
welfare model. This process has contributed to closing off possibilities to argue for 
a return to previous, less strict, border policies. Theoretically, the results show how 
gendered, sexual, and racial dichotomies–in this case of a progressive, modern, and 
decidedly Swedish gender order imagined as threatened by foreign masculinities–
perform a key role in reproducing inside/outside distinctions that underwrite con-
temporary border regimes, thus illustrating how certain borders may condition the 
possibility of other borders (Walker 2010, p. 6). Returning to the master frames of 
this book, the narrative about immigrants bringing patriarchal “un-Swedish values”, 
and thus endangering Swedish gender equality, indicate that gendered notions of 
culture and welfare, and the emotional registers of nostalgia, hope, and in this case 
also fear, which are produced when these are deemed threatened, are crucial to 
understanding how border and migration policies are sustained and justified. The 
chapter shows that not only are welfare matters always enmeshed with issues per-
taining to culture (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume); ideas of gender are 
at the heart of both, in this case even structuring their relation by providing a tem-
plate for what is perceived as necessary to protect and from whom.
7.1.1  Notes on Methodology
In a qualitative content analysis of selected texts, I identify recurrent themes and use 
these as starting points for a critical discussion. The first (and most extensive) part 
of the analysis examines media reporting about the Cologne and Kungsträdgården 
events in four Swedish newspapers. The sources included were the morning papers 
Dagens Nyheter (DN, liberal independent) and Svenska Dagbladet (SvD, conserva-
tive independent), and the tabloids Aftonbladet (social-democratic independent) and 
Expressen (liberal independent). They all have a national outreach, and are among 
the most read daily newspapers in Sweden, and together give a rather comprehen-
sive picture of mainstream discourse. With the help of the media archive Retriever, 
I collected all articles mentioning either the word Cologne (“Köln”), or 
“Kungsträdgården” during January and February 2016, including news articles, op- 
eds, and debate articles. Articles whose use of these terms was unrelated to the 
events in question were removed.
Given the aims of the chapter, the analysis concentrates on articles where sexual 
harassment was mentioned in connection to multiculturalism, refugees, integration, 
ethno-cultural explanations, or anti-immigration attitudes (whether the link was 
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reaffirmed or, as was sometimes the case, repudiated). Such connections were made 
in 155 of the 223 articles, i.e. in slightly more than two thirds (see Table 7.1). Based 
on thematic grouping, four distinct (albeit overlapping) storylines were identified 
and analyzed in relation to ongoing discussions in border studies literature. The 
remaining 68 articles that made no such reference discussed the events either with-
out explaining them, or in terms of men’s sexual violence, class, or some other fac-
tor. That the latter articles were not analyzed in detail clearly represents a bias, but 
given that the chapter does not aim to give a “full picture” of Swedish media report-
ing but rather to specifically analyze discourses on migration and gender equality in 
the wake of these events, this should not compromise the validity of the results. 
While I do not systematically compare different types of material or different types 
of media, but rather seek to identify what storylines were present in the media 
reporting as a whole, through-out the analysis it is clarified in what type of material 
(op-ed, news article etc.) and media outlet the individual quotes were found.
The second (and shorter) part looks at how Swedish party leaders in their 2016 
speeches in Almedalen, an annual highly publicized political event, focused on 
“Swedish values” in relation to immigration and gender equality. It examines the 
extent to which the “migrant’s sexual violence” trope by now functioned as a point 
of reference to suggest that immigration had caused a conflict of values between 
“Swedish” and “foreign” views on women. The analysis is based on party leaders’ 
speeches during Almedalen 2016, accessed primarily via the parties’ own webpages.
7.2  Borders, Emotions, and Gender
The chapter draws on critical theories of borders, geopolitical boundary-making 
and regimes of mobility. Three interrelated points from this literature are particu-
larly important: (1) that borders are continually performed in the everyday; (2) the 
role of emotions in such bordering practices, and (3) that border regimes are gen-
dered and sexualized.
The first point, a key idea in so called Critical Border Studies, is that borders, 
rather than simply territorial dividing lines, can be studied as processes or “border-
ing practices”, denoting activities which have the effect of constituting, sustaining 
Table 7.1 Synthetic presentation of collected empirical material for part I
Source
Number of articles with 
relevant mentions of “Köln” 
and/or “Kungsträdgården”
Number of articles mentioning “Köln” 
and/or “Kungsträdgården” in connection 
to ethnicity/migration
Dagens Nyheter 80 54 (68%)
Svenska Dagbladet 65 40 (62%)
Aftonbladet 34 27 (79%)
Expressen 44 34 (77%)
Total 223 155 (70%)
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or modifying borders (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012). Inspired by Étienne 
Balibar’s idea that “borders are everywhere” (2004), many border researchers 
understand bordering as a dispersed practice taking place not only at the geographi-
cal limits of the state but also in the everyday. Through processes of ongoing “bor-
derwork” (Rumford 2012), or “everyday bordering” (Yuval-Davis et  al. 2018) 
borders are inscribed at various sites within and between states, by various actors, 
with dramatically different consequences for different people. Moreover, bordering 
involves an inside-looking demarcation of the nation, and the idea that its core val-
ues are imperiled by outsiders, legitimizing those measures deemed necessary to 
protect the inside from the outside (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012). Walls and bor-
ders, Brown (2010) argues, not only protect but produce the content of the societies 
they delineate. By promising to protect populations from outsiders endangering 
“our way of life”, they simultaneously define the meaning of that “way of life”, 
nostalgically envisioning what risks being taken away or what has already been lost.
Secondly, as Brown hints at, emotions such as hope, nostalgia, love and hatred 
play a crucial role in the everyday production of borders. Feminist geographers have 
explored the affective underpinnings of geopolitical boundary-making, stressing for 
example how fear creates borders (Pain 2009). Sara Ahmed (2014) argues that the 
circulation of emotions has a constitutive effect, creating the surfaces and borders 
that allow us to distinguish between inside and outside. For example, the experience 
of pain when an object touches or penetrates the skin allows us to experience the 
boundedness of the body itself: “it is through this violation that I feel the border in 
the first place” (Ahmed 2014, p. 27). When applied to the collective body, this sug-
gests that the crossing of a border, while indicating the penetrability of the commu-
nity, simultaneously reproduces the community and reminds us of its existence 
(Butler and Spivak 2010).
Thirdly, the inside/outside delineations that underwrite bordering practices are 
imbued with ideas of gender: indeed, “bordering practices are […] made possible 
by certain operating logics that are always already both highly gendered and racial-
ized”, since “particular regimes of mobility and immobility are only imaginable, 
implementable and sustainable because they tap into and reify prior assumptions 
about gender, race, class” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2013, pp. 524, 510).
In recent years, immigration and multiculturalism are increasingly being por-
trayed as in conflict with a putatively Western gender order (Edenborg and Jungar 
forthcoming). Lentin and Titley (2011) identify what they call a reshaping of rac-
ism in Western Europe, whereby racialized exclusion is supported by discourses of 
liberalism, attacking the “illiberalism” of Muslim minorities. Gender is central to 
this narrative, as women’s and LGBTQ rights are imagined as a national or 
European property endangered by immigration. Sara Farris’ (2017) notion of “fem-
onationalism” refers to how nationalists, certain feminists, and neoliberals are con-
verging around the idea that Muslim males constitute a threat to Western societies, 
due to their oppressive treatment of women. Lentin and Titley, as well as Farris, 
associate these discourses with a neoliberal logic that replaces the addressing of 
economic inequalities and structural injustices with talk of “incompatible values”, 
and “cultural conflict”. The current tendency, as Brown puts it, to “sneak liberalism 
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into a civilizational discourse” serves to legitimize control and violence against 
those populations identified as illiberal, without tainting the liberal identity of the 
states performing those actions (Brown 2006, p. 8, p. 179). As discussed later, the 
idea of a national or Western progressive gender order endangered by racialized 
Others not only externalizes patriarchy as a foreign problem, but serves the con-
crete political purpose of whitewashing increasingly illiberal border regimes 
(Edenborg 2018).
7.3  Media Representations of “Migrants’ Sexual Violence”
7.3.1  The Invention of a Media Cover-Up
The first reports of the Cologne events appeared in Swedish press on 6 January 
2016. In its first article, Dagens Nyheter wrote about “mass sexual harassments” 
involving around 1000 men, citing information from German police that the “perpe-
trators are supposed to be young men from North Africa and the Middle East” (Lund 
and Sundberg 2016). Expressen, Aftonbladet, and Svenska Dagbladet, already in 
their initial news coverage, mentioned the ethnic origin of the suspected perpetra-
tors (Järkstig 2016; Larsson 2016; SvD 2016). Nonetheless, it was repeatedly 
claimed in Swedish press that the involvement of migrants in the events was 
silenced. A Dagens Nyheter op-ed on 8 January entitled “Silence is not gold” men-
tioned the German police’s and media’s “unusually long wait” before reporting 
about the events, and the fact that the first article about the events on Swedish 
Television’s webpage had had the headline “Disorder in Cologne”, as indications of 
media silencing: “There is sometimes a tendency among the media to be extra care-
ful with news risking to ‘strike against vulnerable groups’ (…) To be silent or to 
mumble is a big betrayal of the victims of the crime” (DN 2016).
The debate about media silencing intensified further after the reports from 
Kungsträdgården. According to Dagens Nyheter, which was the first newspaper to 
report about the case, during the most recent “We are STHLM”-festivals in 2014 
and 2015, there had been a large number of incidents of sexual harassment of young 
women and girls. While only around ten formal charges had been filed–it had been 
difficult to identify the perpetrators as the attacks were made in the crowds–during 
2015 the police had identified a group of 50 suspected men, described in an internal 
police report as “so-called refugee youth, primarily from Afghanistan” and 200 
young men had been removed from the festival. However, in their press reports the 
police had stated that there had been “relatively few crimes and apprehensions in 
relation to the number of visitors”. A head of police admitted that the police had 
acted improperly in not reporting the Kungsträdgården incidents to the media, say-
ing that “we sometimes do not dare to tell it like it is because we believe it will 
benefit the Sweden Democrats” (Wierup and Bouvin 2016).
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For some, the aftermath of Cologne and to a greater extent Kungsträdgården 
were indicative of a general reluctance to discuss problems associated with 
 immigration. An Expressen op-ed described Sweden as a “culture of denial”, with 
“a long history of sweeping serious problems connected to values and immigration 
under the rug” (Kronqvist 2016a). A Norwegian professor of International Migration, 
interviewed in Dagens Nyheter, described the Swedish debate climate as “anxious” 
and “so afraid to speak of difficult questions that one does not even dare to take up 
and discuss different possible reasons for criminal actions” (Letmark 2016).
The characterization of Sweden as a particularly “politically correct” country 
where uncomfortable views on immigration cannot be expressed is a long-standing 
theme in Swedish far-right fringe media as well as in neighboring countries, where 
Sweden is often used as a warning example. However, the idea that the truth of 
immigration is silenced is not specific to descriptions of Sweden but a recurring 
narrative across Europe. Studying immigration and integration debates in different 
countries, Lentin and Titley (2011) show that insistent calls for “honesty, maturity 
and openness”–always taken to mean a more skeptical approach to immigration–is 
a constant feature of this genre. The fact that the debates, for all their popularity and 
intensity, are never held to be sufficiently “open”, point at a paradox: “always ongo-
ing, they are never really happening” (2011, p. 128). Lentin and Titley suggest that 
such debates are never felt to be satisfactorily open because their function is mainly 
ritualic. Immigration and integration debates, they argue, are “screens for the pro-
jection of profound and emotionally involving questions about social and national 
futures” (2011, p. 129), whereby the figure of the immigrant functions to temporar-
ily compress anxieties, but the discussions never fully capture or reduce these anxi-
eties, nor provide any political possibilities for their resolution.
7.3.2  Immigration, Cultural Conflict and Gender Equality
A recurrent idea in the Cologne and Kungsträdgården reporting was that immigra-
tion meant that patriarchal attitudes were imported from countries where oppression 
of women was widespread. A Svenska Dagbladet op-ed argued that: “This is where 
we need to start: there is a denigrating view on women in several of these countries 
and as people have moved to Europe, this has also become a concern for us” (Ivanov 
2016). In an analysis piece in Dagens Nyheter by a crime reporter, it was asked if 
the Cologne events marked the beginning of a new wave of sex crimes and an 
“attack on Western gender equality” (Wierup 2016). An Expressen op-ed argued 
that a debate on “values and views on women connected to immigration” was 
needed: “As wrong as it is to overgeneralize about all individuals in a group, it is 
equally naïve to think that all who come to Sweden become good feminists as soon 
as they pass the Öresund Bridge” (Kronqvist 2016a). The framing of Cologne as 
representing a gendered clash of cultures recurred in debates across Europe 
(Wodak 2018).
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Those who argued that a cultural conflict was the main explanation for the attacks 
in Cologne and Kungsträdgården differed in how they described this conflict. In a 
debate article in Svenska Dagbladet, a philosophy professor highlighted archaic 
tribal cultures seeing women as “prey to take advantage of” (Bauhn 2016). Others 
stressed, with varying emphasis, the importance of cultural and religious norms in 
countries of origin as a key factor behind the attacks, contrasting these norms to the 
values about gender equality supposedly prevalent in Sweden. In a debate article in 
Expressen, a well-known theologian wrote that she refused to “sacrifice the freedom 
of her daughter and all other women”, describing the home countries of the Cologne 
attackers as
…countries with an extremely patriarchal morality. It is countries where the values funda-
mentally differ from ours. Women are ascribed lower value than men–and women regarded 
as sexually active are whores (…) Values are persistent, they take time to change, but we 
have done a good job in Sweden. Sweden is a relatively gender equal country. There are 
problems, not least with sexual violence, but we have come a good bit on the way. Other 
cultures have other values and norms about male, female and sexuality. This must be dis-
cussed, substantially, not trivialized and relativized (Heberlein 2016).
The discussion about immigration and “Swedish values”, to which I return to 
later in this chapter, illustrates what Mahmood Mamdani describes as a “culturaliza-
tion of politics”: the reduction of conflict to culture in a way that conflates religion, 
ethnicity, culture, race, and sexual norms into a tangible essence that is assumed to 
explain the actions of its members, glossing over political economy, history, and 
global relations. Liberal societies, Mamdani argues (2004, p. 18), think of them-
selves as masters of culture whereas “premodern” societies are seen as merely pas-
sive conduits of culture.
The framing of Cologne and Kungsträdgården as primarily a problem of cul-
tural conflict was challenged by feminists highlighting the omnipresence of sexual 
violence across cultures (Fahl 2016; Wirtén 2016). Similarly, some argued that the 
focus on immigration led to the neglect of women’s own experiences of sexual 
violence, lamenting that the events were being kidnapped by political forces who 
had never before cared about gender equality or women’s safety (Björkman 2016; 
Pettersson 2016). While the latter representations offered important counterargu-
ments challenging the anti-immigrant interpretation of Cologne and 
Kungsträdgården, when considered from the perspective of Sara Ahmed’s ideas of 
the cultural politics of emotions, their significance become more complex to esti-
mate. According to Ahmed, emotions have a “sticky” effect as they move between 
figures, the characteristics of one figure being transferred or displaced onto the 
other. When figures are put in proximity to each other, even though the connection 
is not explicitly articulated or is explicitly repudiated, such sticky associations may 
still be created. When those links have become established, open allegations 
become unnecessary; as Ahmed puts it “the undeclared history sticks” (2014, 
p. 47). In our case, the repeated placement of “sexual violence” in proximity to the 
figure of “male migrant”–also in those cases the link was denied–had a similar 
dynamic, sticking the two figures together with the effect that the supposed link (as 
later shown) became intuitive and unnecessary to spell out.
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7.3.3  “Migrants’ Sexual Violence” as Motivating a More 
Restrictive Border Regime
On several occasions, the reports of migrants harassing women in public spaces 
were used to argue for concrete changes in migration policy. The political reactions 
in Germany after the Cologne events provided a backdrop for such discussions. An 
Aftonbladet news columnist described Cologne as a potential “watershed” in immi-
gration debates in Germany and the rest of Europe, leading to what was called a 
“turning of thumbscrews”, such as the Merkel government’s proposals to expel 
asylum-seekers who commit crimes, and restrict the right for refugees to decide 
their location of residence. Alluding to the Swedish government’s turnabout on 
immigration in November 2015, it was said that: “Sweden has already pulled the 
emergency brake. There is an increased risk that Germany will do the same to dras-
tically decrease the refugee inflow” (Hansson 2016).
Several political parties in Sweden explicitly took the events as an argument for 
a further tightened border regime. Interviewed in Expressen, the party secretary of 
the Sweden Democrats argued that “the events in Kungsträdgården make more and 
more people aware of the effects of the outrageous immigration policy that has been 
pursued by the other parties” (Svensson 2016b). In a debate article in Svenska 
Dagbladet, the Christian Democrats, referring to Cologne and Kungsträdgården, 
proposed that asylum-seekers who commit sex crimes should have their asylum 
applications rejected and quickly deported, and that it should be easier to deport 
also sex offenders who have residence permit in Sweden (Busch Thor and Carlson 
2016). A Svenska Dagbladet op-ed described proposals to expel asylum-seekers 
who “do not respect the bodily integrity of women”, as a welcome reevaluation of 
the right to asylum, arguing that the Geneva Convention should be abandoned in 
favor of a quota system, which would not only decrease the number of deaths in the 
Mediterranean, but also make it possible to prioritize women and children before 
young men (Lönnqvist 2016).
Also noting the over-representation of young men among asylum-seekers, an 
Expressen op-ed cited the American political scientist Valerie Hudson’s argument 
that immigration is creating a male surplus in Europe comparable to China’s, which 
according to her leads to higher crime rates and more violence. Arguing that 
Sweden’s migration policy could hardly be called feminist, the op-ed pointed at 
several possible solutions such as focusing on quota refugees instead of asylum- 
seekers, and prioritizing women and children (Kronqvist 2016b).
Wendy Brown (2006) argues that civilizational rhetoric designating certain pop-
ulations as violent and barbaric functions to gloss over or legitimize liberal states’ 
own violation of international liberal norms in its treatment of such populations. As 
seen here, Cologne and Kungsträdgården were interpreted as constituting evidence 
that certain illiberal measures–aimed at keeping out or expelling people who do not 
respect the freedom of women–were not only compatible with the liberal state, but 
necessary to protect it from illiberal incursions.
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7.3.4  The Pedagogy at the Border and the “Good 
Refugee Man”
Borders (widely understood) have a doubly constitutive effect, producing both the 
subjectivities of bodies “at the border”, and of the societies they are meant to protect 
(Brambilla 2015; Brown 2010). Nowhere was this duality clearer than in the 
repeated calls for “sex education” of migrant men. In the previously mentioned 
debate article, the Christian Democrats, in addition to calling for deportation of 
asylum-seeking sex offenders, stressed the importance that migrants are informed 
about which rights and obligations are prevalent in Sweden:
People who seek protection in our country, who have been welcomed here and can take part 
of our resources for their sustenance, must know that even if women in Sweden dress in 
another way, move around in society without male company, go to concerts and maybe 
drink alcohol, they are not legitimate targets of sexual attacks (Busch Thor and Carlson 
2016).
When interviewed in Aftonbladet, the minister of interior and the minister of 
gender equality, both social democrats, also stressed the importance of informing 
migrants about “issues of gender equality, openness and sexuality”, while admitting 
that the problem of sexual harassment did not arrive with refugees, but has for long 
been a domestic problem in Sweden (Nordström 2016). A news article in Svenska 
Dagbladet entitled “Swedish views on women on the schedule” (Thurfjell 2016) 
described the task of high schools to educate newly arrived pupils in what was 
called “Swedish values, including the view on women”. Some boys and girls taking 
part in the classes were interviewed, one of them saying that the differences between 
Sweden and the Middle East concerning gender had at first come as a shock to him, 
but after a few months he adapted. However, the interviewed kids all expressed wor-
ries about all refugee men being seen as potential sex offenders, one boy describing 
how people chose not to sit next to him on the subway after the Cologne events.
The newspaper interviews with migrant boys and men taking part in sex educa-
tion point at a recurrent pattern in the reporting: efforts to identify and showcase the 
figure of the “good refugee man”, characterized as a someone who denounces the 
oppressive views on women prevalent in his country of origin, and affirms his com-
mitment to the gender equality norms of his host country. An Expressen columnist 
argued that the best way to educate migrant men was to take help from the majority 
of migrant men who “quickly accepted one of Sweden’s fundamental rules: men 
and women are equal, and no woman should be the target of any form of sexual 
harassment”, continuing that “[t]heir words will weigh heavily. Like a father raising 
a son” (Cristiansson 2016).
According to several researchers, the foregrounding of gender equality and sex-
ual rights in integration programs, a shift that took place during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century throughout Western Europe, serves not only to delineate 
“good” from “bad” diversity by defining the right (i.e. gender equal) kind of migrant 
subject, but is also itself part of producing the national identity of the host society 
(Farris 2017; Lentin and Titley 2011). By depicting migrant subjects as possible to 
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include only to the extent that they renounce the oppressive views on women of 
their home country in favor of the gender equal values of the new country, the nation 
is reimagined as a progressive, modern, and always superior community in contrast 
to the “backwards” and “static” non-European cultures. Integration, Lentin and 
Titley argue (2011, pp. 204–206), has become a border practice working beyond 
and inside the territorial border, a way of securing that inside the national home, 
invited guests must learn the house rules or be removed. However, whereas the lit-
erature has primarily pointed at the centrality of migrant women in such integration 
measures–studying efforts to “emancipate” migrant women by reeducating them 
into national/European models of femininity (Farris 2017, p.  103)–the measures 
that were called for after Cologne and Kungsträdgården targeted primarily migrant 
men. This suggests the emergence of a second figure of good diversity, next to the 
emancipated migrant woman: namely the “gender equal migrant man”, who by 
embracing the gender equal culture of their host country, is conditionally included 
while also reproducing the geopolitical imaginary of the national/European border 
as a boundary between oppression and freedom.
7.4  “Swedish Values” in Almedalen
During 2016, the notion of “Swedish values” became a key word in national poli-
tics, discussed in terms of how immigration had supposedly resulted in a conflict of 
values. This section examines how the trope of “migrants’ sexual violence” func-
tioned as a point of reference to frame this conflict in gendered and sexualized 
terms, as a cultural clash between “Swedish” and “Middle-Eastern” views on 
women. I analyze how the idea of “Swedish values” was discussed in the party lead-
ers’ speeches during the so called “Almedalen week” (Almedalsveckan) in July 
2016. Every year this event, described by Maria Wendt (2012) as a “political spec-
tacle”, is organized on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. The highlights of the 
week are the party leaders’ speeches (each party is traditionally assigned its own 
day) and the political proposals and signals made in Almedalen receive extensive 
media attention (Norocel 2017).
Prior to the 2016 Almedalen week, the social-democratic prime minister Stefan 
Löfvén, in an debate article in Aftonbladet, wrote that: “It must be clear what rules 
apply in Sweden and what values should permeate our society”, describing Sweden 
as “a modern and free country where justice, egalitarianism and gender equality are 
central values” (Löfvén 2016). In this vein, the party leaders in their Almedalen 
speeches, most of which focused on immigration, integration, and national identity, 
referred in one way or another to the idea of “Swedish values” and charged the term 
with gendered meanings. Löfvén defended the turnabout on asylum policy in 
November 2015: “No country can handle the challenge [of refugees] alone. 
Therefore, Sweden has introduced a temporary law to make fewer come to Sweden”. 
Addressing integration, the prime minister lamented what he called “islands of 
inequality and insecurity that have emerged in Sweden”, and called for a stop to 
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“religious extremists wielding power over the public space, deciding where women 
should be or how they dress” (Löfvén 2016). Annie Lööf, leader of the liberal Center 
party, also spoke of “values that should not be accepted in society”, specifically 
mentioning genital mutilation and “honor violence” (Lööf 2016).
In three of the speeches, the issue of sexual violence against women in public 
spaces was explicitly mentioned to illustrate how immigration was endangering 
Swedish gender equality. Neither of the speeches focused exclusively on sexual 
violence and immigration, but those passages were rather salient and among the 
most cited in media reporting about the speeches (see Stiernstedt 2016; Svensson 
2016a). Anna Kinberg Batra, leader of the Conservative party, spoke about harass-
ment of girls during music festivals and suggested that, in addition to prolonging the 
sentences for sexual harassment, it should be easier to deport sex criminals who are 
not Swedish citizens (Kinberg Batra 2016). Ebba Busch Thor, leader of the Christian 
Democrats, said that when “women cannot go to festivals without fearing sexual 
harassment” it is a sign of a “deep crisis of values” (Busch Thor 2016). Jimmy 
Åkesson, leader of the far-right Sweden Democrats described Sweden as a society 
“where women, girls, young girls, children cannot be out in public spaces without 
the risk of sexual attacks”. In addition, he argued that we cannot “[d]eny the exis-
tence of fundamental Swedish norms and values”, among them “a Swedish way of 
relating to (…) gender relations” (Åkesson 2016).
The identification of gender equality as a Swedish core value is not just descrip-
tive but also performative in bringing forward a specific idea of Swedishness. This 
is reminiscent of the practice described by historian Eric Hobsbawm (1983) as 
“invention of tradition”, whereby certain elements are selectively chosen and com-
bined (and others ignored) to form what is claimed to be a matter-of-factly, histori-
cally rooted national essence. Importantly, the association between gender equality 
and Swedish national identity, which came across in several of the Almedalen 
speeches, draws on the “gender exceptionalist” idea of Sweden as the most woman- 
friendly country in the world, a discourse which has been examined and critiqued 
by feminists (Martinsson et al. 2016; Towns 2002). At least since the 1970s, gender 
equality, a progressive welfare model, and sometimes modernity as such, have been 
portrayed as markers of Swedishness. However, to identify oneself as embodying 
modernity is not a neutral act but invested with specific articulations of power and 
superiority. Or as Judith Butler put it, “power relies on a certain taken-for-granted 
notion of historical progress to legitimate itself as the ultimately modern achieve-
ment” (2008, p. 21). Whereas in the first decades of the twentieth century, ideas of 
Swedes as the purest among the white race, defined against internal Others such as 
Sami, Jews, and Roma were heavily influential, in the post-1945 era this racial 
exceptionalism was succeeded by narratives of Sweden as the most modern among 
nations. Feminist and postcolonial researchers have argued that this narrative still 
carries racial and geopolitical connotations, as the idea of the Swedish welfare state 
as exceptionally progressive continues to be understood in opposition to various 
Others understood as belonging to less egalitarian and less modern cultures, a role 
increasingly ascribed to immigrants (Hübinette and Lundström 2011; Mulinari 
2016; Norocel 2017). There are obvious similarities to how feminist discourses 
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have been mobilized for anti-immigrant purposes in other European countries as 
well, presenting repressive policies that especially target Muslims as progressive 
measures aimed to protect and liberate women (Farris 2017). As the analysis of the 
Almedalen speeches showed, after Cologne and Kungsträdgården, the theme of 
migrants’ sexual violence in public spaces functioned as an explicit or implicit point 
of reference supporting the idea that “Swedish values” of gender equality were 
endangered by immigration.
This form of securitization, depicting immigration as an existential threat to wel-
fare and particularly the “national” gender order, is not just a rhetorical figure, but a 
bordering practice with real world effects. As mentioned earlier, bordering involves 
an inside-looking demarcation of the nation, and the idea that its core values and 
ways of living are imperiled by dangerous outsiders, legitimizing those measures 
deemed necessary to protect the inside from the outside (Parker and Adler-Nissen 
2012). I suggest that the idea of Swedish gender equality being under attack by 
misogynist immigrants functioned as an implicit or explicit confirmation that the 
restrictive border regime introduced in 2015 was necessary. The discursive connec-
tion or “sticky association” between sexual violence and migrant men that was pro-
duced by media reports on Cologne and Kungsträdgården, most likely contributed 
to closing off the possibilities to argue for a return to previous, less restrictive, asy-
lum policies, and delegitimized arguments for lifting the Swedish border controls to 
EU, although all these measures had been presented as merely a temporary “breath-
ing space” (as of March 2020, most of these measures are still in force). Whereas 
during the last decades, the self-image as “progressive” has arguably made main-
stream Swedish discourse less receptive to certain bordering discourses (leaning on 
overt racism or grandiose patriotism), gender exceptionalism, widely shared across 
the political spectrum, provided a fertile ground to exploit for legitimating the shift 
to more restrictive border policies.
7.5  Conclusions
In light of the 2017–2018 MeToo movement, which showed with devastating clarity 
how male sexual violence against women permeate societies across cultures, 
classes, and professions, the debates after Cologne and Kungsträdgården stand out 
in the way sexual violence was so often ethnicized and culturalized, associated to 
migrant men and immigration more broadly. While such a framing was not new or 
surprising, but rather consistent with longstanding Orientalist narratives, this chap-
ter has shown how the trope of “migrants’ sexual violence”, by tapping into Swedish 
gender exceptionalism, contributed to a securitizing narrative portraying the 
Swedish welfare model in general, and gender equality in particular, as endangered 
by patriarchal immigrant cultures. The media analysis showed that the reports of 
“migrants’ sexual violence” were represented as (1) indicative of how media 
silenced problems associated with immigration; (2) as a result of a cultural clash 
between irreconcilable “Swedish” and “Middle-Eastern” views of women; (3) as 
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evidence of the necessity of stricter immigration policies; and (4) as demonstrating 
the need for sex education of newly arrived immigrants. While comparison between 
the different types of material or the different media outlets is outside the scope of 
investigation, it is clear that the most explicit arguments were made in debate arti-
cles and in op-eds in right-wing newspapers (in this case Expressen and Svenska 
Dagbladet). However, also “neutral” news reporting as well as opinion pieces in the 
left-wing or liberal outlets made references to the idea of immigration as a threat to 
Swedish gender equality, if in some cases to repudiate that there was such a link. 
The analysis of party leaders’ speeches in Almedalen showed further how the gen-
dered notion of “Swedish values”, partly by using “migrants’ sexual violence” as a 
point of reference, functioned to simultaneously portray immigration as a threat to 
“our way of life” and to define the meaning of that specific way of life. Theoretically, 
the chapter contributes to border studies by mapping specific ways in which border-
ing practices are made possible by gendered and racialized boundary constructs, as 
well as how re-bordering, by drawing on liberal and egalitarian discourses, comes 
to appear more appetizing even in self-proclaimed progressive societies.
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Chapter 8




While nostalgia is not necessarily an aspect of all forms of nationalism, most con-
temporary groups share a preoccupation with the past, adopting a retrospective view 
of the world that harks back to a forgotten “golden age” for their nation. For some, 
as in the United Kingdom, this can evoke Empire and narratives of social and politi-
cal dominance (Gottlieb and Linehan 2003); while in other nations nostalgic nation-
alism may focus on identity, and the idealization of a past in which nation-states 
contained only one people bound by common ethnic roots and cultural practices. 
The resulting diversity of organizations and ideologies that may be considered 
nationalist – and even nostalgic nationalist – is vast, a fact attested to by the variety 
of chapters in this volume. However, in the context of some groups and organiza-
tions, most notably those in Hungary, the past plays a particularly significant role in 
shaping political outlooks. The complexity of the Hungarian far-right is well docu-
mented, with their commemoration of several key periods in the country’s history 
and their foregrounding of the importance of Hungary’s Christian traditions and 
beliefs argued to set them apart from the experience in many other countries (Bartlett 
et al. 2012). Moreover, Hungary has a particularly broad range of groups operating 
within this space, with far-right organizations combining different time-periods to 
create and shape their own particular forms of nostalgia, framing identities in 
diverse ways that create a fractured and complex nationalist milieu. Alongside this, 
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government-sponsored ideas of nostalgic nationalism contribute to a challenging, if 
often obfuscated, ideological landscape, supporting attitudes and ideas of the far- 
right within the broader populous. It is against this backdrop that this chapter seeks 
to position its consideration of nostalgic nationalism in Hungary.
Using both an analysis of symbols and qualitative interviews to explore the role 
of nostalgia in shaping the ideology of members of the Hungarian Defense 
Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom), this chapter is structured in six sec-
tions. In the first, several important concepts are outlined for clarification, with a 
description of the methodological approach employed specified in the following 
paragraphs. Subsequently the attitudes and values characteristic of the Hungarian 
nationalist movement are discussed to provide a basis for understanding their mobi-
lization. The fourth section provides an overview the current landscape of the major 
organizations in the Hungarian far-right movement alongside evidence of their use 
of nostalgia and the politics of national identity. The penultimate section presents 
empirical data from semi-structured interviews to provide a better understanding of 
nostalgic nationalism and the politics of national identity in Hungary. Finally, con-
flicts that emerge in the formation of Hungarian nationalist identity are discussed 
before a conclusion offering suggestions for future research and an overview of the 
limitations of this study.
8.1.1  On Nostalgic Nationalism
Nationalism can be viewed as an ideology that helps to create and maintain identity 
for an individual or group or create a unity between the people of one population 
(Smith 1995). It can be understood as an organizing political principle that places 
high importance on national homogenization and gives priority to national values 
and interests with the aim of achieving some collective goal. Moreover, it can also 
be seen to describe an affection toward one’s nation, as crafting a sense of belonging 
to a particular group with a supposed common origin, and as instilling a desire to 
keep the nation pure (Dekker et al. 2003). Alongside this, ethno-nationalism can be 
seen as a further sub-genus of nationalism, viewing the nation as a community of 
descent whose members are related by fictive kinship ties to supposedly common 
ancestors, embracing myths of origin, nativist history, folk culture, and a populist 
political philosophy (Smith 1995, 2001). This type of nationalism is often seen in 
post-independence movements, irredentist movements, and “pan” nationalisms, and 
is a key characteristic of contemporary nationalist discourse in Hungary.
The word nostalgia has its roots in two Greek words: nostos, meaning a return 
home, and algos, meaning pain and longing. The meaning of the term nostalgia 
originally indicated a feeling of homesickness and longing for place, but over time 
was expanded to include a temporal aspect directed towards the past. As a result it 
has come to imply a special type of memory, the pain having been removed; it 
implies a longing for an idealized past, which does not, or never did, exist (Goulding 
1999). It can be personal, or grounded in the collective memory of a larger group. It 
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can even, curiously, be for a time and place that an individual or collective never 
experienced first-hand. When combined with nationalism, it can be defined as a 
longing for a heartland when the nation was still theoretically homogenous (see 
Hellström et al., Chap. 1, in this volume). This can create a sense of belonging and, 
as in the case of Hungary, the sense of identity that is so desperately sought by many 
in the far-right.
Nostalgic nationalism is related to ethno-nationalism in many ways, but the two 
are not synonymous: the former is based on the idea of fictive kinship ties and the 
collective memory of ethnic and national groups, as with ethno-nationalism. 
However, in placing its emphasis on a homogenous nation, and in looking to the 
past for the establishment and maintenance of identity, it differs in a key respect. 
Accepting this distinction this chapter will explore these ideas through the lens of 
various organizations that comprise the broad Hungarian far-right “movement”, 
here taken to refer to the entire nationalist network in Hungary. It is not the goal of 
this chapter to discuss all organizations on the Hungarian far-right, of which there 
are many; rather, the focus here is to explore and map the evidence of nostalgic 
nationalism in the attitudes and characteristics of several key organizations.
8.1.2  Methodology and Data Collection
This chapter employs two distinct approaches. The first offers a discussion of the 
main aspects of Hungarian history in order to set a basis for further analysis and 
provide an overview of the characteristics of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism. The 
main far-right organizations in Hungary are reviewed and discussed from the per-
spective of nostalgic nationalism, considering how they present and embody their 
experience of the past, and how the past influences their outlook, attitudes, and 
ideology. To gain an understanding of identity this section will employ an analysis 
of symbols. Symbols are widely under-stood as key markers of group outlook, aid-
ing in communication (Firth 1973) in a way which is both subjective and objective; 
some are always identified in the same way by different people, while others evoke 
emotion associated with a situation (Edelman 1985). The latter type can induce 
“patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations” (Edelman 
1985, p. 6). National symbolism may thus have great political power and evoke may 
emotional expression of national identification, allegiance, and self-sacrifice (Schatz 
and Lavine 2007); it often elicits claims to a specific history and sovereignty and 
highlights the distinctive nature of the nation (Elgenius 2011). National symbols 
may also place emphasis on a nation’s historical past in a way that can then be glori-
fied, romanticized, and mythologized (Schatz and Lavine 2007). Their use far-right 
organizations can thus allow them to project their image to their own group mem-
bers, as well as to others outside the organization, giving their ideology shape and 
form (Breuilly 1993). Particularly in the political context, such symbols are selected 
and combined to provoke emotions and to refer to specific ideas (Mach 1993).
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The second part of the chapter presents the results of a series of interviews with 
members of the Hungarian Defense Movement in early 2018. The transcripts of 
three respondents are used, with their personal data anonymized, presented as 
Respondent 1, 2, and respectively 3. The interviews were conducted via Skype-out 
call and lasted about 20–30 min each. They were conducted in Hungarian, and they 
were later transcribed and coded in Hungarian, with key quotes translated into 
English1. While this is a comparably small sample size, and is thus limited in terms 
of both its validity and reliability, these are to date the only scholarly interviews 
conducted with members of this organization, and provide an unfiltered view of the 
thoughts and emotions of group members.
8.2  The Roots of Nostalgic Nationalism in Hungary
Hungarian national identity seems to be something of a puzzle, combining venera-
tion for ancient pagan ancestors with strong Christian beliefs. To resolve this con-
tradiction, it is important to understand the country’s turbulent history, and in 
particular, the important role played by external domination and occupation in shap-
ing the national psyche. This section provides a brief overview of the country’s 
history up to the twentieth century, as a way of offering a frame of reference for 
understanding nostalgic nationalism in contemporary Hungary.
One important period for Hungarian nationalism, and especially nostalgic 
nationalism, is the settlement of the nomadic Magyar tribes in the Carpathian basin 
around 895 C.E. According to historical sources the Magyars arrived in a group of 
seven tribes, said to be led by a chieftain named Árpád; they were originally a 
nomadic Asiatic people who were not Christian, but had a shamanistic system of 
beliefs lead by a táltos (similar to a shaman). The nomadic Magyars fashioned their 
facial hair in a distinctive manner, wore the dolmány (a special long coat worn by 
men), and a tarsoly (sabretache). Their use of spiritual flora and fauna symbolism, 
proficiency in archery, and the importance attached to equestrian culture are all 
seemingly crucial elements of Hungarian “tradition-guarding” (hagyományőrzés) 
culture. This is widespread within the Hungarian far-right movement, and indeed in 
the wider population, even among those not engaged in politics. This seeming rejec-
tion of modernism may be understood as part of a belief that modernity has erased 
the “true” national identity of Hungary.
A key belief among those involved in Hungarian nationalism is the idea that the 
original Hungarians, the Magyar people, came from the East and hence have more 
genetic and cultural ties to Eastern people than to Europeans. This idea is known as 
pan-Turanism, a term that stems from the Iranian term turan referring to a region of 
1 The focus of the interviews was mainly the respondents’ involvement in the organization: the 
origins of their nationalist feelings, how they became involved with the organization, and their 
activities in it. In addition to this information, respondents often discussed their views on the his-
tory of the Hungarian people and their ideas about Hungarian national identity.
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Central Asia; which may be seen as a form of Orientalism in pursuit of national 
identity formation. This serves to differentiate the Hungarians from their mostly 
Slavic neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, and positions them as ethnically 
Asian. Pan-Turanism is emphasized by many who engage in Hungarian tradition- 
guarding and has ultimately culminated in the biennial Kurultáj festival. Meaning a 
gathering of tribes, the event invites representatives from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, and many other countries. Visitors can watch horse shows, learn about 
Shamanism, attend lectures on the archaeology and culture of the Conquering 
Period, and often attend a concert by one of Hungary’s nationalist rock bands, such 
as Kárpátia (Carpathia) and Ismerős Arcok (Familiar Faces).
As the Magyar people held onto their own spiritual beliefs, they were Christianized 
only at a later stage, following the creation of the Kingdom of Hungary in the year 
1000. The following several centuries saw many outside cultures and invading 
forces enter the borders of modern Hungary. Indeed, even if the Hungarian people 
ever were ethnically homogenous, they were not so for long: Hungary was invaded 
and depopulated by the Mongols in 1241 (Engel 2001) and the Ottomans in 1526 
(Simon 1998), following which waves of immigration saw people from Russia, 
Austria, Italy, Germany, and France. As a result, ethnic Hungarians only made up 
35% of the total population in 1786. This shift is key to understanding the contradic-
tion of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism and the desire for Hungarian “purity”.
Under the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, formed in 1867, Hungarian art, lit-
erature, and society flourished, enjoying a “golden age” that lasted until the end of 
the First World War. The founding of an Austrian federal republic in late 1918 
marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire, with the Hungarian part of the dual 
monarchy dismantled and shared among its diverse populations: Hungarians, but 
also Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, and Ruthenians (Molnár 2001). 
After the Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, Hungary went from a popu-
lation of 18 million to a small country of just less than eight million (Hajdú and 
Nagy 1990). In the process, Hungary had lost about two-thirds of its territories and 
three-fifths of its inhabitants and was now “the most nationally aggrieved state in all 
of Europe” (Payne 1980, p. 110).
Indeed, denunciation of the Treaty of Trianon and anti-Habsburg sentiments are 
at the core of much of Hungarian far-right ideology. For many Hungarians, and 
especially for supporters of the far-right, the treaty of Trianon represents the split-
ting of the heartland; much of Hungarian nostalgic nationalism seeks to a desire to 
reunite this homeland, however unfeasible it may be at present. Hungary’s pre- 
Trianon borders are referred to as “Greater Hungary” by nationalist supporters, with 
the very concept of “Greater Hungary” symbolizing the reunification of all ethnic 
Hungarians from once-Hungarian lands. It is also commonly represented physically 
by the image of present-day Hungary set within the pre-Trianon borders of the 
country, which often appears on decals, jewelry, and clothing. In another incarna-
tion, it appears as a chant used by many far-right groups: “Down with Trianon!” 
(Vesszen Trianon!). As a result much Hungarian nationalist nostalgia ends around 
the time of the Treaty of Trianon, though some (often more extreme) organizations 
(for example, Pax Hungarica, the Hungarian Guard, and some skinhead 
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organizations) have also drawn on the symbols of the Hungarian national socialism, 
and in particular the Arrow Cross. This is, however, relatively rare among Hungarian 
far-right organizations.
A few other key attitudes are prominent within the Hungarian nationalist move-
ment. One of the central characteristics of the Hungarian far-right is its anti-Roma 
outlook, which is a recurring trope throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Indeed, the term “gypsy criminality” (cigánybűnözés) was revived by Jobbik 
(Juhász 2010) and many do indeed believe that the Roma are biologically pro-
grammed to be criminals. In far-right ideology, the Roma are not seen as being part 
of the original Hungarian nation, hence ideas of nostalgic nationalism can often 
imply a return to a time before their arrival in Hungary2.
The far-right in Hungary, more generally, is also concerned with issues surround-
ing the traditional family. These ideas about traditional family are most often 
encompassed in the idea of “European Christian values” and ideals. While not rep- 
resenting ideas of nostalgia per se, they do show how far-right organizations embody 
an extreme Christian identity and, as discussed below, stand in contrast to the idea 
of the pre-Christian “true” Hungarian. These extreme “Christian” values are often 
translated into homophobia, which is common in the far-right movement and is also 
quite frequently witnessed in state-run media. For example, the staging of the musi-
cal Billy Elliot was cancelled in Budapest for promoting “gay propaganda” 
(Wootson 2018). In another case, the far-right Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement 
attempted to disrupt the Budapest gay pride event in the summer of 2018, embed-
ding themselves at the center of the pride parade with a large banner reading “Sin 
cannot be the object of pride” (HVIM 2018).
As described above, Hungary’s turbulent history raises many questions about the 
country’s ethnic and cultural “purity”. There are many periods in Hungary’s history 
that are important for understanding both national and nationalist identity, such as 
the time of the Hungarian conquests, the Christian Árpád dynasty, the “golden age” 
of Austro-Hungary, and the trauma caused by the Treaty of Trianon. The next sec-
tion discusses the landscape of the Hungarian far-right movement, and the types of 
nostalgic nationalisms that are encountered in several key organizations.
8.3  A Discussion of Nostalgia and the Politics of National 
Identity Among Hungarian Far-Right Organizations
There can be no discussion of the far-right in Hungary without a consideration of 
the main Hungarian right-wing populist party: the Movement for a Better Hungary 
(Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik). Originally founded in 2003 with 
close links to the nationalist movements, and paramilitary organizations (Kyriazi 
2 It is unknown as to exactly when the Roma people arrived in Europe, but it is thought to be as 
early as the twelfth century.
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2015), Jobbik entered the political scene by joining forces with the anti-Semitic 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP), and 
together they received 2.2% of vote in the 2006 elections. This initial difficulty not-
withstanding, Jobbik’s support grew over the following years, eventually rising to 
14.47% of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections. This number increased 
further to 20.22% in 2014, by which time their ideology had become openly anti- 
liberal and anti-EU, with homophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma rhetoric also 
growing in prominence (Bartlett et  al. 2012; Holdsworth and Kondor 2017). 
Following the 2014 national elections, Jobbik attempted to change their image, and 
adopt a “softer” and more moderate tone with the party’s then-leader, Gábor Vona, 
described his new vision for Jobbik as a “modern conservative party” (Thorpe 
2016). This image change did not succeed as well as Jobbik had hoped; in the 2018 
Hungarian national elections they achieved only 19.06% of the vote and 26 seats in 
parliament (see Loch and Norocel 2015, pp. 263–265; Cinpoeş and Norocel, Chap. 
4 in this volume, for a further discussion of Jobbik). Although their electoral support 
was somewhat reduced, Jobbik became the second largest party in the Hungarian 
parliament, and the only real opposition party to the current government. However, 
immediately following the election, Vona kept his promise to his party: if they lost 
the election, he would step down. His resignation sparked a split in the party, and 
several members left in June 2018 to form a new radical nationalist political party 
named Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom). The new party is chaired 
by László Toroczkai, the founder of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, who 
has openly expressed a desire for a “white” Hungary (ECHO TV 2018).
Alongside this, the main party of the current Hungarian far-right governmental 
coalition, the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz), was founded in 1988 
as an anti-communist party. Led by Viktor Orbán, the party has radically changed its 
politics since its foundation. In the past, the party has been described as a “main-
stream conservative party with radical right policies” (Mudde 2015). Now, however, 
it has been argued in policy and media communities that Fidesz are firmly situated 
on the far-right (Heijmans 2019). In the period after Fidesz’s election in 2010 and 
up until their second (consecutive term) re-election in 2014, Fidesz effectively 
turned Hungary into “a culture within which racist speech and prohibited far-right 
paramilitary activities are tolerated” (Fekete 2016, p. 40). The most striking and 
long lasting of their campaigns was the campaign against migrants, sparked by the 
migrant crisis of 2015, when images of refugee men, women, and children at the 
Budapest Keleti train station were used as propaganda by the government. The gov-
ernment also proceeded to place anti-migrant billboards around the country and 
flood the news media with anti-immigrant rhetoric. This anti-immigrant campaign 
intensified again before the 2018 elections, but suddenly softened in its aftermath. 
Additionally, in 2017 Fidesz began a campaign, which may be deemed anti-Semitic, 
against the Jewish Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros. This has 
included the attempted closure, and now expulsion of the Central European 
University (CEU) in Budapest, and anti-Soros billboards around the country. While 
there is a tendency in scholarship to focus on Jobbik, as they are indeed a populist 
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far-right party, Fidesz has now seemingly occupied Jobbik’s space in Hungarian 
politics and now sets the nationalist undertones in Hungary’s government and people.
Fidesz won the 2018 Hungarian elections by a landslide, securing 49.3% of the 
vote and 133 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament. In doing so they have 
managed to decimate the opposition and make Hungary dangerously close to a 
single- party state. They have managed to do this through creating a state monopoly 
on the media, especially in rural areas, and through large-scale anti-migrant and 
anti-Soros propaganda campaigns deployed nationally. Hours after their election 
win Fidesz announced plans to enact a “Stop Soros” bill, a campaign clearly 
intended to crack down on NGOs, critical intelligentsia, and other opponents to 
Fidesz’s rule. Prior to the elections, Fidesz announced that they had created a list of 
2000 “Soros agents”, of which 200 names were published in the pro-Fidesz Figyelő 
magazine immediately following the April 2018 elections. On this list were people 
working for various humanitarian NGOs in Hungary and academics at CEU in 
Budapest. In June of 2018, the “Stop Soros” bill was approved in parliament, effec-
tively criminalizing any act or organization, which helps refugees in Hungary. More 
recently, kindergartens are to teach “Christian culture” and “strengthen national 
identity,” beginning in September of 2018 (Dull 2018). Fidesz has now outlawed 
gender studies programs in Hungary, and it is leading a campaign to convince 
women to birth more children.
The landscape of Hungarian nationalism is quite broad. However, it can be 
divided into three main groups of organizations: political movements, social move-
ment organizations, and fringe movements. The political movement has been previ-
ously described here; it is constituted by the various political parties that can be 
situated on the far right, namely Jobbik, Fidesz, and the newly founded Our 
Homeland movement. The second group reunites those larger organizations that 
may have a political affiliation, but do not take part in politics directly; this group 
includes organizations like the Hungarian Guard, the newly formed National 
Legion, and the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement. The last group includes the 
fringe organizations with smaller membership numbers, including chapters of inter-
national skinhead organizations. Several of the more prominent far-right organiza-
tions are presented here as examples of the different forms of nostalgic nationalism; 
all organizations presented below can be considered under the second category of 
groups, as they are not directly in the political sphere and are the mainstream orga-
nizations of the Hungarian far-right.
In Hungary, a prominent symbol used by the far-right is the Árpád Flag, origi-
nally the flag of the first Hungarian dynasty, which consists of alternating red and 
white horizontal stripes. Revived by the national socialist Arrow Cross Movement 
(Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom) in the 1930s, the flag was banned by 
the Soviets less than two decades later. After the end of Soviet influence in Hungary, 
however, the flag witnessed a rebirth in the Hungarian nationalist movement. Other 
noticeable symbols of Hungarian nationalist movement supporters are the wearing 
of a tarsoly, the use of ancient Hungarian runic writing, and the image of turul (a 
mythical ancient Magyar bird). It is worth noting that other important national sym-
bols to the Hungarian people, which originate in the more recent history have not 
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been adopted by the Hungarian nationalist movement. For instance, the raven with 
a ring in its beak as a sign of King Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458–1490), one of the 
most highly regarded Hungarian kings, has not been appropriated.
As highlighted above, one of the most prominent attitudes characterizing 
Hungarian nationalist movements is irredentism and concern around the Treaty of 
Trianon, presenting a nostalgia for a time when all ethnic Hungarians were part of 
the same state. Self-identifying as a radical youth nationalist movement, the Sixty- 
Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom, HVIM) 
was founded on 21 April 2001 by László Toroczkai. The organization is decidedly 
irredentist, their name being an homage to the sixty-four counties constituting the 
Kingdom of Hungary, as part of Austria-Hungary dual monarchy. HVIM have their 
main seat in Szeged, which lies in Csongrád county, as the organization believes this 
area to be the center of Hungary. The Csongrád county, which lies in southern 
Hungary, is believed to be the site of the original Blood Oath, which according to 
legend was the official pact between the seven Magyar tribes. This is also the birth-
place of Sándor Rózsa, a highwayman and outlaw who led his own company into 
battle in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. HVIM’s symbolism and identity are obvi-
ous, both from their online presence and their name.
The Outlaw Army (Betyársereg), which was formed in 2008, have the some- 
what threatening motto of “Don’t hurt Hungarians, or else!” (Ne bánstd a magyart, 
mert pórul jársz!). The leader of the Outlaw Army, Zsolt Tyirityán, is one of the 
most well-known figures in the Hungarian far-right movement. The organization 
asserts that they are a loose alliance of self-organized clans, which abide to the tra-
ditions of Eurasian civilizations. They profess to disregard the laws of the state in 
favor of following the ancient laws of the Hungarian plains (puszta); they compare 
themselves to the outlaws of the past, arguing that they have been forced to act out-
side of the law by contemporary political and state structures. Their logo is a skull 
wearing the same hat, and in in the same orientation, as the well-known image of the 
famous Hungarian outlaw Sándor Rózsa. The Outlaw Army has close ties to several 
of the other prominent far-right organizations in Hungary, including the new Our 
Homeland party (for example, Plankog 2019).
Looking back to the twentieth century is the New Hungarian Guard Movement 
(Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom), formed in 2009 after the original Hungarian Guard 
Movement was dissolved, 3-weeks prior. The initial Hungarian Guard Movement 
was founded in 2007 with 56 members, a number chosen to commemorate the 1956 
revolution (LeBoer 2008). The new organization is now split into local chapters, 
perhaps strategically so, in order to avoid a repeated dissolution. According to the 
New Hungarian Guard’s old website which has now been removed, the organiza-
tion’s tenets include trust in God, and their actions must abide by the ancient rights 
of freedom, and ancient traditions. Their main goal is to protect the Hungarian state, 
and the interests of the Hungarian nation, but it is unclear as to how they attempt to 
achieve this. The organization has also revitalized symbols of the national socialist 
Arrow Cross regime, using the red-and-white striped Árpád flag in their emblem 
and wearing a uniform consisting of black boots, black pants, black military 
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waistcoats, white shirts, and a black cap emblazoned with the Árpád stripes 
(Holdsworth and Kondor 2017).
Finally, and perhaps most puzzling in terms of identity, is the Hungarian Defense 
Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom). The organization was formed in 
October of 2014 after the dissolution of the organization For a Better Future 
Hungarian Self-Defense (Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem), originally created 
after the disbanding of the Hungarian Guard discussed above. Outwardly, the 
Hungarian Defense Movement promotes an image of a helpful family- and 
community- oriented organization, which seeks to protect the Hungarian people, 
organizing food and clothing drives, depicting families along with children on their 
Facebook page, and organizing family-friendly events. The Hungarian Defense 
Movement has one of the largest support bases in the Hungarian nationalist move-
ment with over 5500 supporters on Facebook. The organization regularly patrols the 
streets in areas with high concentrations of Roma and are openly anti-Roma. Among 
the organizations in the Hungarian nationalist movement, the Hungarian Defense 
Movement has the least obvious representations of nostalgic nationalism. In order 
to further explore these ideas in an organization, which outwardly does not show 
any obvious identity of nostalgic nationalism, interviews with its members are ana-
lyzed in the following section.
Presenting a nationalist identity that is new to the Hungarian nationalist move-
ment is the Identitarian movement, which has also appeared in Hungary with two 
separate and unrelated organizations. The short-lived Identitesz was created in 
September 2015 at a University in Budapest, originally titled the Conservative 
Student Society. The organization was led by László Balázs and claimed to build a 
“new right”. Identitesz has since dissolved, after announcing its intent to become a 
political party. It ultimately joined forces with the Outlaw Army. On 8 July 2017, 
the two organizations formed a coalition movement called Strength and Devotion 
(Erő és Elszántság), at which time Balázs resigned as the leader of Identitesz.
Identitesz was often confused with the Hungarian branch of the Generation 
Identity movement (Identitás Generáció) (for a wider European analysis of 
Generation Identity, see Nissen, Chap. 6 in this volume). The Hungarian Generation 
Identity was formed in 2014, and seemingly in 2017 had about 100 members 
(Kulcsár and Halász 2017). Along a different line from the more traditional nation-
alist organizations in Hungary, Generation Identity deem important to protect both 
the European and Hungarian identity, namely from the threats of migration and 
Islam. They claim to not have any issues with any one particular group of people, 
Muslims included, but to be against the “Islamization” of Europe. They are con-
cerned with the supposed replacement of European peoples by migrants and refu-
gees and subscribe to ethnopluralist views. Their actions around Budapest have 
included displaying large banners in public areas, with such slogans as “Islamization 
kills!” (Dezse 2017) and commemorating the Siege of Buda on 2 September 1686. 
The siege originally marked a defeat of the Ottoman forces, but now is framed to 
represent the freeing of Hungarians from Islam. This organization epitomizes a par-
ticularly curious case for studying Hungarian national identity. They are, indeed, a 
part of a much larger network whereby all subscribe to the ideals of ethnopluralism 
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and are against Islamization. However, they are also focused on specifically 
Hungarian issues, among them the idea of bringing back Hungary’s “glorious days”. 
At a closer look of their online activities, some of these issues become clearer. For 
instance, its leader Ábel Bódi complained that the main issue in contemporary 
European societies is that the youth no longer have a true identity; and argued that 
youth should be proud of their national identity and heritage (Sellner 2017). While 
referring to the “Hungarian golden age” of some 150 years ago, the organization is 
at the same time looking toward the future, proclaiming its goal to “making Hungary 
more European” (Sellner 2017). Bódi has been open about his Austrian-Hungarian 
ancestry and his desire to recreate the union of the two countries. Of all the organi-
zations, Generation Identity is the only one to present a distinctive desire to recreate 
the past.
Apparent in the ideology of each organizations is the idea that they are the pro-
tectors of the Hungarian people and the country borders; that they belong to a retro-
gressive mobilization that will bring Hungary back to the time they see as the 
country’s “golden age”. HVIM seeks to restore the borders of Greater Hungary, the 
Hungarian Guard looks to the twentieth century, the Outlaw Army venerates the 
time of outlaws, and Generation Identity looks to the time of the Austro-Hungarian 
dual monarchy, and the defeat of Otto-man/Muslim forces.
8.4  Discussions with Hungarian Nationalists
Four distinct themes emerged when discussing questions of Hungarian national 
identity and nostalgia. First, the importance of Magyar ancestors and the conquer-
ing period of the Carpathian Basin. Second, the importance of Christianity and 
Hungarians as a Christian people. Third, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
the “golden age” of the Hungarian intelligentsia. Finally, the idea of Hungarians as 
victims, both in terms of the effects of the Trianon Treaty, and in the sense that the 
history of Hungarian people was in some way stolen, leaving a need to regain and 
rebuild Hungarian national identity.
Interview participants frequently alluded to the culture of the ancient Hungarians. 
One respondent discussed learning about the Conquering Period in school, and even 
remembered the feelings of national pride they had as a child:
In school we learned about the ancient Hungarians, the ancestors, like Lehel, Emese, Attila, 
and Árpád, and I was filled with pride that we have more than a one-thousand-year-old his-
tory, and I have these types of ancestors. (Respondent 1)
This is significant when considering the new kindergarten curriculum instituted by 
the Fidesz government, in which they aim to “strengthen national identity” (Dull 
2018). Orbán’s government has repeatedly emphasized control over the educational 
curriculum in Hungary, aiming to reform the education system and country in their 
nationalist and Christian image (McKenzie 2019). Another respondent, when dis-
cussing the aims of the organization stated that:
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…with us [the Hungarian Defense Movement] the emphasis is rather on bringing back the 
old Hungarian values and living by them. (Respondent 2)
What these values are remains unclear, as is whether these values would be those of 
the nomadic Magyars or the later Christian Medieval Hungarians.
There was a strong emphasis on Christian beliefs from all respondents, with one 
saying “God bless you” at the end of the interview (Respondent 2). One participant 
was particularly vocal in articulating the role of religion; this respondent, speaking 
about the organization, said they “believe in the unity of the Holy Crown” 
(Respondent 1) and “in Christian teachings” (Respondent 1). When pressed, they 
further stressed the importance of Christian values to the organization:
Yes, well, for example, umm, coexistence with Christian beliefs and umm, teachings. And 
whether this is going to church, or the compliance with the Hungarian Believe in One motto 
(Magyar Hiszekegy3). We take a vow each year before the Holy Crown in order to renew our 
oath, and live by this oath as much as possible. (Respondent 1).
This notwithstanding, at times it became apparent that even the participant was 
struggling to reconcile idealization of the nomadic pagan Magyars and Christianity. 
Respondents would not deny the Hungarian peoples’ pagan Magyar past, but would 
find ways to explain how this past suits a European Christian image:
Well, if we really look into our history, Hungarians have always, always been a spiritually 
Christian people, even though they did not technically belong to the Catholic Church. 
(Respondent 1)
This suggests a fascinating blurring of national and historical identity, blending the 
two separate periods of the nation’s history to create an imagined nostalgia.
One participant spoke about Hungarians as a nation who contributed much to the 
world and the furthering of society. They were proud of their country, which they 
openly discussed:
We know that we’re a nation who left a mark on the world, multiple times, even the world 
wars, from inventions to grammar, our language, our talents. (Respondent 3)
This participant rejected the idea that the Hungarians were conquered and defeated 
throughout history:
What they taught me way back in elementary school, that they just defeated us everywhere, 
we lost everywhere, and, and that we were slaves, or I don’t know what, that is truly stupid. 
(Respondent 3)
They unfortunately did not clarify which particular instances were incorrectly 
taught in school. This idea connects with the process of national identity formation 
and recreation that is seemingly happening among those in the Hungarian far-right, 
potentially obfuscating history in order for their nation to not seem weak. Despite 
this, all respondents spoke, at times, of the Hungarian people and the country of 
3 Magyar Hiszekegy is a poem written in 1920 by Szeréna Sziklay, wife of General Elemér Papp-
Váry, for a competition run by an anti-Trianon movement: “I believe in one God, I believe in one 
home, I believe in God’s eternal truth, I believe in Hungary’s resurrection. Amen.”
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Hungary as victims, with particular mentioned made of the injustice of the treaty of 
Trianon. One respondent emphasized how unfairly the Hungarian people were 
treated:
Not one nation in the world has had something done to them like what was done to the 
Hungarians with Trianon. (Respondent 2)
Another set Trianon in the context of Hungary as a holy country:
…for the country of the Holy Crown to be together again, which they separated during 
Trianon. (Respondent 1)
Other participants spoke of the victimization of Hungarian people in terms of 
national identity, with one noting:
…and then there’s our national identity, our past, our history, which they took from us. 
(Respondent 3)
And
…this Hungarian national identity needs to be preserved, it must be rebuilt. (Respondent 3)
It seems as though this perceived victimization serves to justify the views and atti-
tudes held by far-right supporters.
Results of these interviews demonstrates that there are not clear ideological and 
identity-based lines between the organizations in the Hungarian far-right move-
ment. Indeed, members of one organization can cover a spectrum of attitudes and 
beliefs. This, however, is likely more apparent among members of the Hungarian 
Defense Movement as the organization is not as strongly ideologically-motivated as 
others. Another point that becomes clear is that most organizations in the main-
stream Hungarian far-right movement embody nostalgic nationalism to some 
degree, with it often being central to the ideology of the organization. These inter-
views have also demonstrated a mixture between a nostalgia for the time of the 
ancient Magyars and the later Christian medieval Hungarian periods, which pres-
ents a perplexing formula for nationalist identity as well as an explicit desire to 
reclaim that identity.
8.5  Conclusions: National Identity in Conflict
This chapter explores several concepts surrounding the nostalgia connected to 
nationalism in Hungary. One of the main periods of Hungarian history used sym-
bolically by traditional Hungarian nationalist organizations is the time of the 
Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, leading to a pan-Turanism that seeks 
identity outside Europe. No less influential is the period of conversion to Christianity, 
with many in the Hungarian far-right promoting the idea of a Christian Europe, and 
a Christian Hungary. Greater than both, however, is the single most important his-
torical event to the Hungarian nationalist movement: the Treaty of Trianon.
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Taking a closer look at the attitudes and beliefs circulating within the Hungarian 
nationalist movement, and at the history of the country, reveals a few paradoxes. 
First, the idea of a “pure” Hungarian people cannot exist in a country that has wit-
nessed so many and varied waves of de- and re-population. Second, the conflict 
between the culture and ancestry of pagan Magyars cannot easily be reconciled with 
the idea of Hungarians as a Christian people. Indeed, despite the protestations of 
interview respondents, it is clear that elevating both is an exercise in cognitive dis-
sonance. While this is not uncommon amongst nationalist groups elsewhere – for 
example, in Italy, Scandinavia, and Russia (see: Laurelle 2008; François and 
Godwin 2008) – its prominence in the discourse of Hungarian groups is, perhaps, 
somewhat unusual.
While the results of a comparably small qualitative study prevent the drawing of 
unambiguous conclusions, the findings of analysis presented in this chapter suggest 
that Hungarian nationalist nostalgia is often complex, contested, and at odds with 
itself. Groups and individuals can construct their own national and historical identi-
ties by piecing together and blending ideas from several periods of their nation’s 
history, creating compound identities that make the Hungarian far-right less a cohe-
sive movement and more a mass of groups in temporary and fluctuating allegiance, 
willing to work with or against each other on an issue by issue basis. Further research 
is clearly necessary to explore these issues in more detail, and in particular to ascer-
tain whether the findings of these interviews are replicated in respect of other 
groups. If this is the case, it may have clear implications for both existing scholar-
ship, foregrounding the importance of imagination and nostalgia in shaping the ide-
ology and outlook of far-right groups, and counter-extremism policy, highlighting 
the possibility for education, and greater historical literacy, to contest and challenge 
the drivers of engagement in far-right groups. However, the extent to which the 
Hungarian state – under the leadership of a far-right party – is willing to engage in 
such action remains to be seen.
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Chapter 9
“Retrotopia” as a Retrogressive Force 
in the German PEGIDA-Movement
Andreas Önnerfors
9.1  Retrotopia as a Retrogressive Force
One of the key concerns of the political movement coined the “European New 
Right” (ENR) is to engage in a “metapolitical” struggle related to issues of soft poli-
tics such as concepts, history and culture (Salzborn 2016, pp. 38, 45–46). The aim 
is to relabel political ideas dating back to the rise of interwar fascism in new linguis-
tic framings, to engage in politics of remembrance and memory relativizing the 
negative impact of fascist politics in Europe and to monopolize a definition of 
European identity in an exclusionary culture war against internal “traitors” and 
external enemies. A long-term goal of metapolitical struggle is to achieve an agenda- 
setting prerogative of interpretation on these topics. Thus, it comes as no surprise 
that contemporary populist movements on the right fringes across Europe exploit 
the potentials of new linguistic framings as well as of memory and identity politics 
in order to mobilize popular support.
One particular element of this strategy is to utilize the potential of “retrotopian 
longing”. Zygmunt Bauman argues in his last book Retrotopia (2017) that larger 
and larger segments of Western electorates, or more ambiguously “the people”, 
share a sense of being left behind, abandoned, ignored (not “listened to”) and made 
redundant. This demise is blamed on internal traditional political elites, the “main-
stream media” and foreign foes in narratives frequently saturated with elaborate 
theories of conspiracy and high treason. Furthermore, people flock to tribal mentali-
ties, encapsulating societal discourse within mutually exclusive and mutually hos-
tile filter bubbles and echo chambers. To this toxic mix are added a dramatic 
privatization of violence, stimulating copycat behavior, and an almost 
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insurmountable and increasing cleavage between rich and poor. “Retrotopia”, 
Bauman explains, is the outcome of a dramatic U-turn in the public mindset: “from 
investing public hopes of improvement in the uncertain and ever-too-obviously 
untrustworthy future, to re-investing them in the vaguely remembered past, valued 
for its assumed stability and so trustworthiness” (Bauman 2017, p. 6). With other 
words, progress is equated with the past. What happens in this state, according to 
Bauman, is that nostalgia and melancholia have turned into a part of a cultural poli-
tics of emotions. In the eternal trade-off between freedom and security, people are 
drawn back to Hobbes and increasingly authoritarian modes of politics, which leads 
to a “rehabilitation of the tribal model of community” (Bauman 2017, p. 9).
Tribalization is intimately linked to the exclusionary campfires of cultural mem-
ory politics. Since the present is perceived as an alienated foreign country and the 
future appears as an almost certain apocalypse, the only consolation is offered by 
culture, heritage and tradition. Politics of historical memory have, however, only 
one principal aim: “the justification of the entitlement of the group (called ‘nation’) 
to territorially delineated political sovereignty” leading to neo-nationalist construc-
tions of identity (Bauman 2017, p.  62). What contemporary politicians of anger 
exploit is a crisis of identity and income which has fomented the “anger of the 
excluded and abandoned”, a recipe for the global success of populism (Bauman 
2017, p. 69). Bauman’s Retrotopia is a refreshing contribution to studying the inter-
sections between culture, welfare, and migration. As compelling his argument might 
appear, the retrotopian model remains, however, currently under-theorized and is in 
need of further theoretical development and empirical studies that confirm its basic 
hypotheses.
Thus, in this chapter I will propose that the rise of the German PEGIDA (The 
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of Europe) since 2014, a “right wing- 
movement of indignation” (Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 139) can be related to the politi-
cal exploitation of resentment, nostalgia, and melancholia in large segments of the 
electorate, sustained by the recent and drastic increase of migration. Moreover, 
PEGIDA’s alliance with the radical right party Alternative for Germany (Alternative 
für Deutschland, AfD), entering the German national parliament Bundestag in 
autumn 2017 (as well as continuing massive electoral support leading up to multiple 
state elections in 2019), demonstrates the political impact of these developments, 
propelled by massive mobilization in which online and offline activism reinforce 
each other (Salzborn 2016). I will argue that cultural manifestations in general and 
German politics of historical memory in particular are an integrated part of the 
metapolitical strategy of PEGIDA since 2014. In line with Sara Ahmed and her 
concept of a “cultural politics of emotion” (2014; see also Edenborg, Chap. 7 in this 
volume) the affective power of emotions in politics is discussed.
Drawing from my own and other previous qualitative and quantitative studies of 
PEGIDA in the form of a meta-analysis (up to, but not including the Chemnitz riots 
in 2018 and described below), I outline initially the performative style of the move-
ment and its activism offline and online. This performative style sets the stage for 
multitude of cultural expressions out of which I have chosen to focus on the discur-
sive content of two representative examples. The “PEGIDA-hymn” and its lyrics 
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discussed below communicates a form of programmatic self-styling of the move-
ment, whereas the other example on a more culturally complex and intricate level 
aims at exclusion. In 2017, PEGIDA engaged with Holocaust-remembrance as a 
particular German trope of memory politics enabling the movement to rhetorically 
exclude the “Muslim Other” from a shared German burden of the past.
9.2  Post-welfare (N)ostalgia
For the eastern part of Germany (and the post-communist “East” at large), a particu-
lar political sentiment has even received its own label, ostalgia (Ostalgie), a word-
play with and conflation of “nostalgia” and the German word Ost for the cardinal 
point “East”, which recent scholarship describes it as “motivated amnesia”: “post- 
communist merciful forgetting, selective nostalgia, ‘ostalgia’, ‘retroutopia’” 
(Klicperova-Baker and Kosta 2017, pp. 99–111). PEGIDA originated in Dresden, 
Saxony and it is likewise in the former GDR the AfD at the occasion of federal elec-
tions in 2017 has received its largest support, in some constituencies surpassing 
30% of the votes.1 But it would be misguided to believe that this particular form of 
nostalgia (as a political sentiment to exploit) is limited to the eastern parts of 
Germany. Clear pockets of high support for AfD are also located in Western 
Germany and the party at the time of writing contests the Social Democrats as the 
second largest political force. These phenomena demonstrate that the idea of that 
“something” is lost which has to be reclaimed, restored and ‘made great again’ has 
arrived in core segments of Western electorates. While “ostalgia” mainly serves as 
an explanation in the political psychology of post-communist countries, it could 
likewise be argued that “reversed ostalgia” (or another term that awaits to be coined) 
was/is observable in Western Germany as well, the imagined and still existing so- 
called “wall in people’s heads” that paradoxically unites Germans across the coun-
try. For the “West” in general we might characterize this mood as an irrational 
longing for an ideal bipolar pre-1989 world order, where the capitalist and liberal 
“West” (while under the impending existential threat of nuclear Armageddon) not 
yet had to be confronted with to engage with the complex challenges of south-east 
and eastern Europe nation-building, the implications of EU eastern enlargement, the 
contemporary rise of neo-authoritarian and post-democratic rule in Hungary, 
Poland, and Russia and definitely not the contemporary shared burden of global 
conflict. In this state of growing unrest, it is the AfD as a traditional party that has 
developed the largest momentum in Germany as a whole and exploiting sentiments 
1 For an overview, see http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl-2017-alle-ergeb-
nisse-im-ueberblick-a-1167247.html. Accessed 8 Dec 2017; more details: https://www.
bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html. Accessed 8 Dec 2017. Results for 
state elections in Brandenburg, (AfD, 23.5%) and Saxony (AfD, 27.5%) in 2019, see https://www.
spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-ergebnisse-aus-brandenburg-und-sachsen-die-grafiken-
a-1284812.html. Accessed 9 September 2019.
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of resentment. Originally established in 2013 with the aim to question and to reduce 
public spending (particularly on EU-level) and to push for libertarian reforms of 
fiscal policy, the party has since assumed a far more ethno-nationalist program and 
is now the largest opposition party in the German parliament. During 2018, calls 
have been made to put the party under scrutiny of the German secret service, known 
as the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz, BfV). At the same time, contacts between the former head of 
BfV, Maaßen and the AfD and his downplaying of evidence of racism during the 
Chemnitz-riots in August and September 2018 have led to a fundamental crisis in 
German interior politics. Following the murder of “Daniel H.” by immigrants, the 
city in Saxony (during the DDR renamed as Karl-Marx-Stadt) turned for several 
weeks into a battle ground of radical right mobilization during which innocent for-
eigners were chased through the streets. Chemnitz marks a turning point in the 
violent radicalization of different German right-wing actors and created significant 
momentum by uniting outright neo-Nazis, right-wing hooligans, AfD and PEGIDA 
under one umbrella (Perrigo 2018; Spiegel 2018).
From its outset in 2014, PEGIDA never aimed to become a strict political orga-
nization, but rather to explore traditional social network and street activism in com-
bination with online-presence as its main field of activity and profile in combination 
with a fuzzy ideological profile (Önnerfors 2017, pp. 174–175). The stronghold of 
PEGIDA is still Eastern Germany, although some sister organizations also were 
established in Western Germany and other countries such as the UK and even as far 
as Canada. PEGIDA is best understood as a “brand” of political style rather than a 
pattern of political organization. On the level of political preferences and interper-
sonal contacts, there is however no doubt that PEGIDA and AfD have developed 
affinities and synergies, for instance when in 2015 jointly launching the identitarian 
internet platform einprozent.de (Önnerfors forthcoming  2020; see also Nissen 
Chap. 6, and Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume). These mutual contacts 
have been developed since and the magnitude of far-right protest in Chemnitz in 
autumn 2018 has been explained against the background of significant synergies in 
the milieu. I have covered the rise and development of PEGIDA extensively else-
where (Önnerfors 2019: pp. 173–200).
In his book “Whiteness in Swedish motion picture 1989–2010” (Vithet i svensk 
spelfilm), the film scholar, critic, and writer Hynek Pallas (2011) develops the con-
cept of “post-welfare nostalgia”, a term that aptly describes the dynamics also at 
play in Germany. Pallas determines a point in time when postindustrial society 
changes profoundly due to an experienced loss of welfare (Pallas 2011, p. 87). This 
process can also be located in what Hanspeter Kriesi has identified as a new struc-
tural conflict in which “globalization ‘losers’ are opposed to globalization ‘win-
ners’”, also in cultural terms (Kriesi 2014, p. 369). Bauman speaks in this context 
about a “sadness of deprivation” (2017, p. 93). Hübinette and Lundström (2011) 
argue that there is a “double-binding force” that unites two sides of white mourn-
ing. In the first case, racism is evoked as a melancholic reaction towards an experi-
enced loss of a racially homogeneous society. In the other case, it is the collapse of 
the image of a morally superior country (through parliamentary success of 
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right-wing populist parties) that causes anxieties, panic and denial among anti-rac-
ists and feminists. As opposed as these positions might appear on a political level, 
they both paradoxically nurture the idea of two varieties of white supremacy that 
now appear lost, an “unspeakable melancholia filled with limitless pain” (Hübinette 
and Lundström 2011, pp.  46, 49–50). Unfortunately, the authors do not explore 
melancholia and the emotional dimensions of loss (or pain) as analytical categories 
further (see Ahmed 2014). It is here Pallas’ concept of “post-welfare nostalgia” 
offers a broader approach, based upon British scholarship on post-imperial, “loss-
of- empire” nostalgia and in particular Paul Gilroy’s (2004, 
pp. 97–104,107–116,125–132) writings on the pathology of postcolonial melan-
cholia trapped between un- confronted shame, willful amnesia and manic re-perfor-
mance of former glory. This is similar to what Taggart has coined the imagined 
heartland: “a construction of an ideal world but unlike utopian conceptions, it is 
constructed retrospectively from the past–it is in essence a past-derived vision pro-
jected onto the present as that which has been lost” (Taggart 2004, p. 274; see also 
Wodak 2015, p. 40). The dream of omnipotence collapsed with the dismantling of 
the British empire which created a sense of deprivation among core segments of the 
(predominantly white) electorate facing new realities such as multiculturalism, 
migration, the dissolution of national sovereignty and what are perceived as civili-
zational conflicts (in Huntington’s terms) or, in Pallas terms what we witness is a 
“lower European middle-class self- construction as losers in a new social hierarchy” 
(Pallas 2011, p. 134).
Society after 9/11 and the erosion of social welfare as a consequence of neo- 
conservative politics and multiple financial crises created mutual alienation and pro-
cesses of “populist demarcations” (Pallas 2011, p. 89). These developments “provide 
with answers upon the question why Western societies react upon de- industrialization 
and growing unemployment with racism and sentiments directed against immi-
grants and borders closing around the nostalgic perception of what a nation essen-
tially is constituted of” (Pallas 2011, p. 98).
Pallas makes clear that there are problems comparing countries like Sweden to 
Britain, or other colonial powers in this regard. In the Swedish case, he argues, there 
is a more homogeneous form of “nostalgic gaze around lost solidarity in the dis-
course concerning welfare-society and folkhemmet [my Italics; the particular 
Swedish 19th-century concept of a socially equal and culturally uniform ‘People’s 
Home’]” (Pallas 2011, p. 90; see: Norocel 2016; Hellström and Tawat, Chap. 2 in 
this volume; Önnerfors forthcoming 2020). Still, Pallas concedes that mechanisms 
of national melancholy can be studied through the (measurable) rise of racism and 
critique against politics of multiculturalism and diversity even in a broader European 
framework. It is here PEGIDA as a successful social movement represents a telling 
case. In a state of post-welfare, European “mourning collectives [are] collectively 
disoriented in environments they once upon a time took for granted, but where they 
don’t feel at home any longer […]. Since the idea of a people is so fundamental in 
European nation-building, a ‘loss’–or changes–of it create collective emotions; nos-
talgia, melancholy” (Pallas 2011, p. 148). The German political “loss of empire” on 
a global scale can be dated back to several instances: to the military defeat of 1918 
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(together with sustained vivid myths of the injustice of Versailles peace treaty), a 
general loss of superiority to the defeat of 1945 (paired with the incapacity to mourn 
atrocities and dictatorial repression) and a persistent feeling of resentment and infe-
riority in parts of Germany due to the collapse of the GDR in 1989 (and reversed 
feelings in the former West). Hence, there might be different layers of mourning, 
memory, amnesia, and selective cultural re-performances of former glory at play, 
which complicate a straightforward application of Pallas’ theories about a consis-
tent post-welfare nostalgia to the German case.
However, by linking these theoretical approaches, I suggest an interpretative 
framework focusing on resentment, nostalgia, and melancholia as contemporary 
expressions of cultural politics of emotion. This interpretative framework has the 
potential to inform culturalist approaches to nationalism studies at the crossroads of 
(the perceived loss of) redistributive justice as a political good and migration as a 
perceived political threat. In the “liquid modern” status of an imagined perpetual 
crisis, decline of welfare and societal cohesion, what is understood as culture is used 
to express “retrotopian” and exclusionary identity-concepts which paradoxically 
are perceived as progressive since promoting fundamental political change (Bauman 
2017). As Bauman argues in his introduction titled “The Age of Nostalgia”, contem-
porary political visions are not focused on the future but on a “lost/stolen/aban-
doned yet undead past” (Bauman 2017, p. 10). It is this unspecific longing for the 
past (that never was) as future that movements like PEGIDA successfully have been 
able to mobilize and to channel into diverse civil society agency online and offline.
9.3  The Performative Style of PEGIDA
Recent research defines the performative style of contemporary populist politics as 
“the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audi-
ences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the 
political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life” 
(Moffitt 2016, pp.  28–29). Political style has three key features: “appeal to ‘the 
people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and crisis, breakdown or threat” (Moffitt 
2016, p. 29; Önnerfors 2019). Ruth Wodak has instead highlighted (2015) that con-
temporary right-wing populism, although displaying a “diffuse political style” and 
employing “performance strategies”, agglomerates around a core of ideological 
positions such as a revisionist view of history, anti-intellectualism or pseudo- 
emancipatory positions (claimed approval of human rights or gender equality) 
aimed at exclusionary denigration of political enemies. Analyzing PEGIDA from a 
performative perspective reveals how cultural elements are used to create a back-
drop and repertoire for the promotion of ideas. First, one can interpret the city of 
Dresden, where PEGIDA assembles its supporters, as a stage. Completely wiped 
out as a living city after allied (not so entirely proportional) bombing in the final 
months of the Second World War, Dresden became a part of the Soviet occupation 
zone, eventually of the German Democratic Republic and only slowly recovered 
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from wartime damage to restore its glory as “Florence of the North”. Dresden came 
into the spotlight again just at the end of the GDR, when thousands marched against 
ruling communist nomenclature under the motto “We are the people!”, contributing 
vigorously to the pressure that eventually would lead to the fall of the Berlin wall 
and the entire militarized border to the West. By reclaiming the motto of the GDR- 
citizenship movement and one of its iconic places, PEGIDA consciously ties into a 
symbolic history and a cultural geography of resistance.
As a rule, the events in Dresden consisted of three parts: (1) a stationary opening 
rally followed by (2) the “evening walk” as such, concluded by (3) a final stationary 
rally. At the beginning and end of each event, speeches and addresses were pre-
sented. A particular dynamic frequently developed between speaker and audience, 
whereby the latter interjected sentences and passages of the speeches with a variety 
of chants like “We are the people”, “Media-Liars” (Lügenpresse) and surprisingly 
frequent (and in English) “Ami, go home!” (Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 49). These 
chants would require a separate study, since they assume the function of ritualized 
and extremely condensed narrative tropes with the aim to display acclaim for and 
comment positions expressed by the speaker. These occasions, also documented on 
numerous videos posted on the PEGIDA-Facebook page and on its YouTube- 
channel, might be possible to compare with a typical way of ritual interaction 
between speaker and audience at party conventions and mass rallies of the 
GDR. Party press such as the Neues Deutschland almost prescriptively inserted a 
standard hyphen into the accounts of different rallies almost like retrospective stage 
directions (Starker, lang anhaltender Beifall, Sprechchöre – Forceful, long lasting 
applause, chants). And of course, the peaceful revolution of 1989 was replete of 
significant chants. During the rallies and walks, a huge number of banners and sign-
boards with different (and sometimes conflicting) slogans were exhibited. These 
can be interpreted as an important element of PEGIDA self-design and re- affirmation 
of positions expressed in writing, speeches or chants. (Vorländer et  al. 2016, 
pp. 50–51) Finally yet importantly, Pegidistas carried various flags that increasingly 
assumed meaning. Apart from the German, national flags of Israel, France, Ukraine 
and most notably Russia have been displayed as well as German regional flags 
either from existing or defunct periods of German history and lambda-banners from 
the Identitarian movement.
Particularly charged is the intensified usage of the so-called “Wirmer”-flag, 
referring to a new national flag designed during resistance against the Hitler-regime 
and appropriated by the German “new right” where it has undergone a reinterpreta-
tion. This flag arranges the German colors black-red-gold in a fashion similar to the 
Norwegian. It has become a symbol of PEGIDA, insinuating that the current politi-
cal system of Germany can be paralleled to a totalitarian state and that supporting 
the movement is to be seen as an act of resistance – a powerful trope of victim- 
perpetrator- reversal in the German radical right (Vorländer et al. 2016, pp. 51–52; 
Wodak 2015, p. 4) As a closing ritual during the final rally, participants raised their 
mobile phone flashlights or lighteners “to let the politicians see daylight”, followed 
(and in the light season) substituted by singing the German national anthem 
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(Vorländer et al. 2016, p. 47). “The truth is out there” and “the politicians are blind” 
to see this–the topos of “political correctness” is performed in live action.
On the website of PEGIDA, a particular PEGIDA-hymn2 (4′18″) with the title 
Together we are strong (Gemeinsam sind wir stark) can be downloaded. It is in use 
since autumn 2015 (PEGIDA 2020). The hymn has no (official) lyrics, instead the 
voices are produced by a humming men’s choir set to an orchestra. Starting from a 
rather gloomy mood in the beginning, the music changes its character to become 
positive and impressive, finishing off in a heroic upbeat sentiment accompanied by 
ringing bells. The tune is best described as some sort of soundtrack or a hymn creat-
ing sense of community and strength for a football supporter club. It underlines the 
performative character of PEGIDA’s events, as well as the movement’s roots in and 
close ties to the hooligan and football supporter (sub-)culture of Dresden.
Apparently, the lack of lyrics prompted one of PEGIDA’s supporters to write a 
text that is set to some form of sprechgesang and published on YouTube on a chan-
nel created by the anonymous profile Tolkewitzer (named after a part of Dresden). 
The channel (followed by 233 people) has 33 videos, most of them displaying clear 
support for PEGIDA, AfD and the Identitarian movement.3 In material like this, 
through the lens of cultural performance, it is possible to study the overlap between 
PEGIDA as a political social grassroots movement on the street, AfD as the orga-
nized parliamentary branch and Identitarianism as ideological unifying superstruc-
ture of the ENR. The PEGIDA-hymn (published in February 2016) is performed by 
a male voice with the name “Alfred Schnabel” who cannot be identified clearly. A 
huge number of YouTube-videos under his name are non-professional folk ballads 
about local places and events composed for the occasion. However, the PEGIDA- 
hymn with its lyrics (not officially endorsed by PEGIDA) stands clearly out with 
almost 55,000 views (Table 9.1).
The lyrics represent typical ideas circulating in the PEGIDA word cloud: 
Islamization drives European patriots to rise, it is a duty for the Germans to protect 
their country. However, there are also internal enemies, the state, the economic sys-
tem and religion who steal the prospects of future generations and do not care about 
their own people. For the sake of Europe and Germany, it is time to throw Islam out 
of the country, PEGIDA shows the way. “Resistance is a holy duty”, taking to the 
streets is to make it visible. What unites German patriots is the future, freedom, 
democracy and language. These are existential values worth fighting for against the 
enemy. It is a duty to protect the native land, the ‘will of the people’ must be dis-
played. Whereas we can interpret the milieu around PEGIDA as an expression of 
the performance of cultural positions born out the idea of resistance against the rul-
ing “system”, PEGIDA capitalizes also on foreign policy events transformed to 
meaning and decodable only in a specifically German context. This emerged in 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-efB_nJnAU. Accessed 17 Dec 2017.




plain daylight when at the end of 2017 it was announced that the USA was to move 
its Israeli embassy.
9.4  German Vergangenheitsbewältigung as a Cultural 
Argument Against the Absolute Muslim Other
On December 6, 2017 Donald Trump declared that the USA aims to move its 
embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a recognition of a 1980 Israeli deci-
sion (condemned by UNSC resolution 478 and others) that Jerusalem represents the 
united capital of Israel. Trump’s decision sparked an immediate global reaction in 
which infuriated segments of Muslim minorities in Western countries displayed 
appalling anti-Semitic sentiments and engaged in unmotivated attacks against 
Israeli or Jewish establishments (Dreher 2017; FAZ 2017). As much as anti- Semitism 
and violent attacks rightly were condemned, it is noteworthy that the critique against 
these acts were appropriated as a cultural argument against the absolute Muslim other.
Table 9.1 The unofficial PEGIDA-hymn
Patrioten Europas stehen auf,
Gegen Islamisierung in ihrem Land.
Die Heimat zu erhalten, ist Pflicht,
Deutsches Volk zeig' dein Gesicht!
Patriots of Europe rise,
against Islamization in their country.
To preserve the native land is a duty
German people, show your face!
Verraten, verkauft und belogen
von Staat, Kapital und Religion,
den Kindern die Zukunft entzogen,
dem eigenen Volke zum Hohn!
Betrayed, sold and belied
By state, capital and religion
removing future from its children,
deriding the own people!
Wacht auf Patrioten, erwachet!
Setzt den Islam vor die Tür!
PEGIDA kam, um zu siegen!
Für Deutschland und Europa, wir bleiben hier!
Wake up patriots, wake up!
Throw Islam out of the door!
PEGIDA came to win!
For Germany and Europe, we stay here!
Darum Patrioten, nicht zögern,
Widerstand ist heilige Pflicht!
kommt mit uns auf die Straße,
nur so übersieht man uns nicht!
Therefore, patriot, do not hesitate,
Resistance is a holy duty!
Come with us onto the streets,
Only thus we cannot be overlooked!
Wir kämpfen für den Frieden,
und für die Zukunft in unser'm Land,
für die Freiheit, Demokratie, uns're Sprache,
die uns verband.
We fight for peace,
and for the future in our country,
for freedom, democracy, our language,
that united us.
Wir stehen für unsere Werte,
den Feinden weichen wir nie!
PEGIDA ist gekommen,
zu bleiben und zu siegen.
We stand for our values,
we never yield to enemies!
PEGIDA has come,
to stay and to win.
Die Heimat zu erhalten, ist Pflicht
Volkes Wille, zeig' Dein Gesicht!
Volkes Wille, zeig' Dein Gesicht!
To preserve the homeland, is a duty
Will of the people, show your face!
Will of the people, show your face!
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Six days after Trump’s declaration to move the embassy, PEGIDA Dresden 
posted a text on its website and disseminated it in a newsletter titled “The infinite 
anti-Semitism [Judenhass, literally “hatred of Jews”] of the Muslims”4 (PEGIDA 
2020, all translations by the author). The newsletter has all typographic attributes of 
angry social media postings that have inundated divisive political discourse over the 
last five years: nouns and phrases written in capital letters and quotation marks, 
some of them neologisms, “bad manners”, and a rakish style in expressions 
(Madisson 2016, pp. 14–15, 38; Moffitt 2016, pp. 28–29) coupled with casual deni-
grating satire. The readers of the newsletter are called “friends” and thus included in 
an imaginary “we”. First, PEGIDA apologizes for quoting a survey carried out by 
the popular tabloid Bild-zeitung in Neukölln (a part of Berlin, “completely lost to 
Muslim parallel societies”). This excuse must be understood in the context of 
PEGIDA’s general condemnation of German “system” or “mainstream media” as 
“liars”, an argument that is reiterated later on. In any case the survey “confirm[s] our 
opinion about Muslims and their dangerous fascistic ideology”. The newsletter goes 
on: “Hatred against the Jews, which we since decades have tried to oust from 
Germany has returned to our country through uncontrolled mass-immigration and 
failed – be-cause of IMPOSSIBLE – integration”.
The newsletter then states that Germany since decades has been engaged in 
addressing the country’s anti-Semitism, presumably referring to (but not explicitly 
mentioning) the atrocities carried out between 1933 and 1945. Judenhass has now 
returned to “our country” due to migration, and the impossible task of convincing 
migrants to embrace the German mindset of weeding out anti-Semitism and fas-
cism. It is the “Muslims” that are suspected of harboring a “dangerous fascistic 
ideology”. The political establishment and “the press” are accused of “noisy 
silence”, relativizing and excusing the events that have unfolded (in the protests 
against Trump’s decision). “Riotous assemblies of Palestinian terrorists” are trivial-
ized– instead a platform is offered to the Judenhasser to disseminate their hate 
speech. Indeed, the Muslim’s “complete and Judenhass” is allegedly suppressed by 
their “Taqiyya” (the presumed praxis of intentional lying) “until enough enemies of 
the Jews are in the country and they can finally attack”. It is a difficult task to inform 
voters that those “illegally immigration skilled personnel [ironic reference to the 
welcoming attitude towards migrants by the German industry] and other Muslim 
migrants […] are responsible for Germany’s slide back to a very dark chapter of our 
history”. Apart from the wrongly “vilified” AfD that openly condemned Muslim 
Judenhass, the “green-left-wing-fascist players of politics to the traitors of the peo-
ple (Volksverräter) in CDU and SPD [German conservatives and social demo-
crats]” – are accused of not daring to address the issue. The newsletter warns about 
the confusing situation, whereby “neo-fascist anti-fascists” denounce “courageous 
citizens (who are opposed to the new anti-Semitism of the Muslims) as ‘Nazis’ or 
‘racists’”. As such, the media is accused of lying by omission, not being true on hard 
facts and ignoring the Muslims’ despicable attitudes against Jews. The authors of 
4 Islam heisst Frieden – oder doch Gewalt und Judenhass? www.pegida.de. Accessed 17 Dec 2017.
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the newsletter then declare: “Friends, it is time to reveal the name of those who are 
responsible for the situation in our country! It is neither Trump, Putin nor Netanyahu, 
nor the ‘evil right’ or imaginary ‘Nazis’–NO, it is Muslims who act out their 
century- old Judenhass in the middle of Germany.”
The newsletter’s message is complex to unpack. Its rhetoric abounds in recurring 
tropes circulating in PEGIDA-discourse as part of its performative style, expressed 
both on an explicit and implicit level. First, the narrative of the newsletter is con-
structed around the image of Muslims as a monolithic collective “Other” holding 
fixed ideological positions (which they intentionally lie about), isolated socially 
from the German majority culture (the newsletter’s “we”) in parallel societies. This 
is exemplified by “their” century-old hatred of Jews, as expressed during the 
Jerusalem embassy-protests. Whereas Germany and Germans are allegedly engaged 
in confronting their anti-Semitism since decades (and embrace guilt for the 
Holocaust), the backwardness of (mass-immigrated) Muslims in this regard is 
regarded as a proof of the impossibility of cultural integration into the German soci-
ety, or rather partake in the memory politics constitutive for exclusionary German 
national identity-formation. Not mentioned explicitly, however, the next step of the 
argument would be to accuse these “Others” of Holocaust-denial, a punishable 
offence under German law. It is the political and media establishments who are to 
blame that Muslim Judenhass is not treated in an appropriate manner, but intention-
ally diminished and excused. Any suspiciously anti-Semitic positions by the “right- 
wing” (AfD and allies) would in turn have met with a forceful backlash. In fact, it is 
the Muslims who are responsible for dragging Germany back to darker chapters of 
its history. At a number of occasions, PEGIDA makes clear who the “real” fascists 
are: both anti-fascists, the Left and the Green parties, but above all Muslims. This 
follows a recurring line of thought in the PEGIDA-context. In the introduction to an 
insider-account of PEGIDA I have treated elsewhere (Önnerfors 2018, p. 105), I 
distinguish a blame game: who rightly is to be branded as a Nazi or fascist and on 
which grounds?
This blame game can be interpreted as representative for a selective cultural poli-
tics of memory in Germany–no one wants to be associated openly with the political 
regime of 1933–1945, because such an association simply is a cultural taboo (with 
the exception of blunt neo-Nazism, see: Wodak 2015, p. 97, 99–100). To attach the 
attribute of fascism and anti-Semitism to Muslims may be seen as to emotionally 
project the worst imaginable German shame upon the stranger, namely the shame 
for the extinction of millions of Jews during Nazi rule. However, not explicitly men-
tioning 1933–1945 and its atrocities at all might also be explained as a conscious 
and selective form of willful amnesia (Gilroy 2004), unconfronted shame or a spe-
cifically German “incapacity to mourn” (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1984). Yet, 
there is a term even for this psychological operation in a particular German identity- 
formation, namely Vergangenheitsbewältigung  – coming to terms with its past 
through various strategies (Bieberstein 2016, pp. 902–919). This cultural argument 
of melancholia is at play in the newsletter’s rhetoric. According to PEGDIA, for 
decades Germans have been working to eradicate their anti-Semitism, but through 
the mass-arrival of the Muslim “Other” there is a tangible risk for the country being 
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thrown back to an episode in the past (1933–1945), no one desires to return to nor 
has the capacity to mourn in an appropriate way. The diffuse strategy of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is such a constitutive feature of cultural Germanness 
that it leaves no room for any expressions of anti-Semitism, and by extension the 
inherent Judenhass of Muslims is impossible to integrate. The rhetoric of PEGIDA 
in this case is an example of “calculated ambivalence” reinforcing Manichaean divi-
sions (Wodak 2015, pp. 54, 67). Arguments conventionally associated with the radi-
cal right now are projected upon the Muslim “Other” as a proof of their inability to 
adopt a German identity, in particular, and the presumed Judeo-Christian cultural 
heritage of Europe, in general. This makes it possible to construct “scapegoats by 
shifting blame” (Wodak 2015, p. 67). PEGIDA elaborates a variation of the Iudeus 
ex machina-strategy, whereby pretended support for Jews, and Holocaust remem-
brance are “functionalized for political ends” (Wodak 2015, p. 101).
9.5  Retrotopian Performance of Culture 
as a Retrogressive Force
The politics of resentment at play in the German PEGIDA-movement appears to be 
linked to a perceived loss of redistributive justice, in combination with a likewise 
perceived state of powerlessness and deprivation, created by allegedly changed pri-
orities of resource allocation and detachment of representative decision-making, 
receiving existential urgency through the European migration crisis and blamed on 
ruling elites of the “system” in politics and media. What can be witnessed in these 
imaginaries of welfare-decline is the simultaneous rise of culture as an answer upon 
larger insecurities and fears related to identity-formation, and processes of identifi-
cation. The link between “class politics” in which these concepts of loss are 
exploited and have contributed to the growth of the radical right have (Bornschier 
and Kriesi 2012, pp. 10–30; Kitschelt 2012, pp. 224–251).
The fuzzy and performative style of politics that characterizes PEGIDA and its 
allies (Önnerfors 2017, pp. 159–175) allows for the redefinition of conservatism as 
a seemingly progressive force, particularly in the mobilization of civil society 
agency online and offline. Since its rise in 2014, PEGIDA has gained considerable 
momentum as a political movement, contributing to the shift rightwards of the 
mainstream political discourse in Germany. With the AfD entering the German 
Bundestag in autumn 2017 (as well as several state parliaments with double digit 
electoral support), and the dramatic developments unfolding thereafter, the German 
political landscape has experienced a significant and potentially game-changing 
shakeup that aligns it partially with the solidification of neo-authoritarian and illib-
eral democracy in central and eastern Europe (see, Cinpoeş and Norocel Chap. 4, 
and Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume). These developments have been 
spearheaded by the retrotopian performance of culture as a retrogressive force that 
has contributed to the mobilization of civil society agency online and offline. 
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Whereas it is difficult to estimate the overall impact of cultural performances such 
as the PEGIDA-hymn, it is one example of how political positions of the ENR are 
mediatized and integrated into the online hyper-media environment. The PEGIDA 
reaction upon events unfolding following the declared move of the US-embassy 
demonstrate that the new populist right in Germany is at pains to distance itself from 
any anti-Semitism, and instead forcefully ascribes it to “immigrant Muslims” with 
the purpose of continued exclusion. Furthermore, by not being able to share a par-
ticular German sentiment towards the past, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the “Other” 
cannot be integrated into German culture and its shared identity. PEGIDA provided 
the organizational framework and sufficient ideological fuzziness to continuously 
mobilize tens of thousands of people to gather on the streets of Germany, and at the 
same time to connect on social media, two processes mutually reinforcing one other. 
While the normative expectations of the role of civil society engagement for democ-
ratization and participatory inclusiveness are high and underscored by some 
researchers (Putnam et al. 1993), others have recently observed that the ENR hijacks 
typical features of anti-globalization, anti-EU or national justice movements 
(Bar-On 2014; Salzborn 2016). As previously stated, PEGIDA has been labelled a 
“populist right-wing movement of indignation” (Vorländer et al. 2016), which high-
lights the fact that many organizational elements and objects of protest are prevalent 
across the political spectrum such as in the southern European “indignados”-move-
ments. A recently published a book about PEGIDA had the subtitle “the dirty side 
of civil society?” (Geiges et al. 2015), and elaborated on the apparent paradox that 
established socio-political institutions embrace the concept of an active civil soci-
ety, one the one hand, but on the other, do not tolerate activities contrary to the 
values that are favored (see also Ruzza, Chap. 14 in this volume). Sahoo (2014, 
2018) has pointed out a similar situation in India, where the Hindu nationalist orga-
nization RSS engages in typical civil society agency but acts for exclusionary Hindu 
nativist supremacism and against ethnic and religious minorities. Is it possible to 
understand the contemporary development as the emergence of an “uncivil soci-
ety” on a global level? Who defines which values are to be protected and by whom? 
For the supporters of PEGIDA, it is clear that the future lies in the past, retrotopia is 
a driving force for retrogressive political change of the existing order.
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Chapter 10
Challenging Misconceptions: Danish Civil 
Society in Times of Crisis
Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel Rosengren Olsen
10.1  Understanding Crises in the Danish Context
The stability of global capitalism has been challenged successively since the turn of 
the last millennium. It was initiated by the burst of the “dot.com bubble”, massive 
demonstrations against the current globalization regime (the anti-globalization 
movements, see Graeber 2002) and the shocking images of the World Trade Center 
in flames.1 Not long after these events, the entire system of global finance came 
tumbling down during the “Financial Crisis” that brought the entire machinery to a 
grinding halt and demanded enormous amounts of “quantitative easing” to resume 
operations. In the European context, the financial crisis precipitated several further 
crises, including a range of “debt crisis” (Greece, Italy, Malta, etc.) potential and 
eventual “Exits” (Greece, UK), and eventually a crisis of the entire European 
Unionization project, concomitant with the “refugee crisis” mounting as a conse-
quence of the Syrian civil war – and, not to forget; the burgeoning climate crisis.
This leads us to one of the larger questions of contemporary social movements. 
The “traditional stance” on social movements, with point of departure in Marxian 
class analyses, were challenges with the emergence of “New Social Movements” 
1 While symbolic of many things, the Twin Towers were the iconic symbols of world commerce; a 
pride of the Trading City of New York, thus their destruction may be interpreted as symbolic rep-
resentation of an attack on the entire global capitalist system, and equally indicative of the system’s 
instability and fragility when faced with shocks (see also Beck’s [2006] analyses in this regard).
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(NSM) in the late twentieth century, which questions the central concept of Marxian 
analysis that “capital”, “labor”, and “class” could remain undifferentiated and func-
tion as the major frame of social movement and class-based resistance to capitalist 
exploitation (Dubet 1994; Offe 1985; Welton 1993). The change has often been 
structurally identified with a shift to “post-industrialization” in Western societies, 
starting from the early 1960s. The NSMs are structurally seen as aligned with 
middle- class citizens rather than the lower classes and oriented towards personal 
and cultural change (lifestyles and identities) rather than formal policy changes or 
“regime changes” as in the classical Marxist revolutionary theory (Melucci 1980).
The emergence has led to a series of debates over theoretical accuracy in terms 
of description, but equally in the normative implications of the various approaches 
to social movement analysis. A current schism centers on the left’s “abandonment 
of the poor” in favor of the NSM concern with “the personal” rather than with the 
plight of the underclasses, which may have provided an important impetus for the 
realignment between nationalists, conservatives, and the lower classes (Piketty 
2018; Jørgensen 2016). Importantly, the NSMs of the right (Generation Identity, the 
“ALT-Right”, Fortress Europe, etc.) illustrate the diversity and complexity of the 
field of the identity-oriented new movements and the cleavages between their out-
looks on future trajectories.
Taking the contemporary situation into consideration, it is perhaps not too sur-
prising that people may find the situation perplexing and consequently that we see a 
plethora of initiatives pointing in different directions. In this article, however, we 
focus on the confluence between a contemporary Danish NSM, Venligboerne, and 
their position within the larger “refugee solidarity movement”. Using Alan Sears’ 
concept infrastructures of dissent, we argue that the contemporary situation requires 
a diverse range of social movement activity, relying on both traditional and “new” 
approaches to social movement development and “political praxes”, ranging from 
protest activity to everyday engagements with repressed subjectivities (“everyday 
activism”). We attempt to illustrate how Venligboerne provide a “piece” in the com-
plex puzzle of contemporary social movement activity in the area of migration, and 
how we can view their emphasis on “identity and lifestyle” as supportive of the 
larger movements rather than a hindrance.
10.1.1  Research Approach
Inspired by the notion of infrastructure of dissent, we analyze our case, 
Venligboerne, from two distinct angles: Firstly, by attempting to disseminate how 
this particular CSO has differentiated itself from other organizations in the field, 
and secondly, by analyzing the organization as a community of learning. The study 
relies on a mixed- methods approach to data collection based on participatory 
research, interviews and secondary data collection. It is a qualitative, exploratory 
study which aims to describe and understand this particular CSO in a specific 
M. B. Jørgensen and D. R. Olsen
155
context rather than aiming to build invariant models for social movements (Tilly 
1995, p. 1596).
Our research is situated in the Danish context during the peak of the refugee 
(reception) crisis (2015–2018), focusing on the relationship between the organiza-
tional characteristics, and the context of events in which the organization found 
itself. We have opted for a mix of descriptive approaches covering both participation 
(online and offline), as well as the collection of secondary data from various sources 
such as newspapers and online forums. We have more actively engaged with the 
refugee solidarity network as well, from which we have also been able to acquire 
information and insights into the overall movement (albeit from a partial 
perspective).
We chose Venligboerne as a case for several reasons. Primarily because of the 
movement’s emergence in relation to the refugee (reception) crisis and its popular-
ity, having mobilized more than 150,000 members in the extensive range of 
Facebook groups (Toubøl 2015), which earned the movement national recognition 
and presence across the country. The case is also significant because of its distinct 
approach that has differentiated Venligboerne from other CSOs in the refugee soli-
darity movement. Additionally, the initiative differs from most other CSOs within 
the refugee solidarity network; relying on an “a political” approach, heterogeneous 
activities, informal organization, and other characteristics, which, we argue, have 
allowed the movement to situate itself as a an important “mediator” within the very 
diverse range of organizations that make up the refugee solidarity network (Fenger- 
Grøndahl 2016; Nygaard 2017; Toubøl 2017).
10.2  Civil Society and Infrastructures of Dissent
We understand dissent as “… social and political questioning (not just […] mere 
critique or a need for palliative reforms), […] undoing consensus and rendering 
excluded actors and struggles visible” (Jørgensen and Agustín 2015, p. 14). From 
this view, dissent assumes relevance as experiences opposed to a dominant order to 
render new actors, struggles and ways of organizing visible. Dissent commonly 
evokes mental imaginaries of militant forms of action; however, we see dissent also 
as the everyday forms of resistance and politics taking place in the “refugees wel-
come” movement as well as the development of practices of sharing, caring and 
learning.
In his book The Next New Left, Alan Sears (2014) coins the notion infrastructures 
of dissent. Such infrastructures, according to him, provide social movements with 
four essential capacities: collective memory; collective dreams; collective learning; 
and capacity for solidarity. Sears argues that “[i]nfrastructures of dissent can be 
defined as the means through which activists develop political communities capable 
of learning, communicating and mobilizing together” and continues by arguing that 
infrastructures of dissent “[are] a crucial feature of popular mobilization, providing 
10 Challenging Misconceptions: Danish Civil Society in Times of Crisis
156
the basic connections that underlie even apparently spontaneous protest actions” 
(Sears 2014, p. 2). Hence, when we analyze Venligboerne, we seek to identify how 
the organization provides the organizational infrastructure needed to support vari-
ous forms of dissent.
In the context of this volume, we view dissent as intricately related to the “hope” 
for a better future beyond the bleak political situation that Europe (and hereby 
Denmark) has found itself in. It is a rejection of both the apathy and the pernicious 
ethnocentric nostalgias of contemporary nationalistic ideologies. Hope for a better 
future is not merely a positive outlook on things as in a naïve optimism that “every-
thing will be alright”. To the contrary, hope indicates a belief in the value and expe-
diency of activities in the present: that a better future can be created with actions 
implemented today. Hope, in this sense, is also required to combat lethargy, pessi-
mism, and even resignation to the reigning ideological powers. In this regard, we 
see infrastructures of dissent as channels for a politics of hope. Sears argues infra-
structures of dissent “enable people to develop collective dreams, to envision a bet-
ter world, which provides a tremendous motivator and important moral compass” 
(Sears 2014, p. 18).
In Sears’ framework, the infrastructure of dissent entails the capacity for solidar-
ity as an integral component. Following Rick Fantasia, Sears does not regard soli-
darity as an automatic reaction to injustice, but rather something that must be 
cultivated (Sears 2014, p. 21). In other words, while individuals may sympathize 
intuitively with say refugees, organizational infrastructures are required to enable 
solidarity as effective praxis. Hence sympathy will not be useful if it is not trans-
lated into practical action. We regard solidarity as a relational practice; solidarity is 
contentious; emerges strongly in moments or conjunctures; is generative of political 
subjectivities and collective identities; entails alliance building among diverse 
actors; is inventive of new imaginaries; is situated in space and time (Agustín and 
Jørgensen 2016, 2019). In this chapter, we focus especially on the aspect of alliance 
building, which we understand in relation to Sears’ capacity for solidarity. Alliance 
building is a crucial aspect of solidarity. The heterogeneity of political actors can 
only converge in a complex social composition if they manage to identify the diverse 
oppressive effects of the dominant order. This plurality generates a relation of soli-
darity that benefits all parties as the possibility of challenging the system is enhanced. 
Thus, solidarity becomes a driving force in promoting social change from civil soci-
ety (Agustín and Jørgensen 2016). Solidarity cannot precede political actors nor can 
political actors impose their identities or interests upon others. Hence, when consid-
ering alliances between civil society and immigrants, the question is not identitarian 
but about how different political actors converge in ongoing social struggles to undo 
political closure (Agustín and Jørgensen 2016).
Following this approach, the activities undertaken in civil society are predicated 
on a consolidation of the differences that emerge within civil society itself. 
Conflictual situations cannot be reduced to “the state versus its others” but are 
equally present within civil society and must be resolved through other means of 
settlement (or the state will prove itself an inescapable necessity). This corresponds 
to the conceptualization of fluid relations between state and civil society, and 
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underscores the importance of developing appropriate ways of solving such dis-
putes without resorting to state interference or other means of force. Accordingly, 
we do not view civil society as a unitary constellation, but as a bricolage of various 
elements that at times come together as one, but at other times fragment in a range 
of different positions. Civil society, as such, has both propitious and deleterious 
components (Carothers 1999) but cannot be viewed as a uniform or integrated 
entity. In spite of this diversity and adversity, the objective is to advance better ways 
of living as communities and societies; mitigating means of oppression, violence, 
inequality, etc. Employing the idea of infrastructure of dissent makes it possible to 
analyze the contours of politics of hope articulated here.
10.3  Venligboerne: A Brief Summary
The Venligbo movement began in April 2013, with a local initiative to improve the 
wellbeing of residents in the small town of Hjørring in northern Jutland, Denmark. 
The founder, Merete Bonde Pilgaard, saw kindness and hospitality as a way to 
transform people’s lives in a positive direction, not only because it would be nice if 
people were friendlier to one another, but because, she argued, being friendly to 
others is also transformative for the person that changes her own outlook on the 
world. She argued that when people stopped thinking in negative terms about oth-
ers, criticizing and problematizing other people’s identities, actions, beliefs, etc., 
they became happier themselves (TV2Nord 2017). Kindness, curiosity and respect 
for diversity constitute the ideological foundation of the Venligbo movement. These 
values are also supplemented by the advice to meet the other face-to-face, to tell and 
listen to stories and take the time to be with the other person. In a very simple for-
mulation, Merete Pilgaard states that her mission with the organization was to “train 
people in staying kind, even when others are not being kind” (Mortensen and 
Lumholt 2018). Beyond these values, we can observe how the initial ideas have 
branched into a wide range of activities that characterize the movement today:
• Providing various forms of practical assistance such as legal aid, medical sup-
port, language training, job-seeking assistance, transportation, everyday dona-
tions, including raising funding for family reunifications, etc.
• Creating broad alliances between experienced activists and people new to soli-
darity work, as well as across a wide range of activist approaches and 
focus areas.
• Making the problems of the asylum process and integration into Danish society 
visible.
• Insisting on a humanitarian approach different from the exclusivist approach 
taken by the state. The movement also articulates the commonalities between 
people; refugees and Danes alike.
• Emphasizing the importance of personal stories, urging people to listen openly 
and engage with the experiences of the other, regardless of who this person is, 
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even seeking out others that are different from oneself to possibly find stories 
that are different from one’s own.
The movement has been characterized as a reinvigorated wave of Danish NSMs 
that has followed in the wake of the great recession. These initiatives are in many 
ways similar to the NSMs of the late twentieth century, but after a period of hiatus, 
Danish society has seen an increasing focus and emphasis on these new citizen- 
driven initiatives (Regeringen 2014), which are often promoted as precursors of 
future societal arrangements (Lumholt 2019; Mortensen and Lumholt 2018; 
Regeringen 2010).
Although the movement focuses on everyday encounters between people, the 
numerous Venligbo Facebook groups have become an important vehicle for the 
spread of the movement, with each municipal faction usually creating their own 
online forum as subgroups under the overall movement, and many other groups for 
the organization of specific activities such as donations, discussions or local activi-
ties. While Facebook organizing is not unusual for social movements and civil soci-
ety organizations, it is, however, relevant to observe that the groups have mostly 
been used for internal organizational and activity coordination with most of the 
groups being “closed” to non-members (i.e. not used for promoting ideas, policies, 
agendas, and so on). Besides the Facebook groups, several other initiatives have 
also been launched such as Venligbo cafés that have been established and run 
entirely by volunteers, festive events (such as Café Venlig På Tværs in Aalborg), 
help with learning Danish and translations, help to find work, fundraisers, and 
much more.
10.3.1  Organizational Structure
The Venligbo movement features traits of both formal and informal organizational 
structure; however, the general structure of the movement is much closer to infor-
mal social movement organization (SMO) than formal movement organization 
(Staggenborg 1988; Willems and Jegger 2012). The movement has no formal lead-
ership, and founder of the movement Merete Bonde Pilgaard has rarely challenged 
the conduct of local factions, albeit some controversy has existed around the inter-
pretation of the movement values. There is no centralized control or bureaucratized 
decision-making process and no formalized divisions of labor, although many of 
the factions do establish some degrees of formalization to handle organizational 
management on an everyday basis. Especially larger projects such as the Venligbo 
cafés, funds, events, and so on, have necessitated some degree of organizational 
formalization. However, this formalization is only attributable to subunits of the 
movement, not to movement-level organization and functioning. Neither does it 
apply to most movement organizing, which is primarily effectuated through ad hoc 
problem solving. The overall organizational management centers on the value foun-
dation of the movement and a small “daily management board”, “Friendly Guides” 
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(Venligboerne n.d.). This form of social movement organization is broadly similar 
to the “new social movements” (NSM) theories emphasizing identity and personal 
transformations as the primary guide for movement activities (Fominaya 2010; Offe 
1985). This informal, value-based approach to movement organizing has been a 
fecund ground for initiatives that are based on the underlying movement values and 
which accord with the movements’ overall identity, but which are not “caused” or 
predetermined by these identity formulations. This organizational form has sup-
ported the innovative character of civil society and provided possibilities for indi-
viduals to express themselves and act in creative ways.
Initially, there were no attempts to create an institutionalized way of governing 
the adherence to the organizational value foundation. However, in the spring of 
2015, Pilgaard initiated the “Friendly Guides” to administer the rapid expansion of 
the movement and its subunits, which illustrates, perhaps, the most prominent 
change towards formalization on behalf of the overall movement. Importantly, this 
expansion escalated as the Venligbo idea was combined with helping refugees in the 
spring of 2015 when the many refugees fleeing Syria began to reach Denmark. 
Pilgaard met with Mads Nygaard who, at the time, worked in the newly reopened 
Asylum Center in Hjørring. They agreed that the Venligbo ideology would be a 
good idea.
The “hands-off approach” was also challenged during a conflict in 2016 over the 
approach to politics within the movement and by a deviant local group on the island 
Fyn that had adopted the name Venligboerne, but which most other factions agreed 
was not operating in accordance with the movement’s identity, values, or goals 
(Fenger-Grøndahl 2016). However, in spite of the general agreement against this 
particular Facebook group, the incident did spark a persistent internal debate around 
organizational leadership, management, and general principles, which created fault 
lines between various positions within the movement, and which, to some extent, 
remain unresolved.
10.3.2  Network, Alliances and the Refugee Solidarity  
Movement
The Venligbo movement has extensive links within the Danish refugee solidarity 
movement and beyond (Agustín and Jørgensen 2019). These links (collaborations, 
strategies, and ideological alliances) and practices of solidarity are part of the larger 
infrastructure of dissent which has been the basis for the ongoing solidarity mobili-
zations spanning the entirety of the refugee solidarity movement. This infrastructure 
is comprised of solidarity practices and networks of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
(Agustín and Jørgensen 2019; Toubøl 2015), to which Venligboerne adds a rela-
tively new component. The development of the refugee solidarity movement in the 
past has not been as extensive as the scope we witness today, and it may be argued 
that this is the first time in contemporary history that Denmark has experienced the 
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emergence of a loosely affiliated, countrywide network mobilizing around issues of 
migration, nationality, and migration policies. Nevertheless, the prior experiences 
and infrastructures partake in the shaping of the collective memory and praxes and 
guide the building up of the network today.
The existing network consists of a range of different organizations and initiatives 
that vary between highly formalized and occasionally state-aligned initiatives (i.e. 
NGOs such as Danish Refugee Council and Danish Red Cross) to local and highly 
informal networks that are further removed from the state apparatus and, in some 
cases, opposed to the state (i.e. anarchist groupings). Politics can be a highly divi-
sive aspect in this regard, even when we consider a relatively aligned range of actors 
(i.e. the refugee solidarity movement as a whole), that may create cleavages between 
individuals or groups because their ideological backgrounds, identities, world- 
views, repertories of contention, and so on, are incongruent. Some, for instance, 
might see NGOs as inefficient giants squandering money on expensive staff and PR 
campaigns, while others may see the direct-action tactics of small political initia-
tives as “deviant”. What we want to emphasize, however, is the possibility of coop-
eration with a very broad variety of initiatives, as illustrated by Venligboerne, 
creating new alliances between many different organizations, likely, but not exclu-
sively, as a consequence of their “apolitical approach” to everyday activism (“apo-
litical” understood as non-Party affiliation and avowedly not policy-oriented). This 
cooperation has augmented the infrastructures of dissent and provided new avenues 
for activist entrance to the refugee solidarity movement (Rutland 2013; Toubøl 2017).
Within the network, Venligboerne connect with numerous types of organizations 
and initiatives: from municipalities and local political parties to NGOs, political 
movements, and everything in between. These connections exist, not only through 
member overlaps but also through collaborations and mutual support in various 
activities. Thus, in spite of a great diversity within the overall network, Venligboerne 
have been able to position themselves as a significant node with connections perme-
ating broadly across the entire network. This is significant to illustrating the diver-
sity of the network actors and the need for “linking” between organizations that 
might otherwise not cooperate. Our proposition here is that Venligboerne occupy 
exactly this position as a linking organization between the range of actors in the 
overall movement.
It may be argued that this position has emerged as a consequence of interactions 
between Venligboerne and the existing refugee solidarity movement, rather than 
being merely a strategic self-positioning. The movement itself has certainly devel-
oped because of its contact with other organizations and individuals in the refugee 
solidarity movement, not least has this been an impetus for the divide between the 
“political” and “non-political” factions of the movement. Pilgaard has definitely 
never articulated a strategy for the movement in terms of its alignment with other 
organizations or individuals within the broader refugee solidarity movement. Such 
considerations were only articulated as the movement began to grow, and more 
politically engaged activists emerged as prominent voices from “inside” the Venligbo 
movement.
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While refugees and the cooperation with new citizens play a large and important 
role in Venligboerne, the scope of the movement’s activities is much wider. Thus, 
for instance, we also see a close cooperation with other civil society organizations 
such as Næstehjælperne (helping your next one, as in the person in your proximity) 
or Sabaah to help respectively the jobless or the LGBT communities of ethnic 
minorities. The collaboration with Næstehjælperne provides an illustrative example 
of how solidarity shapes alliance building by identifying commonalities and com-
mon struggles. Næstehjælperne have organized a network for “reform-stricken” 
people. Many of the organization’s members are themselves affected by the new 
labor market and social policy reforms that have tightened legislation on social ser-
vices and compensations for people out of work. Within Næstehjælperne, people 
help one another and together oppose the recent reforms, particularly focusing on 
how the contemporary legislation forces people with reduced capacities to work. 
They also seek to bridge the gap between “the working people” and the “non- 
working people” (on social benefits or compensations) because a consequence of 
the current neo-liberal turn has been a stigmatization of people outside the labor 
market. Næstehjælperne and Venligboerne connect struggles through not seeing 
migrants and refugees as competitors for social services, but as people who are 
equally deserving of social rights (Thomsen and Jørgensen 2013). Returning to 
Venligboerne, if we look at the mantra of the CSO “to meet others with curiosity and 
respect”, this outlook underlies the elementary praxes of the organization: the 
engagement with the other in a constructive and non-prejudiced way, regardless of 
who the other is.
The “linking” between diverse groups of the refugee solidarity network, and 
even with organizations from many other areas, is important in terms of the general 
political landscapes as well, since it creates possibilities for broader alliances 
between a range of actors, movements, and groups along the same lines that Offe 
(1985) discusses as an important question for NSM and their alliances with the 
traditional left-right political spectrum. This can be seen in the contemporary labor 
market debates and refugee policies, in which refugees are commonly portrayed as 
“stealing the jobs of the autochthonous population”, or worse still: the welfare 
(Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). It is politically expedient for nationalists and con-
servatives to convince unemployed and underemployed workers that refugees are 
the cause of their predicaments. Consequently, from a progressive perspective, the 
building of alliances between these groups is a necessary step to avoid collusion 
between conservatives, precarious workers and various factions of nationalists. 
Whether such alliances are established as explicitly party-political alliances or 
through informal civil society collaborations, activities or events is not of great 
import, since the development of infrastructures of dissent takes both time and a 
broad variety of initiatives.
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10.3.3  Civil Society and Communities of Learning
In various movements, for instance self-help movements or religious movements, 
the target of the movement is not an external entity that is asked to “deliver changes” 
but rather the members of the movement itself. Consequently, these movements are 
more “inward-looking” and focus on their own practices, activities, and so on, rather 
than looking to an external entity (i.e. the state) to ask for change. Some researchers 
have criticized these forms of movements (particularly the self-help movements), 
arguing that they are “retreating from democratic participation” or lacking in terms 
of engagement with the wider society (Baumann 1999; Marcello and Perucci 2000). 
However, other scholars see more potential for these kinds of groups to play a part 
in the general public sphere and democratic life (Anheier 2004; Giddens 1991; 
Welton 1993). Looking at Venligboerne, we argue there is a positive consequence of 
such participation and involvement in the CSO work.
Primarily, the movement addresses an interpersonal issue. If we return to the 
three central pillars of the organization (kindness, curiosity, and respect for diver-
sity), these constitute the central framing of the movement and identify its primary 
targets and methods. The core pillars address different sides of the same problem-
atic: meeting the other, whoever this person may be. In some cases, the other is a 
Dane, in other cases a refugee. Following the logic of Venligboerne, this categorical 
distinction essentially makes no difference as to how one should relate to the other. 
However, if we reverse the logic of the three pillars, we see that the issue all three 
pillars address is a deficiency in how we engage with the other: a lack of curiosity, 
a lack of respect, and a lack of friendliness. Instead, we often meet others with sus-
picion or negativity: we talk “behind their backs”, and we do not trust their actions 
and initiatives (TV2Nord 2017). Pilgaard argues that by changing this negative 
approach to others, we will improve not only their lives, but also our own. 
Consequently, the movement promises betterment through self-improvement or 
“lifestyle changes”, and the central tenet of the movement is the members’ own 
struggle to improve the way they meet the other, whoever the other is. However, 
while this orientation appears as an inward gaze, the consequence is not a distanc-
ing, or isolation, from the rest of society, the result is rather the opposite; a stronger 
connection with the larger society and, more importantly, areas of society that have 
been either marginalized, suppressed or isolated (refugees but also recipients of 
social support and other stigmatized groups such as the LGBT+ community). Sears 
argues that the infrastructure of dissent provides avenues for collective learning to 
help people develop an understanding of how the world works and how it might be 
changed (2014). Moreover, collective learning provides the means for developing a 
profound political culture, which we, in the context of this book, link to the idea of 
a politics of hope: hope cultivated and driven through communities of learning.
Welton (1993) views new social movements (NSM) as sites of adult learning, 
arguing that these movements are particularly well-suited sites for such activities, 
and that we should view the NSMs as spaces for learning about new subjectivities, 
social justice, solidarities, civic engagement, and personal relations to a wider 
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society (Kilgore 1999). This includes the cultivation of emancipatory praxes, and in 
spite of the espoused “individualism” of NSMs, Welton argues that introspection 
and personal fulfillment “cannot be separated from collective action” (Welton 
1993). The personal engagement with the other thus becomes a “first step” towards 
renewal of political imagination and accompanying praxes of dissent.
In a Deweyan sense, this learning process is based on the educational content of 
experiential and cooperative engagement with as broad and diverse a variety of 
social life as possible (Dewey 1916). In the case of Venligboerne (and similar orga-
nizations), we see how CSOs can contribute constructively to supporting engage-
ment between groups that may otherwise tend to be isolated from each other, even 
if they are geographically situated close together. As in Dewey’s experiential learn-
ing, the organization facilitates a personal encounter and experience with a social 
reality that may otherwise seem distant or unrelated to the individual, thus allowing 
for people of different groups to explore commonalities of oppression and for new 
solidarities to emerge. We must also note that besides the case of refugees, the SO 
supports a broad range of interaction between people from all walks of life in shared 
endeavors to solve everyday problems and establish collective projects and visions 
for the future, which is exemplary of the Deweyan ideal of social development and 
captured in his distinction of great societies from great communities (Dewey 1938).
The negative case (usually the result of a prolonged voluntary or involuntary 
separation between groups) can be exemplified with youth criminality, gangs, social 
control, racist organizations, and the like, which are all examples of collusions 
around other social objectives and through other forms of organization. These are 
examples of social learning and civil society organization all the same, but we see 
how they are not examples of positive forms of collective organization. They do not 
contribute to the development of good sense because they are isolated from most of 
society, because they do not collaborate with others, because their values are exclu-
sionary, and because their practices are mostly self-serving.
The daily engagement with others helps to develop new, shared imaginations and 
collective visions for a different future than the hegemonic discourses of contempo-
rary society, which have been borne by the politics of fear (outlined by Hellström 
et al., Chap. 1 in this volume). Instead of pandering to these xenophobic discourses, 
Venligboerne provide a space for challenging contemporary nostalgias and fears 
through an open engagement with the “Other”; experiment with the possibilities for 
conviviality, collaboration, and solidarity. Thus, this example illustrates how hope 
can be cultivated, even in dire situations such as during the compounding crises that 
Europe faced following the great recession.
When we relate these observations to the contemporary Danish society, an 
important insight can be gleaned from the chosen case that may shed some light on 
Dewey’s somewhat forgotten insight of democracy and education. His educational 
approach reminds us that a politics for democracy must be founded on an organiza-
tional approach that supports a broad and diverse engagement between different 
forms of life (Dewey 1916). Civil society’s qualities rest on the normative insight 
that they should be conducive to such activity that widens and extends the interac-
tion between all citizens as far as possible, and at the same time do so in a way that 
10 Challenging Misconceptions: Danish Civil Society in Times of Crisis
164
emphasizes egalitarianism and mutualism, as in the case of Venligboerne (see also 
Freire 1970). In times of crisis, this function becomes particularly pertinent: the 
cultivation of hope and development of collective imagination and ideas (Haiven 
and Khasnabish 2016) are crucial to the infrastructures of dissent and collective 
abilities to challenge ideological hegemonies and political closures. Similarly, we 
may also point to the importance of individual agency and empowerment, which is 
also part of the development of alternative politics. While class-based movements 
emphasize the political power of a collective group in unison, NSMs tend to empha-
size the power of the individual to promote an active self-invested participation in 
political problems. Both approaches are integral to solving many of the complex 
problems faced in times of great challenges and uncertainty.
10.3.4  Infrastructure of Dissent in Times of Change 
and Insecurity
Learning in social movements has been addressed from a variety of perspectives, 
but in this chapter we want to primarily connect it with the idea of infrastructures of 
dissent in a time of large-scale changes and insecurity. As we mentioned in the 
introduction, the world economy and global capitalist system tremble; the twentieth 
century global political order is reversing; nationalism, ethnocentrism, and various 
nostalgias are on the rise along with rampant inequality. But what are the perspec-
tives for contemporary progressive social movements?
Thinking in terms of infrastructures of dissent is useful to move beyond the tra-
ditional perspectives of class-based social movements that easily overlook both the 
diversity of political subjectivities as well as the necessity for developing intra- 
organizational collaboration, trust, resource sharing, planning, visions, and much 
more. The case of Venligboerne, we hope, illustrates how a CSO may appropriately 
position itself, not necessarily in the forefront of protest, yet still at the heart of 
progressive development.
To “learn”, in this respect, is not associated with the formalized idea of didactic 
curricula and teaching methods, but can be understood with Alain Touraine’s theory 
of the subject (Dubet 1994; Rutland 2013) emphasizing the movement of the indi-
vidual through social space as a process of “work on the self”, meaning an individ-
ual development, which is not reducible to some “knowledge of facts”, but which 
includes emotions, ideas, visions, ideology, resources and subjectivity, shaping the 
individual’s sense of self in social space though without giving up the recognition of 
a social space that equally influences the movement of the individual.
This view is important to avoid fracturing among progressives and to strengthen 
alliances between different groups (such as refugees, workers, the jobless, etc.), to 
establish spaces of social learning and development which together constitute the 
infrastructures of dissent that may constitute the support needed for progressive 
forces of the twenty-first century.
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10.4  Conclusions
The Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch wrote about utopia and hope in the first part 
of the twentieth century. He rejected the cultural pessimism of his peers (for instance 
Adorno) and insisted on the transformative power of political action by the working 
class and the new social movements. A particularly compelling statement stemming 
from The Principle of Hope (a three-volume piece) written between 1938 and 1947 
goes: “The most tragic form of loss isn’t the loss of security; it’s the loss of the 
capacity to imagine that things could be different” (here from the 1986 edition). 
Although not carrying the same optimism as Bloch, Sears also expresses hope of 
political transformation (in his case for the reinvigoration of the left). Hope is action, 
and action for him is located within the framework of the infrastructure of dissent. 
This provides the means to develop the capacity to make connections and develop 
knowledge out of collective experience and to enhance the ability to work strategi-
cally as mobilizations evolve (Sears 2014, p. 6). He argues that individuals learn 
rapidly, but that it takes a collective effort and an infrastructure to “develop a big 
picture perspective on issues and to envision a better world worth fighting for” 
(Sears 2014, p. 6).
In our analysis of Venligboerne, the space for the civil society organization is 
expanded beyond a space for political protest. The solidarity work and the welcom-
ing culture form part of a broader infrastructure of dissent. Venligboerne can be 
viewed as a community of collective learning, which is particularly pertinent at a 
time when refugees, migrants, and Muslims have been cast as the culprits of 
Europe’s contemporary ailments. Here we see how learning becomes crucial for 
enacting everyday progressive politics. The movement’s contributions are not 
merely protest actions against escalating political repression, but also an educa-
tional process focused on a renewed understanding of the other, whether the other is 
a refugee, unemployed, Muslim, migrant, or simply another Dane. Such learning 
processes are important in order to reorient the contemporary cultural trajectory that 
is moving us towards increasingly xenophobic, hierarchical, and self-centered out-
looks on the world. While protest activity of course plays a part in the same direc-
tion, it is important to recognize the work of culturally oriented social activity that 
supports the protest activity by providing an open space for adult learning, and thus 
forms part of the infrastructures of dissent that enable contemporary formations of 
transformative alliances and possibilities for a reinvigoration of utopian politics of 
hope: the ability to collectively imagine better futures with space for a diverse range 
of subjectivities.
The experiential dimension of discovering possibilities of co-existence, shared 
ideas, possibilities for shared projects and cooperation, exchange and integration 
between different groups are all central aspects in understanding Venligboerne. 
From our analysis of Venligboerne, we argue that the organizational form in combi-
nation with the organizational goals provide a pertinent example of such a space for 
adult learning, which supports both engagement and interaction with a broad range 
of social organizations (Dewey 1916).
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Rather than focusing on the success or failure of such an approach (Haiven and 
Khasnabish 2016), it makes sense to view the praxis itself as a model for civil soci-
ety activity. While the case here is obviously neither exclusive nor uniform, the 
point is less about a specific variety or type but about a general approach. While 
Venligboerne as a case provide a significant ensemble which we can learn much 
from, they should not be seen as the only possible configuration of such a CSO. In 
conclusion, in our work to improve on the social cohesion, solidarity, collaboration 
and general welfare of our societies, perhaps the most important issue is not to over-
look the importance of everyday activism and adult learning as dimensions of CSO 
praxis and as parts of broader infrastructures of dissent.
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Chapter 11
“Impossible” Activism and the Right 




The breaking down of the Finnish political consensus culture (Nieminen 2010), 
together with a hybridization of the communicative space (Chadwick 2013) and the 
electoral successes of The Finns Party since 2008, has created a new environment in 
Finland for debates on refugee-related matters. In these debates, anti-immigration 
arguments are presented not only by the candidates of The Finns Party, but a range 
of politicians from across the political spectrum (Horsti and Nikunen 2013). This 
applies to face-to-face debates, legacy media and social media alike. Particularly on 
social networking sites (SNS), the voices of “White, angry welfare protectionists” 
have grown loud. These voices are backed up by claims that are more moderate in 
tone, and together they both echo and construct collective imaginaries of welfare 
nostalgia and threat. In the threat imaginaries, Finland is envisioned as an innocent 
and rational State under siege from a chaotic, ethnically diverse and hostile world. 
(Pettersson 2017; Pyrhönen 2017; Schierup et al. 2018, and Hellström et al., Chap. 
1 in this volume).
In this communication environment, there is little mediated space for asylum 
seekers and refugees to come to the forefront with their views and experiences of 
how the State respects their right to seek protection, evaluates security in their for-
mer homeland, and balances between dichotomies and conflicting principles such 
as safety vs. risk, human rights vs. control, threat/burden vs. asset.
One tactic for asylum seekers to increase their ability to be heard in public is to 
organize demonstrations in central urban spots or in connection with asylum 
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centers. Accordingly, the Right to Live demonstration1 was initiated on 10 February 
2017 in central Helsinki with the main purpose of creating awareness around refu-
gee rights and deportation practices upheld by the State. This occurred in the after-
math of political protests led by asylum seekers in Berlin, Vienna, Cairo, New York 
and elsewhere in the world. As internationally, also in Helsinki, the form of the 
demonstration was a sit-in demonstration, or protest camp in Gavin Brown et al.’s 
(2018) and Anna Feigenbaum et al.’s (2014) conceptualization. The demonstration, 
which lasted over the winter, spring and summer, until 17 September, was debated 
on various online forums, often in relation to a migration-critical counter demon-
stration initiated on the same urban spot by demonstrators who held opposite socio 
cultural values and political agendas to the asylum seekers and their allies, namely 
migration criticism, welfare nostalgia and so-called Euroscepticism.
Examining how and by whom the Right to Live demonstration was discussed in 
public, I explore in this chapter how, if at all, spontaneously formed social engage-
ment groups led by asylum seekers and Finnish allies manage to direct the public 
debate over refugee rights towards increased humanitarianism, justice in the asylum 
process and awareness of the security situation in regions of war and conflict. This 
is done in a theoretical framework built around the paradoxical relation between the 
“right to be understood” (Husband 1996) and “impossible activism” (Nyers 2003). 
While, according to Charles Husband (1996, 2009), marginalized collectives should 
ideally have “the right to be understood” as a so-called third generation human 
right, in practice, not all have the opportunity to become political subjects who can 
make claims on welfare services, security and protection. In the context of migrant 
protests, this argument appears to be particularly true, as shown in studies by Ilker 
Ataç (2016), Jouni Häkli et al. (2017), Sara de Jong and Ilker Ataç (2017), Peter 
Nyers (2003), Carolina Moulin and Peter Nyers (2007).
In contrast to many of the international sit in-demonstrations, such as the one 
organized outside the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Cairo in 2005 (Moulin and Nyers 2007), the Right to Live demonstra-
tion was a joint endeavor of migrant protesters from Iraq and Afghanistan and their 
Finnish allies. How, if at all, the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, open and collaborative 
nature of the endeavor came to influence how claims of increased humanitarianism 
and refugee rights came to be circulated and heard in the communication environ-
ment, and how, if at all, they came to empower a public discourse of hope rather 
than nostalgia, is discussed further in this chapter.
1 The Right to Live demonstration is not be confused with a US-based movement on reproductive 
rights with nearly the same name. The two initiatives are unrelated.
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11.2  From Grateful Refugee to Political Subject
To understand the significance of a sit-in demonstration led by migrant protesters 
and their allies in the context of Finland, one must relate the protest to certain fluc-
tuations taking place in contemporary civil society with regard to anti-racist activ-
ism, refugee rights and anti-deportation movements. There are four phenomena that 
require a brief overview.
First, due to the center-right Government’s (PM Juha Sipilä 2015–2019) tight-
ened asylum policies, it seems that the significance of traditional top-down led 
NGOs is diminishing while the role of spontaneous network type of initiatives (Peli 
Poikki – Enough is Enough demonstration), and groups formed ad hoc  in online 
environments is increasing (e.g., We see You and Refugee Hospitality Club Finland). 
This phenomenon may be influenced by the Finnish Government’s funding cuts to 
so-called humanitarian NGOs (Yle 2015, July 9), but this is not the whole reason, 
since broader phenomena, such as the digitalization of our everyday lives and an 
increased tendency for citizens to “bypass” the state and to mistrust elites leading to 
new social movements (Offe 1984), also play a role.
Although not a new phenomenon, this is still a noteworthy trend, since Finland 
has traditionally been the “promised land” of NGOs, and as in the other Nordic 
countries, the state and civil society have been and are still closely related today 
(Haggrén et al. 2005; Luhtakallio 2012). Hence, in Alana Lentin’s (2004) theorizing 
of anti-racist activism as existing along a continuum of proximity-to-distance from 
the public political culture of the nation-state (Rawls 1993 [2005]), most Finnish 
civic refugee rights and anti-racist movements have traditionally been in line with 
the public political culture.
Second, in Finland, although the founding of Antifa Finland in 1992 marked the 
beginning of a more spontaneous and confrontational agency in the field of refugee 
rights and antiracism, street politics is a marginal phenomenon in comparison to 
Sweden or France, for example (see: Pries and Brink Pinto 2013, and Jämte 2013 
for Swedish NGOs and movements against racism; Luhtakallio 2012 for Finnish 
civil society at large; Seikkula 2019, and Alemanji and Mafi 2018 for mainstream 
types of anti-racist agency in Finnish civil society). However, the organizing of anti- 
migrant collectives to patrol the streets in the midst of the intensified entry of asy-
lum seekers to Finland in 2015–2016, as well as a few deportation cases that evoked 
great public furore, have lately given rise to an increased number of street-level 
engagements for increased refugee rights both in the capital area and elsewhere.
Third, today, when a large part of the communication practices of refugee rights 
groups and spontaneously organized collectives take place on social networking 
sites, new challenges are emerging. These sites, platforms and forums are crucial for 
the organizing of campaigns and events, and at the same time, because much of this 
activity takes place on social networking sites, they are vulnerable to fake profiles, 
trolling and hate (see: Gustafsson 2019, May 15 for a contemporary court case 
against 24 people convicted for defamation).
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Four, it is noteworthy that in Finnish street politics for migrant rights, there are 
few participants from migrant groups that arrived in the country decades ago, from 
e.g. Chile or Somalia, which contributes to a White ambiance at many demonstra-
tions. The modest participation of migrants and refugees in larger protest move-
ments in Finland may relate to a collective feeling of gratitude for the right to enter 
one of the most politically stable countries in the world, for tax funded allowances, 
for services such as refuge, food, medical care, and language training (Yijälä and 
Nyman 2017, p. 83; Kokkonen 2010). These feelings of gratitude may be mixed 
with guilt and also frustration at having to feel and show gratitude towards some-
thing as abstract as a State. Perhaps it is the “obligation of gratitude” (Ong et al. 
2015), as experienced by self and others, rather than gratitude in itself that affects 
the willingness of migrants living in Finland to enroll in great numbers in protest 
movements.
However, recently, Finnish activists have become more aware of their lack of 
legitimacy to speak up about certain refugee related matters, and as is argued in this 
chapter, there is a new type of more prominent migrant figure that emerges in and 
through self-expression2 – one who demands visibility, voice, rights, and fairness 
when it comes to how the State, anti-migration collectives and their allies relate to 
matters of representation, ethnicity, and race.
11.3  Towards Becoming Understood
To envision the refugee in this strong position, as a political subject, someone who 
has a legitimate voice that is heard by elites and others, is a controversial sugges-
tion. Peter Nyers (2003) has introduced the concept of “impossible activism” when 
referring to the political self-organizing of asylum seekers, refugees, non-status 
residents. He means that such activism tends to reveal problems as well as new ways 
of thinking and acting politically. Questions rising are: who is to be protected; who 
will do the protecting; who represents those in need of protection; can the endan-
gered3 speak for themselves; what are the possibilities and constraints that (dis)
allow political activism by non- or quasi-citizens? (Nyers 2003, p. 1071) He states, 
“Not surprisingly, representatives of the sovereign order display a striking anxiety 
whenever the abject foreigner takes on the status of a political activist engaged 
2 Asylum seekers in Finland have been engaged in direct political advocacy also before 2017, 
although these actions have received only little attention from the legacy media (Horsti and 
Pellander 2018).
3 There are plenty of notions used for queries about if, when and how endangered, vulnerable, 
minoritized, or racialized individuals and collectives get to speak up about issues concerning them. 
Spivak (1996 [1985], p. 214) talks about the subaltern, Nyers (2003, p. 1073) about the abject 
foreigner, Chouliaraki (2013) and Eide (2017) about vulnerable others. As I see it, vulnerability is 
a “productive position, condition, or state that does something”, something more than a “lamen-
table condition from which subjects should be defended, rescued or liberated” (The Engaging 
Vulnerability-project 2016). See also Dancus, Hyvönen & Karlsson (2020).  
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in acts of self-determination (e.g., stopping his/her deportation).” (Nyers 2003, 
p. 1078).
This anxiety, I suggest, carries certain consequences for the preparedness and 
willingness of political elites, journalists, and other key figures in the public debate 
to understand the process of asylum from the point of view of the protesting asylum 
seeker – sometimes perhaps more a subconscious than conscious position, other 
times as a means of doing nationalistic politics.
A theoretical notion that challenges the nationalistic and nostalgic collective 
imaginaries of an ethno-nationalistically united “we”, is Charles Husband’s (1996, 
2009) concept of the “right to be understood”. According to Husband, following the 
principle of the right to be understood means to actively seek to comprehend minor-
ities. For Husband (2009, p. 141), the right to be understood is a collective right 
within what can be envisioned as the “third generation human rights”, i.e., collective 
rights that go beyond the mere civil and social. In my reading of Husband, this 
“right” is intended to balance the share of rights and obligations in the communica-
tive space so that the right to free speech would not rule out moral obligations, such 
as a willingness to listen to social groups in vulnerable positions in society. 
Following Iris Marion Young, Husband (1998, pp. 139–140) calls for an active state 
that guarantees equity of participation through the creation of state institutions 
capable of advancing mechanisms and processes to aid understanding across bound-
aries such as ethnicity, culture, and religion. At the core of the theoretical idea lies 
the ideal of the state being able to nurture solidarity towards vulnerable social 
groups. This, according to Husband (1996, p. 4), requires a moral sensibility which 
underpins a reflexive self-consciousness in regard to in-group values, that is, who 
“we” are and what is important to “us”, and a recognition of solidarity with 
minorities.
Not all “minorities” are citizens, which brings us back to Nyers (2003; Moulin 
and Nyers 2007) and the question on whether asylum seekers, as abject4 foreigners 
with a variety of legal statuses, can be expected to have collective rights in the field 
of communication, particularly when it comes to self-expression and a respectful 
and imaginative recognition of their political claims? And if so, can the State and its 
institutions be expected to be those “who understand” them and engage with their 
claims? My answer is yes. According to article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), everybody is guaranteed the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
in other countries. Subsequent regional human rights instruments have elaborated 
on this right, which in practice means that asylum seekers have the right to appeal 
decisions by migration authorities to a court. Legal and political decision-making 
cannot be fully detached from the mediated discourses as media, through agenda 
setting (McCombs 2005) and mediatization (Hepp et al. 2015), influence the ideo-
logical context in which the decisions are made, and also are influenced by these 
ideological contexts. Accordingly, as I see it, asylum seekers also have the right to 
self-expression in the public debate in which elites and citizens share information, 
4 The abject is someone who is cast-out, discarded, and rejected (Nyers 2003, p. 1073).
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debate over moral and ethical questions and – in an ideal democracy – also scruti-
nize policies and decisions made by national and supranational institutions.
11.4  Material and Method
This chapter creates a synthesis of three different sets of empirical material5: inter-
views with protesting asylum seekers and their allies, analysis of legacy media, and 
big data analytics from Facebook. The first set of data consists of interviews with 19 
protesting asylum seekers and their allies; the second set consists of 57 news articles 
in legacy media covering 13 news articles on the Yle web-site (the national broad-
casting company), 16  in Helsingin Sanomat (the main Finnish-language national 
paper), 6 in Hufvudstadsbladet (the main Swedish-language national paper), 10 in 
Iltalehti (evening paper), and 12 in Turun Sanomat (regional paper). The third set 
consists of 3643 postings and comments published in Facebook groups between 
February 2017 and June 2017.
The in-depth interviews with activists, both asylum seekers and their Finnish 
allies, and the legacy media content have been analyzed using close reading 
(Lentricchia and DuBois 2003) in Atlas.ti. The big data material was collected from 
the Facebook API by means of a custom-built tool (https://github.com/HIIT/hybra-
someloader, see Nelimarkka et al. 2018) and the material has been analyzed using 
close reading and computational methods, such as link analysis. The material was 
collected before Facebook implemented new regulations, forbidding data from pub-
lic groups from being collected without the consent of the group administrator. 
Despite this, with regard to research ethics, I do not refer to individuals and I do not 
use direct quotes from the big data.
The four pro-migration groups analyzed on Facebook are: “We see You”, a com-
munity with 8800 followers, “Stop Deportations”, a community organization with 
over 14,000 followers, Rasmus-valtakunnallinen rasismin ja muukalaisvastais- 
uuden verkosto (Rasmus – the national network against racism and xenophobia), a 
group with over 16,000 members, and “Refugee Hospitality Club”, a group with 
14,000 members. The four anti-migration sites on Facebook examined are Minun 
Suomeni on sinivalkonen (My Finland is blue and white), a group with over 4400 
members, Suomi Ensin-foorumi (Finland First Forum), a public group with over 
4400 members, Rajat Kiinni-kansanliike (The civic movement Close the Borders), 
a public group with more than 9900 members and Maahanmuuttokriittiset (The 
migration critics), a group with more than 5100 members as of 2018.
5 The empirical material was obtained by the Academy of Finland project Anti-racism under pres-
sure: Social movements, NGOs and the mediated claims-making (2013–2016/2018) in collabora-
tion with the Academy of Finland consortia Racisms and public communications in the hybrid 
media environment (HYBRA) (2016–2019). The help of my research assistants, Juho Pääkkönen 
and Erna Bodström, has been crucial in the collection and organizing of the empirical material.
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I roughly categorize these groups into pro-migration and anti-migration groups 
in order to grasp general trends in the debate but it must be kept in mind that the 
groups within the two categories are not identical in character. For example, Rasmus 
contains more comments on a much broader register for and against migration than 
the three other groups in the pro-migration category. Maahanmuuttokriittiset (The 
migration critics), again, contains more respectful and dialogical commenting than 
the three other groups in the anti-migration category.
11.5  The Reasons to Protest and the Formation of the Camp
After the arrival of an all-time record of 20,485 Iraqi and 5214 Afghan asylum seek-
ers in 2015 (Migri 2015), the Government6 implemented an amendment to the 
Aliens Act (HE 2/2016 vp), stating that after 16 May 2016, if a person does not meet 
the requirements for asylum or subsidiary protection, Finland can no longer grant 
the person humanitarian protection.7
At the same time, Finnish immigration officials revised their security assess-
ments for Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. They stated that it was safe for nationals 
to return to their home countries, making it more difficult for asylum seekers from 
these countries to receive residence permits in Finland (Migri 2016). During spring 
2017, there was also well-grounded information about at least one case in which a 
man was deported against his will, despite not having received a final decision 
regarding his asylum application (Svenska Yle 2017, February 20). In addition, dur-
ing the same spring, inaccurate decision making in the asylum administration also 
began to be documented by persons other than human rights activists. According to 
the Finnish Migration Service – a government agency under the Ministry of the 
Interior – 4% of all negative decisions come back to the Migration Service from the 
Administrative Court because of an erroneous handling of the case by the Migration 
Service, whereas in 2015, the proportion was only 0.2% (Rämö 2017).
To protest against these alleged wrong-doings by the Finnish state, on February 
12th, 2017, a few migrants with connections to the refugee rights activist network, 
the Free Movement Network (founded in 2006), formed an ad hoc sit-in demonstra-
tion that soon started to attract more participants.
6 In May 2015, The Finns Party joined Finland’s coalition government for the first time after finish-
ing second in the national elections, ushering a move away from pro-immigration and pro-EU 
policy. During spring 2017, the party split into two groups, The Finns Party, led by Jussi Halla-aho, 
and a group initially called the “New Alternative” and later the “Blue Reform”. The latter contin-
ued as part of PM Juha Sipilä’s center-right government until the parliamentary elections in 2019.
7 The amendment meets the minimum requirements set by the Refugee Convention (1951) but still 
tightens the rules around asylum as before May 2016, it was possible according to § 88  in the 
Aliens Act (HE 2/2016 vp) to grant protection on humanitarian grounds to a person even if he/she 
did not meet the requirements set out by § 87 and § 88 in the Aliens Act.
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The sit-in demonstration was originally planned to be a brief publicity-attracting 
event, but it was prolonged day by day without a clear decision or plan for how to 
proceed. Tents and sleeping bags were brought in to the initial central spot of the 
demo by Finnish supporters who had heard about the demonstration in social media 
or through their affiliation with the Free Movement Network.
Many informants, migrants and allies alike, speak of the formation of the sit-in 
demonstration as “chaotic”, and a continuous and tiresome struggle with city 
authorities and political opponents (the migrant-critical counter-demonstration) for 
their pure right to exist. Despite this “survival mode” and harsh winter climate, 
political claims became refined as a collaboration between the three subgroups 
(Iraqis, Afghans, and Finns) and distributed online on various forums. Leaflets were 
printed, meetings with decision-makers and supporters were organized, press 
releases sent out, and the tent area was kept clean in order to avoid dirtiness being 
used as justification for the Police to evict the area – the last, a demanding task in a 
spot where no infrastructure such as heat, water, toiletry or garbage services are 
provided for. Taking care of these tasks was possible as the collective transformed 
from a loose network of strangers into a close circle of friends. Both migrant pro-
testers and their allies soon started referring to their collective as the “Demo family”.
11.5.1  Who Represents Whom?
An important feature of the “Demo family” was a continuous discussion over repre-
sentation. Some of the allies had expertise in public relations and, also because of 
their much-needed skills in Finnish (and Swedish, in order to serve the Swedish- 
language media in Finland), PR tasks were mainly planned by the allies. However, 
in situations where journalists or politicians visited the protest site, the allies sys-
tematically guided the visitors towards the migrant protestors. For the collective, it 
was important that the sit-in demonstration in public was presented as a migrant 
endeavor. For this reason, the initial unofficial connection to the Free Movement 
Network was also often silenced and research interview questions that related to 
leadership or the choice of spokespersons were often answered cryptically. The 
Finnish allies were, for example, told to chair weekly meetings because the Finnish 
way of having meetings was appreciated by all, not because they would be in charge.
Most of the internal conflicts, such as difficult personal relations, or worsened 
group relations between the Arabic speakers and the Dari speakers, were also inten-
tionally overlooked by the migrants and the Finnish allies alike in order to keep the 
ideal of a non-hierarchical and democratic organization alive (see: Laaksonen et al. 
forthcoming for more on how authority within the organization was formed). In 
practice, however, there were people within the collective who played the roles of 
leaders, spokespersons, and representatives for others. Various power positions 
were constructed via everyday activities (for example, carrying water to the camp 
was a low-status task, cooking high-status, etc.), but power positions were also con-
structed through social media actions that could both exclude and include.
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It was much easier for the migrant protestors to talk about their role as represen-
tatives for asylum seekers outside the demonstration site than about issues relating 
to internal leadership and group relations. Many of the migrant protestors saw them-
selves as representatives of families and children residing far from the capital area, 
and of people whose skills in English were insufficient to follow currents and under-
currents in policy-making. Some of the migrant protestors had launched and now 
administrated active social media networks to better reach these groups and indi-
viduals. Information on upcoming deportations or bad conditions at certain recep-
tion centers could be shared via these sites and other networks managed by the 
migrant protestors. The administrators of these sites claim that they have become 
known persons within their communities – persons who “bring hope” to desperate 
individuals and families who deal with negative asylum decisions and struggle with 
the authorities. Hence, the migrant protestors administrating popular demo-related 
Facebook groups in Arabic and Dari seem to have become important nodes for 
transmitting various kinds of grassroots information from reception centers in the 
provinces to Finnish pro-migration activists, and vice versa.
11.5.2  Law, Order, and Security in Legacy Media
Another factor contributing to the cumulative burden of the sit-in demonstration 
was the constant feeling of claims being misinterpreted or neglected by legacy 
media. In the established news media, the Right to Live demonstration was dis-
cussed mostly in relation to the anti-migration counter-demonstration. Together the 
two sit-in demonstrations were framed as a problem – a problem of law and order in 
the city center, and a potential provocation to more serious security-related threats. 
What kinds of threats, from whom, directed where, and how the Police knew about 
these threats was left unclear, despite the fact that representatives for the Police had 
earlier stated that “everything has worked out well with the Right to Live demon-
stration” (Finnish News Agency STT 2018, 26 June). The claims put forward by the 
migrant protestors of brutal and systematic violence in regions to which former 
asylum seekers were deported from Finland, and claims of severe problems within 
the migration administration, were left aside by journalists in their stories on the 
demonstration. Instead, the responsibility to explain in legacy media what really 
happened on site was handed to the Police. In fact, the situation was persistently 
framed by journalists as a matter of law and order, leaving no room to clarify why 
the asylum seekers were protesting. In the interviews, the migrant protestors 
expressed sentiments of having been betrayed by the journalists. Migrant protestors 
claimed in the research interviews that they got to argue their case freely when 
interviewed by journalists, but, once the story came out, only a brief “nonsense 
quote” had been published instead of all the political claims that they had put 
forward.
The framing of the issue as a case of law, order and security on the expense of 
human rights perspectives, echoes prior studies on news on migration (Benson 
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2013). However, what distinguishes the reporting on the Right to Live-demonstration 
from migration news in general is the exceptionally strong polarization of migrants 
and so-called immigrant critics, and the focus on rather mundane concerns, such as 
littering in urban space, rather than on, for example, controlling migration flows and 
demographic anxieties (see Hellström et al., Chap. 1 in this volume). Concerning 
polarization, what we see here is that the emerging migrants’ rights movement led 
by migrants and their allies in Finland was so persistently presented through a polar-
ized angle that it seems difficult to break even in situations where polarity cannot be 
seen on the field. For example, in reporting on a regional support demonstration in 
the city of Kotka where anti-migrant activists were not present, their very absence 
became a point of emphasis. In other words, instead of being allowed to form claims 
relating to the actual pro-asylum agendas, organizers were quoted on how relieved 
they were that the atmosphere was peaceful and no counter-demonstrators were 
present (Pisto 2017, March 11).
11.5.3  Human Rights and Welfare in Social Media
Issues of law, order and security are emphasized on Facebook as well, but the per-
spective taken is very different depending on the site concerned. On the pro- 
migration sites, the broader circle of sympathizers with the migrants’ demonstration 
who mainly identify as “native” Finns, center the discussion on the disturbance and 
harassment from the immigrant critical counter-demonstration. Rumors about Neo- 
Nazi “raids” on the site of the demonstration were discussed on these pro-migration 
sites and security measures contemplated (for example, a child-friendly pro-migrant 
event was planned with the aid of staff from the neighboring ice-skating rink but can 
celled last-minute for alleged security reasons). The Police’s lack of interest in com-
ing to the site when asylum seekers made telephone calls in order to get protection 
from the immigrant critics were also discussed by the broader circle of 
sympathizers.
Despite the discussion about harassment, trouble and security risks, the predomi-
nant frame for discussion in the pro-migration groups was that of human rights. This 
is particularly true in posts by supporters of the demonstration who identify as 
“native” Finns. Particularly at the beginning of the demonstration, when migrant 
children and families spent time at the tent, this frame dominated the discussion. 
This frame was constructed by strong criticism towards the Finnish Migration 
Service, political elites, and the center-right Government of PM Juha Sipilä.
In this setting, the role of debaters who self-identify as asylum seeker is three-
fold. First, the migrant protestors and asylum seekers are “fact providers” who post 
visual and textual material from foreign sites in order to show proof of the current 
safety situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The content circulated is often in Arabic 
and contains pictures showing brutality. Although this kind of content does not 
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necessarily translate well into culturally Finnish mindsets, the claims formed in 
relation to the material tend to be powerful (e.g., “Baghdad is not safe. Don’t send 
me back there!”). Second, the migrant debaters are the “experience experts” who in 
affect- laden posts and by using online translation tools or rudimentary Finnish, 
express a variety of feelings, ranging from wary hope to extreme frustration for their 
difficult and uncertain situation. And third, they are “help-seekers” who through 
these forums appeal for help for various personal problems, mostly relating to legal 
issues and/or health. Call-outs for help were also sent out by “native” supporters 
who volunteered with document translation, housing, employment, or visits to 
authorities. These appeals from both migrants and volunteers were on most occa-
sions met with expressions of solidarity, and many times also with advice leading to 
a solution. Hence, on a micro-level, these groups function as “networked communi-
ties of support” that challenge the so-called “crisis of solidarity” (see Hellström 
et al., Chap. 1 in this volume).
On the contrary, on the so-called anti-migration sites, the tone of voice was hate-
ful and one can barely speak of actual debate on the issue of deportation; rather 
there was a collective bashing of asylum seekers, migrants, their supporters, author-
ities, and the legacy media. The established news media were alleged to be in con-
spiracy with other powerful parties in order to hide the “real” problems and 
consequences of migration in general and Islam in particular (see: Pyrhönen 2017).
In these outbursts, commentators often brought up welfare issues. The underly-
ing logic in these comments was that Finns are hardworking taxpayers who have to 
fund the slackness of migrants and to pay for them to be deported from “their holi-
days”. The accusations were harsh, sometimes containing death threats or referring 
to a need for a “mass cleansing”. What is interesting is that welfare nostalgia here 
functioned as some sort of justification for threats and ill wishes. The logic beneath 
this followed a pattern of “them” being here to use “our” welfare services and “our” 
tax money, which “they”, according to the so-called migration critics, had no right 
to (see: Horsti and Nikunen 2013; Pettersson 2017; Pyrhönen 2017, for similar con-
clusions on social media discourses on migration politics).
What makes the welfare discourse particularly interesting in this case is that it 
was used both by parties supporting the anti-deportation movement and those 
opposing it, but for opposite goals. In the pro-migration sites, reference was made 
to the rapidly declining nativity in Finland and the potential of asylum seekers, as 
future taxpayers, to contribute to maintaining the Finnish welfare system. As typical 
in social media bubbles, a link analysis shows that these two understandings rarely 
met. This non-dialogical communicative agency around deportation also contained 
features of strong simplification as there were few attempts/opportunities to give the 
key notions, such as “welfare” or “human rights” a precise, deeper and context- 
bound meaning. The lack of precision and contextualization of these three key 
notions in popular debate risks watering down claims for and against deportation, 
and may obstruct the refugees’ opportunities to be understood.
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11.6  Strategies and Obstacles for Being Understood
In the context of the theme of this volume, this chapter has examined some of the 
difficulties that contemporary humanitarian engagements in civil society face in a 
socio-cultural and economic climate where security, cultural protectionism, and 
neoliberal governability direct the media debate away from hopeful visions of 
humanitarianism, unity and global solidarity. Standing at the nexus of the right to be 
understood (Husband 2009) and the “impossibility” of political protest led by non- 
citizens (Nyers 2003), the aim of this chapter has been to provide a better under-
standing of whether asylum seekers involved in political protest manage to influence 
public debates on the core socio-cultural values in society, and if so, to examine the 
ways in which this influence works and the forms that it takes.
Drawing on a cross-reading of the three data sets (interviews with migrant pro-
testors and their allies, legacy media content, and analyses of eight Facebook- 
groups), I have shown how issues of representation are difficult to overcome even 
when collectives explicitly strive to create a movement without hierarchies; how the 
legacy media frames complex issues on State responsibility, human rights princi-
ples, and the nature of democracy in terms of law and order in urban space; and how 
arguments on asylum and migration put forward by political opposites do not meet 
in social media.
The issue of representability, which in relation to the communication environ-
ment is illuminated by the stepping aside of the Finnish allies in public in favor of 
the asylum seekers and the sweeping under the carpet of disagreements, even rup-
tured relations, between ethnic groups, to me resembles more a strategy for being 
understood than an organizational problem. It seems that the collective, knowingly 
or semi-knowingly, essentialized themselves into a community of “asylum seek-
ers”, instead of e.g., Afghans and Iraqis and Finns – hence engaging in a sort of 
“strategic essentialism”, in Gayatri Spivak’s terms (1996 [1985]).
What this means on a general level is that the protestors seem to have provision-
ally accepted a common identity category in order to pursue a chosen political goal. 
Elisabeth Eide (2017) and others, even Spivak herself, dispute the notion of strate-
gic essentialism and the ways in which the notion has been used. Perhaps, one 
could, as Eide (2017, 76) proposes between the lines, talk about a “standardizing of 
their public image” instead. By putting forward a “standardized public image”, the 
group identity of the protestors was simplified and collectivized in order to achieve 
certain objectives, in this case for their claims on faults and injustices in the asylum 
system not only to be voiced in public but also listened to, understood and applied 
in both policy and administrative practice.
Unfortunately, as I have argued, the journalistic framing of the demonstration as 
an issue predominantly threatening urban order and the security of Finns, and the 
lack of dialogue, precision and respect for the “vulnerable other” in online milieus 
are hindering the migrants’ efforts to be understood.
One can interpret the media focus on law and order in urban space as symbolic 
of how the State regains manageability over migration. Where manageability of 
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migration is a lost game, perhaps primarily in the minds of welfare nostalgics, and 
in media discourses with an overblown crisis rhetoric, here, at a safe spot, not along 
State borders but in the middle of the city, around a few tents and portable toilets, 
manageability is symbolically regained.
Nyers (2003, p. 1090) has said, “[t]o be a refugee, to be political—is consider-
ably difficult, if not impossible since radical takings of foreigners are always at risk 
of being deflected and absorbed by the non-democratic re-takings of sovereign 
power for the purposes of national and international (re)foundings.” While the Right 
to Live-demonstration received recognition by Ministers who visited the camp and 
elite politicians who publicly supported their claims, the migrant protestors were 
unsuccessful in defining the conditions of this recognition, at least during and 
immediately after the protest.
By no means does the biased legacy media representation mean that the endeav-
ors of the collective have been wasted. The protestors have created spaces where 
information exchange can occur in online media run by supporters of their cause. 
Through these multi-ethnic networks, activists, allies and supporters of the cause 
can seek evidence, map authority wrongdoings, and learn from one another (see: 
Jørgensen and Olsen, Chap. 10 in this volume). By doing so, they create a pool of 
invaluable, accumulated and grounded knowledge that draws on experience and 
expertise in Finnish laws and administration culture, but also on the transnational 
competencies so necessary to make sense of such complex phenomena as interna-
tional migration movements and policies. These networks may have the potential to 
change policy and facilitate not only migrant voices but also majority and elite 
understandings of the asylum process and the security situation in the Greater 
Middle-East. So far, however, this is only an endeavor in the making.
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Scholars argue for a paradigm shift regarding social movements’ claims for justice, 
from redistribution towards recognition, the later dominating the last decades. 
Today’s struggles and claims on social justice are divided between redistribution –
aiming at a just sharing of resources and welfare, and recognition of a different 
standpoint, based on ethnical, racial, sexual orientation or gender components 
(Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 7). To inquire about the cultural replacing the material 
or identity replacing class is inadequate since it confines recognition to identity 
politics and ignores the dynamic relationship between redistribution claims and 
challenges to misrecognition (Hobson 2003, p. 1). The equitable distribution of eco-
nomic resources is associated with the remedy of racial, gender, sexuality, or citi-
zenship related subordination and this nexus becomes more obvious today, in the 
context of a growing politics of social exclusion, supported by technocratic, neolib-
eral arguments. The fall of communism, the free-market ideology, and the ascen-
dance of identity politics played an important role in downgrading redistribution 
claims when recognition demands were increasingly predominant (Fraser and 
Honneth 2003, p. 8). Nonetheless, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee 
(reception) crisis opened the opportunity to bring back class into public debates, 
affirming the necessity to bridge between recognition and redistribution claims.
In Romania, feminist activists and scholars agree about the feminization of pov-
erty and that certain groups of women face multiple obstacles to enter the labor 
market, to earn a decent income. Feminists also agree that societies depend on the 
care work of women – unrecognized, unpaid or low paid, flexible, in formal and 
informal markets. They agree as well that deprivation and poverty are related to 
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social rights and entitlements or the lack of, threatened during the economic crisis. 
Austerity measures around the world gave rise to protests to which feminists aligned 
(feministas indignadas in Spain). In Romania, the 2012 anti-austerity mobilizations 
had a visible, strong feminist component, divided nevertheless between those who 
challenged the democracy-liberal-market consensus and those who supported it 
(Ana 2017).
The anti-communist backlash in public debates informs about the discursive 
opportunity structure during post-communism and the possibilities for subversive 
movements, with progressive narratives, such as the feminist one, to engage with a 
critique, not just of welfare state retrenchment, but of the welfare chauvinism and 
neoliberal capitalism that split people between the meritorious contributors and the 
non-worthy–migrant, Roma, the poor1.
While feminist scholars criticized neoliberal globalization (Jaggar 2005), neolib-
eral policies, arguing for welfare measures to support dependency work and as a 
matter of justice for women (Fraser 1994), some Romanian feminist scholars argued 
that in post-communist countries, welfare policies are detrimental for women 
(Miroiu 2004a, b). During the first decades of post-communism, when the anti-
communist backlash was at its apogee, the feminist movement debuted as an intel-
lectual-elitist endeavor, constituted within a mainstream liberal philosophy 
(Molocea 2015). It soon became NGO-ized, in the context of privatization and 
deregulation and acting sometimes as a substitute for the retreating welfare provi-
sions that already represented a space for women paid and unpaid labor and feminist 
struggles (Bernal and Grewal 2014, p. 9). It followed the path of other social move-
ments in Eastern Europe–of an early institutionalization within the process of 
democratization, under the influence of funds available to NGOs (Della Porta and 
Diani 2006, p. 246). The democratization and free-market discourse, coupled with 
the integration within supranational structures, inhibited criticism towards hege-
monic institutions that advocated global scale marketization and liberalization, but 
which nevertheless developed in parallel, in an underground scene. Feminist auton-
omous groups organized around political and cultural activities, supporting an anti- 
authoritarian, anti-fascist, no borders, and anti-capitalist discourse. Due to the 
anti-left backlash, to threats from the extreme-right and to police repression2, they 
remained in the underground, thus less visible in the public discourse.
The late 2000s financial crisis and the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis opened a 
discursive window of opportunity (Koopmans and Statham 1999) where class, 
economic inequalities, and poverty began to penetrate the liberal right-wing curtain 
that aggressively promoted privatization and deregulation, delegitimizing the use of 
welfare provisions, by deepening the cleavage between the worthy and non-worthy.
An intersectional politics of hope started to contour from feminist positions, 
through a three-dimensional process of bridge-building at the level of: (1) discourse, 
1 See, http://artapolitica.ro/2018/07/17/denuntarea-indezirabililor-noul-civism-timisorean/




between redistribution and recognition; culture and welfare; class and gender and 
ethnicity; (2) movements, within the feminist movement and across movements, 
between white feminist NGOs, Roma feminist organizations and informal, queer 
and radical-left collectives, the housing movement, engaging politically in a process 
of solidarity with forcibly evicted persons, migrant workers, and refugees; (3) rep-
ertoires of action, between contentious actions and more institutionalized forms of 
political interventions. Many if the actors who occasioned these bridge-building 
processes were feminist activists, with overlapping membership who acted as bro-
kers (Diani 2013).
To address the question of an intersectional politics of hope, questioning neolib-
eral capitalism and welfare chauvinism, addressing the role of class analysis within 
contemporary feminist movement discourses and strategies in post-communist 
Romania, I draw on Nancy Fraser’s “perspectival dualism” model and on interviews 
and participant observation conducted in June 2015 and between January and 
August 2016 as part of my Phd thesis research. I conducted 44 interviews in 
Bucharest, Cluj, and Sibiu that lasted between 30 min and almost 3 h.
12.2  Recognition, Redistribution, and Power Struggles
Today’s struggles and claims on social justice are divided between those concerning 
redistribution that aim at a more just distribution of resources and welfare and those 
regarding recognition of various groups and individual standpoints, based on ethni-
cal, racial, sexual orientation or gender components (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 
p. 7). Recognition and redistribution demands are frequently analyzed disjointedly. 
For example, within the feminism movement, claims for redistribution as a remedy 
to masculine domination are often disconnected from those for recognition of gen-
der difference, revealing the wider trend of dissociating cultural politics from social 
politics, the politics of difference from the politics of equality (Fraser and Honneth 
2003, p. 7). To view recognition and redistribution, as disconnected, artificial antith-
eses is misleading.
To enlighten about the antithetical construction of recognition and redistribution, 
Fraser reconstructs the paradigms associated with them, as categories of intercon-
nected assumptions about the causes of injustice and its antidotes that inform today’s 
social movements (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p.  11). Related to maldistribution, 
class structure refers to the societal institutionalization of the economic mechanisms 
that systematically exclude some people from access to resources and opportunities 
to participate as equal partners in social life (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p.  49). 
Related to misrecognition, status order indicates the institutionalization of patterns 
of cultural value that deny some members of society the recognition needed to par-
ticipate on a par in social interactions (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 49). However, 
as redistribution and recognition are intertwined, class and status order concomi-
tantly affect access and participation of individuals on a par in society. Consequently, 
claims for redistribution have effects on recognition and claims for recognition 
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impact distribution, giving rise to intended or unintended effects. For example, 
social welfare creates and ranks various subject positions or stigmatize and devalu-
ate certain beneficiaries (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 64–65). They have a com-
plex expressive dimension by the fact that they contain in themselves interpretations 
of the value and meaning of activities such as “childrearing” versus “wage-earning” 
and constitute subject positions, such as “welfare mothers” or “taxpayers”, affecting 
both the identities and the economic position of social actors (Fraser and Honneth 
2003, p. 67). Benefits that specifically target the poor are a direct redistributive form 
of social welfare that tend to stigmatize its beneficiaries, by distinguishing them 
from “tax-payers” and “wage-earners”, adding the insult of misrecognition to the 
harm of deprivation (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 68). Likewise, proposals to rem-
edy androcentric evaluative patterns may have economic effects on the targeted 
recipients (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 65). For example, campaigns against pros-
titution aiming to improve women’s status might have negative effects on the eco-
nomic position of the sex-workers (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 69).
To avoid obscuring identity forms of economic injustice or the economic effects 
of identity struggles, rather than lining up identity politics with recognition and 
class politics with redistribution, social movements should claim both recognition 
for categories of personhood and redistribution of material resources, as they both 
foster parity of participation and achievement of social justice (Fraser and Honneth 
2003, pp. 11–12; Gal 2003, p. 93). “Perspectival dualism” allows transgressing the 
distinctions between the economic and cultural dimensions of society, showing how 
redistribution and recognition are intertwined, collide and affect each other, without 
reducing one of them to the other or constructing irreducible oppositions between 
the cultural and economic dimensions of society.
Arguing that class and status are not the only dimensions of injustice, some 
researchers consider that power injustices and struggles over power include within 
them oases of recognition or redistribution, but are not reducible to them (Ferree 
and Gamson 2003, p. 35). They complement the “perspectival dualism” model with 
the power dimension analyzed both as autonomy, reflecting the individual level of 
self-determination, and as authority referring to the actual participation in decisions 
at societal level, revealing the relational attribute of power, politically crucial regard-
ing the relation between community and individuals (Ferree and Gamson 2003, 
pp. 36–37).
Perspectival dualism’s understanding of recognition and redistribution as two 
joint dimensions of social justice opens the possibility to disentangle the intricate 
relationship between different subordination systems making the target of social 
movements, such as class exploitation, and patriarchal and racial oppression. It 
allows engaging with the critiques of feminist movement’s cooption by neoliberal 
global capitalism. The interdependence between recognition and redistribution 
struggles becomes even more obvious in the context of the financial and refugee 
(reception) crisis. While the first one brought to the forefront redistribution issues, 
the second revealed the intricacy between recognition and redistribution related to 
whom is recognized as worthy and entitled to resources and whom not. Claims for 
social security are entwined with the reactionary scapegoating, whereby certain 
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people are not included in the redistribution scheme, being portrayed as undeserv-
ing. There is a potential that bottom-up emancipatory initiatives foster solidarity 
and bridge between recognition and redistribution demands, between culture and 
welfare as two intertwined dimensions of social justice.
12.3  Class and Gender During Post-communist Transition
In Romania, class analysis missed for decades, due to a strong anti-communist 
backlash, following the collapse of the state-socialist regime, both as a research 
category and as discursive practice. Politico-economic liberalism became the heter-
onomous intellectual framework, whereby libertarianism, neoliberalism and neo- 
conservatism developed unabated. Ideas associated with the left were rejected, class 
analysis was pushed to the margins, feminist discourses denigrated, and anti-racist 
organizing hindered by racist violence and discursive racialization in the build-up 
process of the ethnic Other, intensively targeting the Roma, but also the Hungarian 
minority.
During post-communism, many Romanians left the country to work abroad, 
becoming in 2009 the second biggest group of non-nationals living in other EU 
member states (Publications Office of the European Union. 2011). Their preferred 
destination countries were Italy and Spain, despite restrictive measures (Andrén and 
Roman 2016, p. 253). In 2010, Romanian migrants constituted the largest foreign 
group in Italy and the second largest in Spain (Andrén and Roman 2016, p. 254). 
During visa liberalization and shortly after EU accession, more Romanian women 
migrated to Italy than men (Mara 2012, p. 5). However, among Romanian officials, 
there was no explicit commitment regarding migration politics, aside from inflam-
matory discourses and campaigns against the internal Other. The increased negative 
media coverage of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain, contributed to growing 
anti-immigrant sentiments in both countries, and exploded with the “Mailat case” in 
Italy that triggered violent attacks on Romanian Roma and non-Roma. As a 
response, through a process marketization of Othering, aiming to prevent the other-
ing of non-Roma Romanians by Western Europeans, the Romanian government 
conducted a highly expensive nation branding campaign in Italy and Spain, based 
on a racialized construction of Romani alterity (Kaneva and Popescu 2014).
In the aftermath of the 2015 refugee (reception) crisis, a more detailed discussion 
about migration emerged in the public debates. While hosting approximately 2.475 
refugees, Romania was not a choice for transit or staying for refugees (Iacob et al. 
2016). However, the Romanian president together with other state officials showed 
fierce opposition to the EU refugee quotas3. The extreme-right party Noua Dreaptã 
organized a protest to ask for the rejection of refugee quotas, framed as solidarity 
3 https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/analiza-consiliul-jai-analizeaza-propunerile-ce-privind- 
imigrantii-romania-respinge-cotele-obligatorii-14710768
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with Bataclan attacks in Paris4. Support for refugees and opposition to xenophobic 
and racist discourses came from radical left, anarchist, queer and feminist activists 
that organized actions of protest, such as a flash mob in front of the Hungarian 
Embassy in Bucharest against Orbán’s policy to build a fence to bar refugees and 
solidarity actions to collect goods for refugees and migrants, bridging with interna-
tional pro-refugees movements5.
During post-communism, public intellectuals, as part of the new elite were a 
conservative group, with neoliberal affinities, opposing left discourses and promot-
ing a “preventive antifeminism” within the dominant debates, since other forms of 
activism, from marginalized positions were considered “subversive and incompati-
ble with the paramount national, ethno-religious concerns” (Roman 2001, p. 63). 
Civic involvement was considered minimal, due to state mistrust and lack of aware-
ness of democratic contractual rights (Pasti et al. 1997, p. 181), reinforcing a con-
servative attitude in women as political subjects (Miroiu and Popescu 1999). Other 
scholars question these diagnoses and explain that there is a gap between normative 
assumptions and experiences of inequality (Magyari 2006, p. 119), as well as aca-
demics’ unquestioned privilege and complicity with power and institutions (Lovin 
2013, p. 196). Likewise, others argue that, at the end of 2000s, class was rediscov-
ered within academic and public discourses. This was a result of Western capital-
ism’s crisis, which intensified during the financial crisis, and the build-up of a 
network of transnational young scholars, journalists and civil society actors, making 
the political opposition to the neoliberal consensus (Ban 2015, p. 640). While the 
latter dominated the first two decades of transition, informing about the confined 
possibilities for subversive movements, to engage with class and a critique of neo-
liberalism, during the recent years, the left-wing oasis opposing the liberal- 
conservative politics, became more visible (Ban 2015, p. 641).
Much of the criticism of welfare state and the hostility towards egalitarian poli-
tics is triggered by a fear of dependency of an omnipotent providential state rooted 
in the communist epoch, which might interfere in individuals’ private life (Gheaus 
2008, pp. 198–199). How does the argument of a welfare state being detrimental to 
women in post-communist context unfold? While before communism women where 
dependent on men, during communism they were integrated into the public sphere 
(Magyari et al. 2001), with political rights – although unusable in practice in a one- 
party system, with access to the labor market and equal pay – although employed in 
light industries, less prestigious, with lower salaries. Social entitlements, universal 
and equal access to education were ensured, subsidized by the state. However, while 
officially women’s emancipation was part of the communist program, in practice it 
was more of a castle in the air rather than a brass tack, with multiple burdens for 








of abortion, and the lack of contraceptives that brought hardships for women (Bucur 
1994; Roman 2001; Teampău 2007).
After 1989, the profound restructuring of the workforce unveiled national scale 
contradictions, when governmental reforms privileged male dominated heavy 
industries, exposed to a slower process of liberalization, compared to female domi-
nated light industry, which was the first to be privatized. Many women were 
employed in the private market, paying taxes to the state, and in underpaid low 
prestige state sectors. Men occupied positions in prestigious state sectors and heavy 
industry, earning more. The state support of heavy industries and the privatization 
of light industries allowed for welfare products for men to be paid from women’s 
taxes, working in the private sector (Miroiu 2004a). The resources of the welfare 
state came from “market women’s taxes” and were redistributed to “state men” 
(Miroiu 2004a, p. 246). Therefore, Miroiu (2004a, p. 278) argues that the reciprocal 
support between feminism and liberalism is an emancipatory project, indispensable 
in post-communist Romania.
The economic liberalism and minimal welfare state favored by Miroiu, would 
only serve the economic success and autonomy of a certain category of women at 
the expense of underprivileged women and other vulnerable groups, ignoring those 
women in the informal grey economy, by privatization and left without social pro-
tection or welfare benefits. In the wider region, Emigh et al. (2001, p. 29) show that 
while women might have had some advantages on the labor market, due to the his-
torical legacies of socialism, Roma people and Roma women were disadvantaged 
and the racialization and feminization of poverty contributed to the development of 
an “underclass” inhibiting the elimination of absolute poverty. Those women who 
found new opportunities in the capitalist market economy were those privileged 
enough in terms of status or educational background (Emigh et  al. 2001; 
Ghodsee 2005).
Gender equality was not a priority for transition governments, unless related to 
EU accession (Massino and Popa 2015, p. 171), expressed through legislative and 
public policies endeavors to comply with the acquis communautaire, considered an 
import process, labeled “room service” feminism, superficial since the Romanian 
society did not have the foundation for it (Miroiu 2004b). Likewise, Bucur (1994, 
p. 225) explained that during communism, women were given rights before they 
“could read and write – before they would even understand the meaning of voting 
rights” without engaging in a “conscious fight and organized movement”, curtailing 
those efforts of feminist groups to create spaces of resistance and alternative dis-
courses and to improve legislation and policies. This was the context and the man-
ner in which during the first decades of post-communist regime: liberal feminism 
instituted itself as the mainstream form of feminism; class and a critique of political 
economy were ousted from the public discourse; and racism contributed to the 
depoliticization of the socioeconomic aspects of Roma marginalization (Vincze in 
Gheorghe et al. 2018).
Critiques of the first wave of transition’s liberal feminism argue that these are 
simple causation models that contribute to constrict women’s agencies and conflate 
subjectivities to victimization, passivity, and false-consciousness (Lovin 2013, 
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p. 196). During post-communism, the widespread support for neoliberal policies 
and the reticence towards the state deepened the existing dependencies for women, 
creating new ones, both unjust. The double-earner/double-carer model or universal 
caregiver model (Gornick and Meyers 2003, p. 3), or the caregiver parity model 
(Fraser 1994) start from the premise of nuclear families, corresponding to Western 
reality, while in post-communist countries different generations might still live 
together and child-care is provided within the family (Gheaus 2008, p. 193). The 
gap between the existing gender equality legislation and its implementation wid-
ened through lack of enforcement and deficiencies in application. Moreover, the 
economic crisis and the anti-austerity measures – some of the severest in EU (Stoicu 
2012), translated into cuts in welfare provisions and state salaries. This is to be 
understood in the context of rising of neo-conservatism and ethno-nationalism in 
the years following the crisis, inflamed during the refugee crisis by state officials’ 
opposition to the refugee quotas and the extreme right’s xenophobic anti-migrants 
discourse.
12.4  Feminism After 1989: Between NGO-ization 
and Street Movement
The fall of the communist regimes, the EU accession along with the shift in social 
movement theory during the 1990s towards cultural approaches exposed scholars to 
different understandings of the dynamics of contestation and social and political 
activism. Most of the literature on post-communist feminism in Central and Eastern 
Europe described activism as transactional, professionalized and lacking potential 
for broad political mobilization (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Císař and Vráblíková 
2013), using conventional tactics of influence, being NGO-ized (Grünberg 2000). 
The financial dependency on foreign resources (Grünberg 2000; Gal 2003) studded 
the NGO-ization hypothesis and turned scholars to the effects of EU funding on 
NGOs (Roth 2007) and activists’ mobilization at international level (Císař and 
Vráblíková 2010). While these accounts frame a hostile picture of activism in the 
region, recent research (Jakobsson and Saxonberg 2013) challenge the NGO-ization 
diagnosis, emphasizing the variety of mobilizations, groups, and repertoires 
(Regulska and Grabowska 2008; Vlad 2015; Lovin 2013). In Romania, the anti- 
communist backlash contributed to consolidate the liberal feminism as the main-
stream form, while obscuring the contributions on the one hand of queer feminist 
informal groups associated with the anarcho-punk scene that produced an anti- 
authoritarian, anti-fascist, no borders, and anti-capitalist discourse that remained 
mostly in the underground, and on the other hand of feminist Roma groups trapped 
in tensions either within the anti-racist Roma movement or the liberal NGO-ized 
feminism (Vlad 2015, pp. 98–99).
Roma feminist groups and autonomous, informal collectives, targeting different 
yet overlapping manifestations of oppression and showing a steady commitment to 
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various forms of protest have not only coexisted with the NGO-ized feminism, but 
engaged in synergetic actions, as the latter moved towards more confrontational 
tactics and inclusive, intersectional politics. The deepening of the economic crisis, 
accompanied by a rise of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia (ECRI 2011) gave 
rise to attacks that served as a catalyst for cooperation, occasioning a bridge- building 
between anarcho-queer, Roma, and liberal NGO-ized feminisms. These tensions 
and external threats proved necessary for the crystallization of a more inclusive 
politics of hope, from intersectional positions, emphasizing class exploitation, the 
racialization of poverty, the oppression of sexual minorities, or housing issues. They 
favored bridging between recognition and redistribution, between culture and wel-
fare as intertwined dimensions of justice that affect each other in practice and need 
to be addressed together.
In Romania, during the first decades of post-socialism, feminism developed in 
four directions. First, in academia, gender studies became institutionalized at the 
end of the 90s, with the first state subsidized gender studies programs built-up at the 
National School of Political Science and Public Administration (SNSPA) in 
Bucharest, created a few years after dispersed courses of feminist theory organized 
around the Feminist Analysis Society AnA that did research and published the femi-
nist studies journal AnAlize (Miroiu 2010, p. 587). In 2000, another gender studies 
Masters Studies was created in Cluj at Babes-Bolyai University and, in 2004, in 
Timisoara. While the gender program in Bucharest adopted a liberal social stratifi-
cation and NGO-ized feminist approach to research, the gender studies MA in Cluj 
integrated class and ethnicity from an intersectional feminist perspective, under the 
influence of neo-Marxism.
Second, although gender equality was not a priority at the level of formal official 
politics, gender equality and non-discrimination bodies were created to comply 
with the acquis communautaire during EU pre-accession. This opened the possibil-
ity of collaboration with feminist NGOs that could participate in policy-making, in 
the area of gender equality, non-discrimination, and violence against women. The 
search for legitimacy, to be recognized as official partners by the state, further 
pushed NGOs towards formalization and professionalization, supported by the 
availability of funds, from international and European donors. Dependency on 
financial resources charged NGOs with more bureaucratic work, leaving them with 
fewer resources for unpredictable, reactive actions. This faced them with charges of 
depoliticization and demobilization.
Lastly, queer feminist self-managed collectives crystalized on the anarcho-punk 
scene, combining political, and cultural activities around zine production, reading 
circles, concerts, and protests and Roma feminism developed bringing to the fore-
front the reality of intersectional oppressions through theatre or grassroots and com-
munity organizing. The Food not bombs chapter in Cluj organized an autonomous 
market, Ladyfest Romania was organized in Timisoara in 20056 and in Bucharest in 
6 https://fia.pimienta.org/05/cd/en/festival.html
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2007 together with a Take Back the Night March7, anti-NATO protests were orga-
nized in 2008 that were severely repressed by the police8. In efforts to bridge 
between class, gender, and ethnicity, Eniko Vincze engaged in contesting the forced 
evictions and relocations in Cluj affecting mostly the Roma and organizing with the 
evicted communities to fight for housing rights. In Bucharest, Giuvlipen, the Roma 
queer feminist theatre company addressed arranged under-age marriages, lack of 
access to education, mental illness, and Roma LGBTQIA issues9 and E-Romnja 
organization developed projects towards the involvement and consolidation of the 
Roma women position in Romanian society10.
12.5  Intersectional Emancipatory Struggles 
and Street Feminism
During the recent years, an intersectional politics of hope consolidates, through 
three bridge-building processes, fostered by feminist activists who acted as bro-
kers – position facilitated by their overlapping membership in formal organizations, 
informal collectives and movements. They bridged at the level of movements  – 
between movements and within the feminist movement; at the level of repertoires of 
action – between contentious and institutionalized tactics; and at the level of dis-
courses – between recognition and redistribution claims, culture and welfare, re- 
politicizing class along with gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The emergence 
of these interrelated processes was facilitated by the discursive opportunity opened 
by the financial and refugee (reception) crises.
First, within the movement, the process of bridge-building between different 
feminisms involved collaboration between feminist NGOs and newer feminist 
Roma organizations, through joint projects, targeting women’s emancipation at 
grassroots level, between queer self-managed feminist groups and queer Roma fem-
inist activists, in the political-artistic sphere or at the level of contentious mobiliza-
tions. The role of activists with overlapping membership, who acted as 
bridge-builders, was crucial. For example, while working together at Agentia 
Impreună – an organization fighting for Roma’s rights, two feminist activists nur-
tured the idea of contributing to the bridge-building between the Roma and the 
feminist movement through common grounds, one of which was violence against 
women11. One of the two activists was also a member of Filia (organization that 
initially worked on gender studies from a more liberal perspective) and together 





11 A.F. 1 – Filia.
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Front co-organized the 2011 protest for the introduction of the protection order for 
the victims of domestic violence12. Subsequently, both activists left Agentia 
Impreună. One of them became the president of Filia. The other founded the Roma 
feminist organization E-Romnja. Together they developed the project “Phenja  – 
violence does not have color” on preventing and combating violence against women 
that aims to build initiative groups of Roma and non-Roma women based on some 
common experiences, politicizing class inequalities and poverty, while accounting 
both for the gendered and ethicized differences in experiencing violence and eco-
nomic inequalities13.
Still at the level of bridging within and with other movements, Macaz–Teatru 
Bar Coop – as a space and collective that aimed to develop and promote a politically 
engaged theatre repertoire, by supporting projects that critically analyze the con-
temporary socio-political dynamics and retell the local history from liberating posi-
tions14, played a crucial role at bridge-building between movements and collectives, 
including those working from a feminist perspective. Some members of the queer 
feminist collective Dysnomia were as well part of Macaz, where they held some of 
the collective’s meetings or launched their first feminist zine. The Roma queer femi-
nist theatre company Giuvlipen played some of their plays at Macaz, among which 
Gadjo Dildo or Cine a omorât-o pe Szomna Grancsa15.
Another point of bridging is related to the right to housing struggle, where activ-
ists from Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire (FCDL) were also members of 
Dysnomia collective and of Macaz, where they organized several encounters. FCDL 
also worked with E-Romnja and Desire Foundation that developed the campaign 
Căși sociale ACUM! [Social housing NOW!], against ghettoization in Patarât (a 
neighborhood in Cluj), and organized several street protests in different localities to 
reclaim housing justice for Roma, especially those belonging to the impoverished 
working class16. Involved in the Roma, feminist and, more recently, housing move-
ment, the founder of E-Romnja, contributed to bridge between the different move-
ments, acting as a broker. Challengingly, she recalls the difficulties to convince 
feminist organizations to work on evictions, in a context in which the dominant 
feminism was not explicitly anti-racist (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et  al. 2018). 
Ultimately, Centrul Parteneriat pentru Egalitate (CPE) collaborated with FCDL17 
and members of Front and participated at the anti-evictions protests. Explaining 
their intersectional strategy, one of the members of FCDL, also a member of 
Dysnomia collective, mentions:
12 http://www.ziare.com/stiri/proteste/protest-fata-de-violenta-asupra-femeilor-vineri-la-palatul-
par-lamentului-1135139. Accessed 14 Jul 2019.
13 A.F. 1 – Filia; http://e-romnja.ro/e-romnja/projects_in_progressdetailed_romani.html. Accessed 
5 Sep 2019.
14 https://www.macazcoop.ro/about-us-1. Accessed 5 Sep 2019.
15 https://www.facebook.com/pg/giuvlipen/events/?ref=page_internal; http://artapolitica.
ro/2017/05/09/dreptate-pentru-szomna-grancsa/
16 https://www.desire-ro.eu/?p=3116. Accessed 3 Sep 2019.
17 C.C. – CPE.
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For us, political mobilization is very important, not charity, not paternalism, not representa-
tion. These are fundamental principles because I come from this anarchist area, you know? 
We cannot say that we have equal relationships (with the evicted people from the Common 
Front) because we are not equal, we are not the same, we know. But the relationship must 
be fair, just and transparent and non-invasive from our part (…) I mean, we’re educated 
differently, meaning that I have more privileges (…) There is an inherent class tension in 
these things that is very important and I’m not going to pretend that it does not exist. For 
example, there is a fundamental skepticism, important and cool, a suspicion from the work-
ing class and Roma in the same class towards non-Roma who are more privileged.
Second, bridge-building between contentious repertoires of action, more specific to 
queer feminist anarchist groups and institutionalized tactics that dominated the 
interventions of mainstream liberal feminist NGOs culminated during the organiza-
tion of Slutwalk Bucharest in 2011. How the proximity between the two occurred? 
Some feminists, previously involved in the organization of LadyFest participated at 
the creation of the radical left project of Alternative Library18 and, in 2010, started 
organizing feminist reading sessions, which became consolidated and known as the 
Feminist Reading Group. The Alternative Library offered many feminist titles and 
was an alternative to Filia Centre’s Library  – the only one on gender studies in 
Bucharest. Activists from Front Association started to mingle with those from the 
Reading Group with whom they found ideological proximity and out of this encoun-
ter, the project of organizing Slutwalk Bucharest grew. Slutwalk Bucharest was a 
moment of coagulation between queer feminist collectives and feminist NGOs that 
started to meet in the courtyard of Alternative Library to organize the march, write 
banners and brainstorm about slogans19. As processes of intra-movement bridge- 
building started, of convergence and familiarization among different feminisms, 
bringing about a knowledge exchange process in terms of discourses, organizational 
practices, and tactical repertoires. It involved contamination regarding protest tac-
tics, non-hierarchical organizing and consensual decision-making. It also included 
discursive contamination, bringing at the forefront a critique of capitalism and the 
anti-racist struggle interlinked with gender, but not reducible to one another.
The process of bridging between institutional tactics specific to NGOs and grass-
roots activism in communities is also illustrated by the founder of E-Romnja, 
explains that while working in organizations for Roma rights, where she coordi-
nated gender related projects, she distanced herself from Roma women, because the 
organizational strategies favored dialogue mostly with formal official institutions. 
When she realized that being decoupled from Roma women, she is not aware of 
their perspectives and experiences, she decided to go back to the grassroots, work 
with women in community development, “speaking about water, electricity and 
tampons” (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et  al. 2018, p.  122). To this end, she founded 
E-Romnja (Gheorghe in Gheorghe et al. 2018, p. 122).
18 From dissatisfaction with the police violence during the NATO summit in 2008, a few years later 
the project of the Alternative Library was born.
19 IT Front, Bucharest; CP Front, Bucharest; AP Accept, Biblioteca Alternativa Bucharest.
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Third, bridge-building at the level of discourse and the discursive contamination 
were occasioned by these collective action encounters and enhanced by the role of 
activists with overlapping membership, who acted as brokers. This allowed for a 
re-politicization of class along with gender and ethnicity, fostering the debut of an 
intersectional politics of hope from working class, anti-racist, feminist positions. It 
was out of the societal tensions revealed during these collective action processes 
that discursive contamination emerged. For example, activists remember that anti- 
capitalist messages and some “racist slippages” provoked heated discussions20, dur-
ing the organization of Slutwalk:
It was a moment of hope for me, when the Slutwalk was organized, though after it faded 
away. I have learned that there are other groups that have feminist concerns, with other 
nuances and other directions but for me it was important that there was this moment when 
we did something together and we talked (…) with all the differences and with all the quar-
rels. I do not know if you remember the anti-capitalist banner? It was a panic with an anti- 
capitalist message, and people began to worry. It triggered a little reaction and tension and 
eventually the banner existed and walked through the march21.
For some institutionalized feminist organizations such as Filia, Slutwalk was anti- 
system and conveyed a too radical message22. Its then president did not want to 
associate Filia with Slutwalk, arguing that it would look bad on the organization’s 
CV and they risk losing potential funding23. However, she agreed that Filia mem-
bers participate individually at the organization of Slutwalk, but without any affili-
ation mentioned. A class discourse or a political economy critique was inexistent in 
Filia until contact with the anarcho-queer feminism of the Reading Group and later 
the Feminist Centre Sofia Nadejde (CFSN)24. One of Filia’s leaders mentions about 
this process of contamination:
No, in Filia, I did not feel that there was a discourse about capitalism, neoliberalism, until 
there was contact with the informal feminist groups, mostly the girls from CFSN. Let’s be 
serious, until then I did not feel that there was a discourse on capitalism or neoliberalism in 
Filia; I did not hear these words in my life. (…) It’s okay that it started then, but it did not 
exist before. So it was a matter of influence from my point of view25.
There was a similar resistance to integrate a feminist anti-racist perspective by 
some of the core institutions for gender studies or mainstream feminist organiza-
tions. Carmen Gheorghe from E-Romnja recalls that initially, when she attended the 
Master’s Programme in Gender Studies at SNSPA “Roma women or Muslim 
women were spoken about as if they were aliens, meaning that they were distant 
women, women who are forced to marry and wear veils” (Gheorghe in Gheorghe, 




24 A.F. 1 – Filia.
25 A.F. 1 – Filia.
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et al. 2018, p. 116). Subsequently, she managed to bring discussions about structural 
inequalities and privileges, contributing to change the mainstream liberal feminist 
discourse (Gheorghe in Gheorghe, et al. 2018, p. 116). As Filia was created initially 
to support the gender studies master, their feminist perspectives were blind to class 
and ethnicity at first and only later on changed, through turnover and transforma-
tions within the organization and through discursive contamination occasioned by 
brokers and collective action encounters.
Bridge-building and contamination at discursive level between the political 
economy and the cultural ideologies that serve to justify exploitation and domina-
tion continued after Slutwalk, through different protest actions. For example, femi-
nist activists influenced and challenged the dynamics of the winter 2012 protests 
(Ana 2017). They coalized to resist and stand against racism, xenophobia, sexism, 
and homophobia manifested during episodes of racist violence towards Roma pro-
testers and anti-abortion promotion (Ana 2017, p. 1487). The feminist group in the 
University Square had ideological differences of which activists were conscious 
from the Slutwalk march. Feminists mostly associated with the Alternative Library, 
conveyed anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-authoritarian messages, radically 
positioning against international corporations, police and state repression, while 
feminists coming from NGOs expressed more liberal and democratic positions 
framed in terms of women’s rights as citizens and taxpayers.
Through collective action encounters, the tensions within the feminist move-
ment, between a liberal feminism, that became mainstream, NGO-ized, and with 
initial difficulties in integrating class, ethnicity, sexuality, an anarcho-queer femi-
nism trying to organize outside the dominant structures, and a Roma feminism orga-
nizing both in NGOs and informal collectives brought to the surface social tensions 
that were wiped out in the context of anti-communist backlash and of the promise 
of individual success in democracy and free-market economy. Out of these tensions 
and with the role played by brokers through overlapping membership in different 
movements, was born the possibility of bridging within and between movements 
towards building a more intersectional politics of hope, in which recognition and 
redistribution claims that target different yet overlapping oppressions and injustices 
are addressed together.
The subsequent refugee (reception) crisis, brought slight visibility to the immi-
gration issue. In the context of the establishment of EU quotas for refugees and of 
the construction of the neoliberal order, shaped by marketization and enacted by 
racism (Vincze 2014), it was anarchist, queer, and feminist activists that proposed 
solidarity with refugees to counter-act government’s opposition towards quotas and 
extreme right anti-refugees propaganda. The Community Centre Claca organized 
solidarity actions with immigrant workers from outside Europe, including actions to 





refugees in the neighboring countries27– subsequently organized at Macaz. Claca 
also politicized the exploitation of Romanian migrant workers in Europe, as for 
example the case of construction workers of a mall in Berlin – subsequently called 
the “mall of shame” who were not paid for their work28. Macaz staged theatre plays 
that politicized the issue of migration and refugees among which the documentary 
theatre play Nu ne-am nascut la locul potrivit (We were not born in the right place) 
that blends the life stories of five people’s refugee experience in Romania, with 
fragments from the guide on how to get Romanian citizenship for foreign citizens29. 
For these groups, feminism and intersectionality are part of their political method of 
action and organizing in in order to address the multiple and interrelated relations of 
domination in which sexism, racism, homophobia, are used to justify and support 
capitalist exploitation of certain groups in the society.
12.6  Conclusions
The economic crisis opened a discursive window of opportunity, bringing about a 
process of bridge-building and intra-movement socialization between different 
groups, involving a shift from a politics of blind hope characterizing liberal NGO- 
ized feminism, towards a politics of intersectional hope targeting overlapping 
oppressions. This move included a transfer and contamination by contentious prac-
tices and intersectional perspectives where class, ethnicity, and sexuality were as 
important as gender, with anti-capitalist, anti-fascist ideas and discourses, critical 
towards privatization and deregulation, opposing oppressive extreme-right dis-
courses, including welfare chauvinism. The process of bridge-building was accom-
panied by a shift towards more confrontational tactics challenging the diagnosis of 
apathic, transactional civils society in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.
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Chapter 13
Latin American Transnational Political 
Engagement: Steering Civic Movements 




Social scientists have a growing interest in how and why migrants are creating, 
transforming, and exploiting transnational networks to engage in political move-
ments in both their home and host countries. In this regard, migration scholarship 
has contributed to understand different geographical spaces and actors involved in 
transnational political movements (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003); determining the pro-
file of migrants participating and organizing political transnational activities 
(Guarnizo et al. 2003; Lafleur 2013) and studying the migrant’s political integration 
and participation in the host country (Martiniello 2006).
One of the main criticisms of these approaches, however, is that migration schol-
ars often focus on the political interests and opportunities available to migrants at a 
national scale. Indeed, Glick Schiller and Cağlar (2011, p. 69) argued that cities are 
a better scale of analysis to unpack migrant practices, patterns of organization, and 
strategies of participation. Building on this idea, our aim is to answer the following 
questions in this chapter: how do global cities shape transnational fields of social 
mobilization? What is the nexus between the transnational fields of social 
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mobilization and access to welfare states? How do cultural exchanges shape trans-
national social movements and civic initiatives?
Theoretically, in this chapter we introduce a spatial level of analysis to elucidate 
the dynamics of migrant social movements organized in global cities. By focusing 
on the city of Brussels, this article analyzes the impact of global cities in shaping the 
capacity and desire of Latin American migrants of engaging in political movements. 
Empirically, this chapter presents two case studies where Latin Americans living in 
Brussels engage in political transnational activities to change their living condi-
tions, both in their host and home cities. The life stories narrated in this chapter 
highlight how cultural traditions, symbols, and practices from cultural repertoires 
enable minorities (Faist 2000) to become members of the civil society in Belgium.
In order to operationalize the practices used by migrants to construct transna-
tional social fields of protest, we base our analysis on the concept of social remit-
tances, coined by Peggy Levitt (1998, p.  927). This concept refers to the ideas, 
behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow between receiving and sending 
communities (Faist 2008; Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). In addition, 
social remittances capture the feelings of nostalgia and hope, which were intro-
duced as catalyzers of political movements in the introduction to this volume. Social 
remittances have a direct impact on the way migrants organize a range of transna-
tional activities, such as collective initiatives, development projects, or political 
elections (Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2011; Morales and Giugni 2011). Indeed, the 
mobile and malleable nature of social remittances (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 
2016) creates social, political, and cultural capital that migrants exploit in the city 
where they live.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that migrants accumulate political and cultural 
knowledge, symbols, and practices as a result of their emigration experience. Most 
particularly, we argue that social remittances shape the way migrants: (1) develop 
their political and cultural repertoires of contention; (2) constitute their social iden-
tities and networks, influencing their political behavior; and (3) embody the ideolo-
gies, ideas, and norms of their homeland, while being influenced by the multiple 
cities in which they have lived. In sum, social remittances aim to trace social inter-
actions and networks sustained between, at least, two cities, that determine migrant’s 
attitudes, behavior, and rationales.
In what follows, we first explain the importance of considering the concept of 
global city as the unit of analysis to study the composition and dynamics of the 
social fields of transnational political mobilization. This part underlines the impact 
of the global city’s positionality and the economic, socio-cultural, and political fac-
tors available within them, which structure the opportunities for migrants to engage 
in transnational political movements. In the second part, we present the specificities 
of Brussels as a Global City and as a key arena for protests. In the third and fourth 
parts of this chapter, we examine two main areas of politics, which have been of 
interest to Latin American migrants in Brussels. The first example introduces the 
advocacy efforts of protest that Latin Americans have made in relation to the Belgian 
welfare state and their access to social protection, whereas the second example 
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focuses on the efforts made by Latin Americans to spur political changes in their 
home countries.
In this chapter we present evidence collected through ethnographic work, includ-
ing biographical interviews and participant observation (Bayard De Volo 2009). The 
ethnographic approach is a useful method for uncovering the processes, meanings, 
emotions, and interests that sustain and motivate social groups to engage in political 
activism (Herbert 2000). Moreover, ethnography allows researchers to study popu-
lations, whose voices are not well represented in the dominant discourse (Bayard 
De Volo 2009, p. 227).
13.2  Scaling Transnational Fields of Mobilization 
from a Global City
Glick Schiller and Cağlar (2008) define social fields as “networks of networks that 
may be locally situated or extend nationally or transnationally”. Thus, transnational 
social fields are conceived as multidimensional matrices of interactions, which tran-
scend geographical boundaries and distances (Bermudez 2010; Levitt and Glick 
Schiller 2004). Based on this definition, we conceptualize transnational fields of 
mobilization as social fields in which the exchanges, interactions, and resources 
exploited have the purpose to challenge and reorient political and social structures. 
As a result, we conceive transnational social fields of mobilization as multidimen-
sional spaces where migrants: (1) find political opportunities, cultural capital, and 
resources to protest and organize civic movements; (2) develop networks and strate-
gies of contention; (3) feed their ideologies, sense of belonging, and grievances; and 
(4) boost their motivations and evaluate the outcomes of their political engagement 
(Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010). In other words, 
transnational fields of mobilization are abstract spaces where migrants exchange 
information, ideas, skills, and resources to engage and coordinate transnational 
political and social protests. However, it is important to recognize that these spaces 
are physically sustained and fed by active members of the civil society, mostly liv-
ing in cities. As a result, cities act as nodes where the signals and interactions origi-
nate, arrive, and transform.
The dynamics and opportunities available in cities vary depending on their den-
sity, local infrastructure, economy, and global positionality (Glick Schiller and 
Cağlar 2011). Therefore, urbanists and geographers distinguish between cities and 
global cities. Global cities are dense urban clusters characterized by wealth dispari-
ties, a shrinking middle class, immigration, and slum production, uneven access to 
services and the creation of private spaces and networks (Curtis 2011). Indeed, these 
strategic territories have some particularities that influence their role as centers of 
transnational fields of mobilization.
The first particularity of global cities is its abundant economic, political, social, 
and cultural capital. The combination of historical and opportunity factors makes 
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global cities poles of attraction for migrants, international actors, governments, and 
nationals from smaller cities (Glick Schiller and Cağlar 2011, p. 69). Consequently, 
global cities become highly dense multicultural spaces, where people interact by 
navigating multiple social codes and exploiting varied political resources.
The second particularity of global cities, directly affecting the transnational 
fields of social mobilization, is its positionality in the international regime. Global 
cities are dense hubs of information, communication, and competition (Sassen 
2005). However, not all global cities are equally dynamic and powerful on an inter-
national level. Global cities are hierarchically classified, in relation to the level of 
their capital flow, political symbolism, and legitimacy in the international regime.
The third relevant element to consider unpacking the nexus between transna-
tional social fields of mobilization and global cities is the repertoires of contention 
and forms of political protest. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 183) argue that rep-
ertoires and strategies of protest change from state to state. On the same line, but 
rescaling the level of analysis to cities, it is possible to argue that the politics of 
contention and strategies of political protest vary from one global city to another. 
Indeed, the local context, traditions of contention, and availability of opportunities 
for protest are unique to each global city. Finally, by rescaling the study of migra-
tion to the city level, we aim to contribute to the better understanding of the nexus 
between local dynamics, local political opportunities, and transnational political 
movements. In the next sections, we provide further details on each of these charac-
teristics, in order to understand how Brussels, as a global city, can have a predomi-
nant role in migrant transnational activism, both in the receiving and sending 
societies.
13.2.1  Brussels the Global City
According to Smith (2005), the practices of engagement of individuals must be 
contextualized in translocal settings. The interviewees in this study are based in the 
global city of Brussels. Brussels is a multicultural, officially bilingual city accord-
ing to Article 4 of the Belgian constitution (Dutch, French), situated in Belgium, a 
multi-layered federal state, and an immigrant nation with a colonial past. Brussels 
is a core city in terms of communication, technology, and as principal seat of differ-
ent international and European institutions. Brussels is one of Europe’s and 
Belgium’s most diverse cities, with regard to nationalities1. In Brussels (Brussel in 
Dutch; Bruxelles in French), competing communitarian (Flemish-French) 
monocultural structures coexist in a pluri-ethnic urban setting, each governing the 
arts, the cultural sector, and immigration and integration policies from within sepa-
rate government bodies (Adam and Martiniello 2013). Moreover, it currently holds 
1 In 2016, 411,000 of Brussels’ residents where non-Belgians, 23% of them where EU citizens and 
12% came from a third country (Hermia and Sierens 2017, p. 2). In 2016, 182 nationalities were 
represented in Brussels (BISA 2017).
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44.5% of the total foreigner population in Belgium (Lafleur and Marfouk 2017, 
p. 30). The city embodies the challenges and possibilities that come with diversity 
in a modern urban center with over one million inhabitants (Walravens 2015).
In this context, migrants face both predicaments and opportunities to become 
politically active. In Brussels, the laws of settling and admission that affect migrants’ 
political participation are set by the Federal Belgian state, whereas the programs for 
the integration and emancipation of ethno-cultural minorities are governed sepa-
rately by the French and Dutch-speaking communities (European  Commission 
2013)2. Traditionally, the perception of migrants in Brussels has been affected by 
historical international and internal mobilities, the increasing life expectancies, and 
declining fertility rates, among the so-called native (autochthone) population (Adam 
and Martiniello 2013; Costanzo and Zibouh 2013), as well as different Walloon and 
Flemish ideologies. The Walloon influence in Brussels, with the support of the 
French-speaking community commission (COCOF), has remained laissez-faire, 
while the Flemish community has become more interventionist. However, both 
sides have adopted assimilationist initiatives that include mandatory integration 
courses as prerequisite for naturalization3 (Adam and Martiniello 2013). The 
European Union mottos of integration and social cohesion for all third country 
nationals have also influenced these policies (Adam and Martiniello 2013).
Historically, in Belgium, migrants have been considered as temporary visitors, 
whose mobility is guided by various economic and social reasons and shaped by 
governmental institutions (Martiniello and Rea 2003). For instance, the closure of 
the coalmine employment programs in the 1950s, and later in the 1970s, the guest 
worker programs led to the theoretical closure of borders and family reunification 
laws (Martiniello and Florence 2005)4. However, Belgium has continued to be an 
immigrant country, now with a more diverse foreign population. Latin Americans 
are part of a small recent minority with several profiles, varying from those that 
arrived in the 1970s and 1980s as political refugees, to more recent migrants that 
arrived for economic reasons in the late 2000s, along with a new category of onward 
migrants that have arrived from other European southern countries, where they had 
settled before (Vivas-Romero 2017). In terms of gender, women represent 60% of 
Latin Americans officially registered in Belgium (DEMO 2015).
The Belgian popular discourse has often ignored the role of migrants, both cul-
turally and politically in urban centers (Martiniello and Rea 2003). However, the 
9/11 attacks in the US triggered feelings of insecurity and fear of the “other” that 
forced cultural and political authorities to publicly debate the participation of ethnic 
2 With the creation of the Brussels Capital Region, the French Community Commission 
(Commission Communautaire Francaise, COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission 
(Vlaams Gemeenschapscomissie, VGC) became the designated authorities over integration poli-
cies and programs in the city.
3 See, http://www.allrights.be/node/491. Accessed 5 Nov 2019.
4 Historically, in spite of the government’s attempt to persuade certain immigrants to return to their 
country of origins, immigrants and their offspring remained in Belgium, in fact the official ban to 
recruit new qualified foreign workers was not successful either.
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minorities in the city’s cultural and political life (Martiniello 2013). Thus, migrants 
and non-migrants lead their political activism on to challenging but stimulating 
grounds.
Our interviewees have not been immune from the aforementioned context; how-
ever, they have challenged their countries of origin and of destination by contesting 
exclusionary or assimilationist policies. Migrants were in fact even more prompted 
to participate politically, as welfare policies became a tool to control migration. A 
clear example of this was the case of Southern European migrants, who according 
to Lafleur and Mescoli (2018), were obliged to provide proofs of their financial 
stability and their non-dependence on the Belgian welfare state in order to reside in 
Belgium. When migrants face these policies, they become active from within their 
different positions in the city. Some migrants are what Martiniello (2004) has 
described as full citizens with full political and economic rights. Evidently, the 
spaces for protest and engagement are large, but sometimes these spaces are affected 
by the ethnicity, gender, or social class of migrants. Others are categorized as deni-
zens with certain political and social rights at a city level (Martiniello 2004), but 
lacking the rights to vote in federal or European elections, as well as access to 
supranational EU rights (Martiniello 2000). In the least privileged position are 
“margizens”, with barely any political or social rights. They do not have a set migra-
tory status and can only access healthcare in Brussels in case of an emergency. 
According to Faist (2001), migrants’ loyalty, levels of political participation, and 
engagement increase as they advance in their status in the welfare state as political 
subjects.
13.2.2  Methods
The data we present in this chapter is drawn from two doctoral projects conducted 
in the city of Brussels. The first project consists of a multi-sited ethnography inves-
tigating the global social protection arrangements of migrant domestic workers. 
Through participant observation and life story interviews, this project collected data 
of the coping strategies of 15 women followed for over 35 months. The interviewees 
were selected through an analytical sample technique, according to their gender 
roles, race (women from the Andean region with multiple ethnic origins), class, 
education level, religion, and generational standpoints. Although their political 
engagement was not the first object of study, it became a parallel aim as the women 
in the study became conscious of their inclusion in the welfare state–or lack of 
thereof–and decided to engage in the political arena of the city.
The second project examines the transnational political participation of Mexican 
migrants in the city of Brussels. Similarly, the researcher followed 24 migrants 
engaged in social and political movements for 26  months. The semi-structured 
interviews conducted with these key informants were complemented with partici-
pant observation at 42 events organized by Mexican migrants including: political 
demonstrations, music rehearsals, charity concerts, gastronomic and artistic 
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festivals, political debates, and film screenings. Through the detailed observation of 
these events, it was possible to identify the dynamics catalyzing and sustaining 
extra-territorial political activities. Furthermore, it was possible to identify the per-
sonal motivations, feelings of hope and nostalgia, and expectations of Mexican 
migrants, that create transnational fields of social protest.
Both cases use ethnography and participant observation. These methods allow 
following, in real time, the processes migrants have to go through in order to engage 
in politics in their home and host societies (Herbert 2000). Additionally, the life 
story interviews helped us to see, at a micro-level of experience, how migrants relate 
their experiences to macro-structures of opportunities and constraints.
In the past months, we examined the data from both research projects and found 
patterns of political mobilization that Latin American migrants use to challenge the 
welfare state and the political systems in their host city (Brussels), and in the cities 
of their countries of origin. By focusing on their social remittances, particularly the 
transfer of information, ideas, skills, and resources, we identified that the transna-
tional social fields of mobilization deployed by Latin American in Brussels, are 
directly influenced by the personal experiences, political behavior, ideologies, ratio-
nales, nostalgia, and social capital migrants have accumulated throughout their life-
time, prior to their migration and since their arrival in their host society.
The following sections present two examples of how Latin American migrants 
living in Brussels have created their own transnational fields of social mobilization. 
These cases show that Latin Americans base their transnational fields of social 
mobilization on the availability of capacities and opportunities manifested in a con-
tinuum between in Brussels and their home cities.
13.3  Challenging One’s Place in the Belgian Welfare State: 
From the Global City of Brussels
Juana is a political refugee who arrived in Brussels in the early 1980s. She began her 
political engagement as a young woman, when she became involved in political 
activism to protest against the political violence in her country of origin. Juana 
comes from Peru, a familial welfare state, where citizens mostly rely on informal 
networks of support to obtain private social protection resources (Martinez-Franzoni 
2008). Historically, women like Juana, who come from indigenous origins have suf-
fered the deficiencies of governments, which have not always provided them with 
spaces for protest. In this sense, in the words of Rivera herself (2013), the Peruvian 
state has very few citizens with full political rights. The latter are, in the most part, 
only male and live in the country’s biggest cities. Juana, thus filled with nostalgia, 
often praised the Belgian state:
Obviously, the system has its weakness but the social system they [Belgians] have is unique. 
And you know it once you know the laws, when you know institutions well enough. I mean 
everything the social system gives you [….] Nowhere else will you find a system like here. 
(Juana, migrant domestic worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)
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Although, Belgium’s welfare system has slightly changed over the years, it progres-
sively transformed Juana’s identity, from being a woman without rights in Peru, to 
a citizen in Brussels. This identity shift allowed Juana to acquire ideas, skills, and 
resources she needed to establish new forms of political participation. As Juana and 
other interviewees mentioned: “In Peru we were nothing. Here you learn how to be 
a citizen” (Brussels, 21 Oct 2014). Migrant women’s citizenship in Belgium is also 
used to send civic social remittances to their countries of origin and to reclaim their 
citizenship status there as well (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). Nonetheless, 
as Belgium began to experience the aftermath of the global financial meltdown in 
2008, the interviewees’ idea of Brussels as an inclusive city was put to the test. In 
this context Brussels, the global city, became the epicenter from which they pro-
tested for the rights they thought they were losing on this side of the Atlantic, as well 
as for those they never had in their homelands.
In this challenging context, they used transcultural capital to protest against the 
austerity measures imposed on the Belgian welfare state (Isaakyan and 
Triandafyllidou 2016). Migrants shared the hope that in a nearby future the Belgian 
welfare state would become an inclusive system for all. Building from their shared 
collective hope for a new future, along with a nostalgia for their activist days in their 
countries of origin, migrants took the streets to protest. At the Women’s Day dem-
onstration in 2016, traditional Huaylas Andean dancing from their ancestors’ region 
became the social remittance through which migrants delivered their message. On 
the day of the event, various women from migrant and non-migrant backgrounds 
joined the Peruvian women to protest at the Brussels Central Station Square. By 
doing so, they managed to share cultural and civic social remittances (Isaakyan and 
Triandafyllidou 2016). To their own surprise, a former Belgian socialist Prime 
Minister joined their dance and listened to their message. This Women’s Day protest 
was not an isolated event. Other interviewees like Alejandra, a Colombian woman 
in her late 50s, have spread other repertoires of conflict or political social remit-
tances (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016), such as public petitions and commu-
nity actions, either physically in Brussels or through new media and technology. 
Such social remittances challenge the place of migrants, mostly newcomers, in the 
city’s welfare state while also taking into account the violent conflict in their coun-
try of origin:
We get together to raise money to help those in need here and abroad. We get together to 
raise funds but also to give people a collective consciousness. They need to realize that 
what’s political is economic. So, they are not simply “economic migrants”. Violent conflicts 
[in Colombia or elsewhere] are associated with economic ones and so on. I informally help 
those coming from Colombia, but also, those coming from Syria, for example. I make no 
differences. Lately, I have also been helping Latino migrants coming from Spain after the 
crisis. […]. I lead them to the right kind of lawyers, so they won’t lose, for example, the 
unemployment benefits they brought from Spain. I give them a house to stay in when they 
need it. I also go out to protest but this is where the real kind of battle is. (Alejandra, migrant 
domestic worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)
Alejandra’s activism goes back to her teenage years as a rural teacher in several 
communities affected by violent conflicts in Colombia in the 1990s. In Brussels, it 
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was hard for her to find her place, and she found it once she began being politically 
engaged, to challenge who she was both in her new city and in the country she left 
behind. Nonetheless, Alejandra’s own place in the Belgian welfare state has been 
challenged by the austerity measures on the health sector.
Other interviewees such as Laura, have chosen formal political structures such as 
political parties to set up their platforms for protest. Contrary to Juana and Alejandra, 
Laura had never engaged in politics before. She came to Brussels as a young au-pair 
at 16 years old. The precarious situation in her own city was what later turned her 
into a politically engaged Belgian citizen. As Laura wanted to advance in the politi-
cal scene in Brussels, she encountered that her particular identity of “Andean 
woman” represented a challenge if she wished to be accepted by those with a 
migrant background in Brussels, whether Latin Americans or not. As a candidate for 
commune elections in 2012, she implemented a repertoire of contention but was 
challenged by her ethnicity:
We wanted the community to win. It wasn’t a personal battle, at least not for me. Even 
Moroccans and Africans also voted for me. It wasn’t easy for us to get a place in the party. 
They usually use foreigners to show the diversity of the city. […]. You know they need you 
because of your particular profile. I fit the profile: migrant woman, divorcee, etc. I mean, 
other women would identify themselves with me. I did not win. I’m a replacement and they 
only call me when someone is sick at the Parliament. I got the letter from the Parliament, 
though, and to me it was a big achievement. Maybe other Belgians wouldn’t see this as 
important, but I do. The community won. […] We won a political space. I have seen docu-
ments in the party or in the Parliament, where they don’t want to make certain rights univer-
sal, and we fight for that, for the inclusion of everyone, not just Latinos… Now that 
everyone is losing rights that should be universal, it’s important for us to have a voice there. 
(Laura, social worker and former care worker, Brussels, 21 Oct 2014)
As these repertoires of contention function through various types of social remit-
tances, the interviewees see a possibility to use their transnational social networks 
and their leftist ideologies to expand their actions abroad:
Researcher: Alejandra, but where do you see your actions having more of a weight?
Alejandra: I’m an inhabitant of this planet. I fight for a fair and real socialist society. I can 
keep fighting for social justice from here or there. ‘It doesn’t matter where one dies, but 
where one fights’ I live by these words, from a famous Colombian duo in the 1980s Ana 
and Jaime. (Alejandra, former migrant domestic worker, Facebook, 10 May 2017)
Behind the social remittances transmitted by these interviewees, regardless of 
whether efforts are directed towards changing their inclusion in the political and 
welfare structures of their sending or receiving societies, there is a guiding transna-
tional social justice script (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2016). This script revolves 
around a street feminism that is a common form of recognition of the difficulties 
that are particular to their condition as migrant women or men, with a certain ethnic 
background, class, and gender in the country of destination. In the following section 
we will explore how these repertoires of contention, social networks, identities, and 
ideologies are transposed to challenge the interviewees conditions in the social and 
political structures they left behind in their countries of origin.
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13.4  Constructing a Transnational Field of Mobilization 
from Brussels: Mexican Migrants Engaging to Change 
the Political System in their Homeland
This section presents the impact of social remittances on the construction of trans-
national fields of mobilization in the case of Mexican migrants living in Brussels. 
The life stories narrated in this part show that Mexican migrants use political oppor-
tunities and exploit the economic and social capital available in Brussels to organize 
their transnational political movements. However, it is essential to recognize that 
their political behavior is deeply influenced, on the one hand, by their previous 
anchored experiences, emotions, and political ideologies before arriving in Brussels. 
On the other hand, the relations and exchanges they sustain with the people back in 
their hometown determines, to a certain extent, the form and strength of their trans-
national fields of political mobilization. In short, it is argued that through the inter-
national exchange of information, ideas, skills, and resources Mexican migrants 
have been able to sustain and engage in the politics of their homeland from Brussels.
Ernesto, a 30-year-old man from the south of Mexico, moved to Belgium in 
2011. Before settling in Belgium, Ernesto participated in political and social move-
ments back in his town of origin. As a teenager, he travelled to Chiapas to work for 
3 months at one of the independent bodies of the Autonomous Communities of the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation, where he helped in the installation of a tele-
communication system.
In Brussels, Ernesto participates in three different types of political and social 
activities. First, he supports a local NGO, whose aim is to protect mine workers 
against human rights abuses in the south of Mexico. Despite the distance, he has 
helped the organization setup their website: “Even if I am here, I am still there” 
(Ernesto, IT professional, Brussels, 25 Aug 2017). Ernesto does not trust Mexican 
authorities; that is why he also participates in demonstrations and political events to 
express his dissatisfaction with the Mexican political system. He organized a small 
committee with several Mexican friends he met in other political gatherings. This 
group of Mexicans has been invited several times to conferences organized by 
European civil groups to raise awareness about the violence and corruption perme-
ating many aspects of the Mexican society. Finally, Ernesto and his friends have 
organized private dinners to raise funds for the victims of the violence in Mexico.
Overall, Ernesto’s transnational political activism relies on his previous political 
experiences back in Mexico; his political awareness and desire to engage in Mexican 
political protests from abroad; and the social and economic capital at his disposal in 
Brussels. In addition, since Ernesto is in constant communication with his family in 
Oaxaca, who regularly informs him about the urgent necessities of their hometown, 
they give him ideas on which specific actors to support from abroad. For instance, 
they suggested him to help a specific group of women, in the aftermath of an earth-
quake that affected his hometown in 2017.
Raúl, a Mexican in his late thirties, arrived in Belgium in 2012. Since then, he 
has worked as a construction worker, a production assistant in music festivals, and 
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as a salesperson in a chocolate store in Brussels. Raúl has been interested in politics 
since he was a teenager living in Mexico City, where he participated in demonstra-
tions to defend political prisoners and the victims of the numerous crimes.
Since he came to Brussels, he calls his mother every week to catch up and talk 
about politics: “My parents have always been interested in Mexican politics. We 
have always talked about social and political issues back home.” (Raúl, Master’s 
student, 13 Oct 2017). His political awareness and will to participate in Mexican 
politics have been translocated to Belgium. His desire to denounce the Mexican 
government from abroad is fed by the discussions that he has with his relatives, by 
the Mexican newspapers he reads every day, by the memories he has of his home-
town, and by a sense of moral obligation along with the hope to transform his coun-
try of origin.
In September 2014, Raúl immediately reacted to denounce the kidnapping of 43 
students in Ayotzinapa. This case became very symbolic to denounce the lack of 
rule of law in Mexico, the inability of the police agents to protect its citizens, and 
the inefficiency of Mexican authorities to conduct investigations and persecute 
abuses against civilians (González Villareal 2015). In response to this incident, Raúl 
called his only Mexican friend in Brussels to protest: “I called my friend to organize 
something. I wanted to do something, even if it was on my own. I made some ban-
ners to denounce what had happened in Mexico. I wanted to go to the Brussels 
Stock Exchange to protest. My friend gave me the number of two other Mexicans 
and protested together” (Raúl, Master’s student, 13 Oct 2017).
Raúl’s immediate reaction to protest could be understood by the moral shock he 
underwent, when he first learned about the missing students of Ayotzinapa. He 
chose to protest on the stairs of the Brussels Stock Exchange because of their sym-
bolism and tradition, hosting other demonstrations. After the political gathering, 
Raúl met other Mexicans, with whom he remained in contact and organized demon-
strations at the Mexican Embassy and the European Parliament.
Raúl’s decision to engage in homeland politics from abroad was directly influ-
enced by the social remittances he frequently sustains between Brussels and Mexico 
City. He found out about the case of Ayotzinapa only after reading an online Mexican 
newspaper. After hearing that people in Mexico City gathered around the Monument 
to Independence to protest for Ayotzinapa, he decided to demonstrate in a symbolic 
place in Brussels, as a result. In fact, he adapted a specific strategy of mobilization 
embedded in Mexico to the Belgian context.
Another example of this is the case of Ana, a Mexican singer and actress who left 
Mexico 23 years ago. In Mexico, she participated in political protests to support the 
indigenous communities and denounce several cases of corruption by Mexican offi-
cials. Since she moved to Europe, Ana has never forgotten her homeland. She is 
continuously exchanging information, ideas, and resources with members of the 
Mexican society to engage in political movements despite being abroad. Her net-
work of personal and professional contacts, both in Mexico and Brussels, has 
allowed her to organize political demonstrations, lobbying campaigns, and even 
accommodate a Mexican family fleeing the wave of violence affecting Veracruz.
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As a professional singer, Ana believes to be in a privileged position to protest 
against the Mexican authorities and denounce their failure to protect the civilian 
population. Ana uses her music and singing to raise awareness in her performances: 
“I have to use music and singing to denounce. If I remain silent, I become part of 
them (the Mexican authorities) […]. The stage is an undeniable space to denounce.” 
(Ana, singer, 05 May 2017). Ana has managed to align her profession with her 
political struggle in order to create original and artistic forms of protest. For instance, 
she makes her own interpretation of traditional Mexican songs, by changing the 
original lyrics to political messages, aiming to denounce human rights violations 
and crimes happening in Mexico. Singing traditional songs is important for Ana 
because it constitutes her social identity and enables her to deliver a political mes-
sage using symbolic Mexican songs, connecting her to the audience through feel-
ings of nostalgia.
In conclusion, Ana portrays Brussels as a key place to build a transnational field 
of social mobilization due to its positionality in the European political scene. She 
believes that the political opportunities available in Brussels are very important for 
denouncing Mexican injustices in Europe: “You can do more for Mexico from here 
(Brussels), than from there (Mexico).” (Ana, singer, 05 May 2017) Through her 
personal networks, profession, cultural repertoire, and political beliefs, Ana has 
managed to find political and economic channels to set up transnational strategies to 
engage in Mexican politics from Brussels.
13.5  Conclusions
This chapter has presented several examples that illustrate how Latin American 
migrants living in Brussels engage in political movements in Belgium to challenge 
their inclusion in the welfare and political systems of their countries of origin and 
destination. The data shows that these migrants have managed to develop and sus-
tain transnational fields of social and political mobilization to defend their political 
struggles and ideals from Brussels’ influence and also, become active members of 
the civil society. Indeed, Latin American migrants have managed to create emanci-
patory initiatives “of hope and nostalgia” to denounce their disagreement with the 
current social and welfare systems, in both their places of origin and residence.
First, we recognized the relevance of portraying Brussels as a global city, since it 
is a place where Latin American migrants have found social, economic, and politi-
cal capital to develop their own strategies of political engagement. The two case 
studies presented demonstrate that the specific characteristics of Brussels, its politi-
cal weight in Europe, and its diversity, create an environment where migrants have 
managed to find economic and political opportunities to engage in political activi-
ties. Secondly, we used the concept of “social remittances” to operationalize the 
exchanges made and sustained over time between Latin American migrants and 
people from their hometowns. These flowing ideas, behaviors, identities, and social 
capital (Levitt 1998) have a direct impact on the shape and duration of the political 
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engagement of Latin American migrants living in Brussels. Through social remit-
tances, migrants remain emotionally attached to their hometowns and they receive 
first-hand information that triggers their will to participate in political activities. 
Furthermore, the members of their homeland societies can provide migrants with 
specific ideas, skills, and resources to protest about a specific injustice or help a 
particular social project in their home country.
Thirdly, this chapter emphasizes the personal characteristics, ideas, experiences, 
and subjectivity of migrants that shaped their strategies and repertoires of political 
engagement. The life stories we present in this chapter stress the role of personal 
ideologies, cultural capital, beliefs, emotions, and motivations triggering and devel-
oping transnational fields of political engagement. As a result, the accumulated life 
experiences, political values, profession, and personal networks determine the fea-
sibility and longevity of transnational political movements. These transnational 
political movements are a counteraction against exclusion in, at least, two countries, 
and might have the potential to challenge the place of migrants in political and wel-
fare systems.
By focusing on the transfer of information, ideas, skills, and resources between 
Latin-American migrants living in Brussels and their respective homelands, in this 
chapter, we showed that feelings of hope, nostalgia, and homeland attachment trig-
ger and shape migrants’ strategies for political and social mobilization. Indeed, 
through these transfers and feelings, migrants feel morally obliged and inspired to 
become active members of the civil society and advocate for better social conditions 
in two different welfare states.
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Civil society groups polarize opinions in normative terms. Most people see the 
majority of civil society groups as a positive force in society. They value their activi-
ties on behalf of specific groups of citizens and appreciate their role in improving 
democratic life through their educational, informational, and deliberative activities. 
However, certain associations, such as anti-immigrant vigilante groups, racist 
groups, or more generally exclusionary groups focus on opposing a political enemy 
defined in ethnic, religious, or political terms. They justify their actions by asserting 
that they are defending other social constituencies that need protection, which they 
often identify as a victimized national majority. There are, in other words, at least 
two rival conceptions of the functions of civil society, which are frequently articu-
lated through concepts of “good” and “evil”, or “civilized” and “uncivilized”. Each 
one of these rival conceptions claims a “high ground” of legitimate involvement and 
seeks to demonize the other. In the current political culture, torn between a populist 
and an anti-populist bloc, it is necessary to clarify the contribution of civil society 
to a “good society” and to document the strategies, discourses, and actions that help 
or hinder this goal. In this chapter, after articulating the political impact of the cat-
egories of good and evil and their implications for civil society, I formulate a typol-
ogy of “bad civil society” groups and relate it to the findings of some of the other 
chapters in the present volume.
Regardless of rival claims, not all social and political formations and the associa-
tions related to them are equally likely to be perceived as good or evil. Right-wing 
populist parties are more likely to polarize opinions about the values of their activi-
ties. That is, their speeches, their electoral manifestos, their civil society 
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organizations, and their forms of political participation. A type of action that polar-
izes opinion in normative terms are their associational activities. These encompass 
the formation and support offered to a variety of civil society groups aimed at advo-
cacy, service delivery, and cultural interventions in the public sphere.
The contest between right-wing populist parties and their opponents is often 
fought out in the public sphere by employing the categories of good and evil. The 
concepts of “good” and “evil” do not have wide currency in the social sciences. 
However, the social and political implications of these concepts are important, as 
shown by analyses of political discourse. Of interest here are those political dis-
courses pertaining to matters of culture, welfare, and migration. They are important 
as recurring elements of political discourse in many different political and social 
arenas and as normative concepts that decision makers mobilize to provide resources 
and legitimacy to civil society organizations. Voters and debates in the public sphere 
often argue their competing viewpoints by employing the categories of good and 
evil; they evaluate policies using these categories, and they often evaluate political 
parties, social movements, or associations in similar ways.
It is important to identify what a good civil society is, and what it is not, as a 
vibrant and effective civil society is only viable if the state provides the resources 
and the regulatory framework that enables its operations. Thus, criteria to formulate 
regulatory frameworks that benefit one or another type of associations are contro-
versial. Different normative conceptions lead for instance to different levels of 
resources donated to civil society, different levels of governance at which funding is 
distributed, different specifications of criteria for access to state resources, such as 
processes of accreditation and checks to ensure compliance with constitutional stan-
dards. In other words, the different normative conceptions of civil society which are 
dominant in different systems of thought produce different configurations of civil 
society organizations and result in different functions attributed to civil society 
organizations (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). There is a relation between the con-
figuration of the population of civil society organizations, the structure of the state, 
and the prevalent ways of regulating them (Warren 2001). For this reason, it is 
important that there is clarity on the appropriateness of state policies toward civil 
society, and that, for instance, unconstitutional organizations are discouraged, such 
as those that should be classified as “evil” civil society. This debate is particularly 
relevant after the right-wing populist successes of recent years and the often asserted 
imperative to “protect” communities, which translates into narrow understandings 
of national culture, welfare chauvinism, and restrictive migration policies.
These successes point to at least a partial colonization of civil society by the 
values of right-wing populism. This amounts to a cultural shift, which is sometimes 
described as the “populist moment” with reference to previous populist moments, 
but also to an understanding of civil society not as merely a set of organized groups. 
Rather, civil society enacts a cultural space in which individuals and a wider variety 
of organizations, such as the media, and activities taking place in the blogosphere, 
reflect distinct and widespread populist views (Goodwyn 1978; Mouffe 2005). 
Thus, I refer to “civil society” both in the meaning of an aggregate of 
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non- governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests, which are 
also known as “associational ecologies”, and as individuals in a society which are 
independent of the government (Warren 2001). In the first meaning, I include politi-
cal groups with roots in civil society. These include also right-wing populist parties, 
which can be considered as movement-parties due to their contentious repertoires, 
and connections to distinct associational ecologies (Ruzza 2010; Ruzza 2017). I 
then consider radical right parties, associations, and movements under the same 
umbrella of radical right civil society formations (on the concept of movement- 
party, see: Rucht and Neidhardt 2002).
14.2  “Protecting” Communities
As frequently utilized conceptual categories, “good” and “evil” are labels that are 
often central to debates within political formations, and more generally in the public 
sphere. In the rhetoric of extremist groups “doing good” might mean protecting a 
community from perceived threats–no matter if the community is not cohesive, or 
even not socially meaningful, such as the community of “the whites”, and no matter 
if the asserted perceived threat is a political fabrication. They then might purport to 
pursue the good of society, even if this view is not often shared by relevant segments 
of the population. Nonetheless, to pursue their ideology, they might form associa-
tions, which through political violence, or other forms of intimidation might objec-
tively exert a negative impact on the lives of certain groups of citizens for the 
supposed benefit of other groups. Here I am referring to a set of associational activi-
ties characterized by discursively exclusionist, undemocratic, or violent features.
An example from Italy illustrates the contemporary relevance of this debate. For 
the last few years, civil society-sponsored vessels helped to salvage migrants 
attempting to reach the Italian coasts using small boats to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea. These ships would routinely rescue migrants’ boats from stormy international 
waters and take them to the Italian shores where they could apply for refugee status. 
These activities were generally labeled as “good” by Italian public opinion, until in 
2018 a new populist government took power, reuniting the anti-establishment popu-
list Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) and right-wing populist League 
(Lega, L). The new government, inspired by nationalist law and order values, and an 
emphasis on security, sought to redefine the activities of rescue operations in nega-
tive terms. Pro-migrant NGOs operating at sea came to be redefined as “merchants 
of death” as in the views of the new government their operations incited other 
migrants to attempt the same voyage, which caused hundreds of failed attempts by 
would-be asylum seekers, and numerous drownings. Rescuing migrants was then 
supposedly motivated by NGOs-vessels trying to support the business of like- 
minded NGOs groups seeking to acquire state funds to house the migrants they had 
rescued. Thus, the “good” pro-migrant civil society was redefined in the eyes of the 
populist government as a “bad” civil society. A change of migration and refugees 
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policy in a more restrictive direction had already been effected in 2017 by the then 
minister of interior Minniti during the previous center-left government. It included 
a decree to accelerate the assessment of asylum claims by refugees and a new “code 
of conduct” for NGOs operating at sea (Minniti 2017). However, this reversal of 
framing, in turn, legitimated the closure of all Italian harbors to NGOs-vessels, and 
further legitimated their indictment for illegal entry when they attempted to land. 
This policy reversal was met with overwhelming support by the Italian public opin-
ion. On the other hand, the vigilante groups that inspected poor urban areas at night, 
which the progressive NGOs had denounced for harassing minorities, came to be 
redefined by the winning populist parties as providing security to a victimized popu-
lation, supposedly terrified by an increasing number of violent aggression, rapes, 
and robberies by illegal migrants. These two examples show the relevance of the 
categories of good and evil civil society.
Here below I clarify the criteria for what can be appropriately defined as bad civil 
society. A related concept, which has also been utilized to describe the same phe-
nomenon, is “uncivil society”, which is often used to describe the right-wing popu-
list discourse in the social media, and also more broadly the discourse of violent 
non-state actors (Krzyzanowski and Ledin 2017). Thus, a different definition of 
“bad civil society” is “uncivil society” which is equally characterized in normative 
terms–here we will use these terms interchangeably. “Uncivil” as “lacking civility” 
implies a specification of why certain types of associations are “bad” and also, 
therefore, implies a vision of the good society, which is based on the acquisition of 
civility as a positive value, or at least a vision of a “civilizing process”, in which 
associations play a causal role (Elias 2000; van Iterson et al. 1984). With particular 
reference to organizations connected to the political right, I examine in the follow-
ing the factors that have made civil society relevant for political actors and point to 
a relation of mutual dependence between the associational world and political 
movements and parties. In this context, I focus on a relationship of mutual depen-
dence between the social and the political sphere–a relation, which develops even 
when most observers would classify certain civil society activities as uncivil.
14.3  “Bad” Civil Society, But Bad for Whom?
The previous example of vigilante groups, which different actors considered alter-
natively good or bad, points to the co-existence of two different concepts of good-
ness, which however differ in one key respect. To the extent that the security of one 
part of the population–the majority, or what certain actors identify as the main-
stream in a partisan way–requires the social control or worse, the upsetting of 
another part–for instance, the migrant population–the concept of civil society is in 
principle exclusionary. In other words, the concept of good is pursued by focusing 
on only a section of the population. The second is inclusionary, as it conceptualizes 
any interference with the personal integrity of any part of the population as negative 
for the entire population. From this example, I argue that there is a conflict between 
C. Ruzza
225
two rival visions. One is espoused by right-wing populist parties, which is exempli-
fied by the vision entrenched in the victory of Trump in the 2016 US elections and 
its “America first!” slogan. The other reflects the cosmopolitan vision of civil soci-
ety as a “civilizing” factor, which was dominant in the classic literature on civil 
society and more recently in the second wave of civil society studies that shaped the 
field from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (Cohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1999). 
These two visions point to a struggle for meaning, and for legitimate social practices 
in an era that is characterized by the success of populist parties throughout Europe.
A contest is taking place in the public arena in which specific parties’ activities, 
civil society groups, and social movements are evaluated for their social value. The 
role of intermediary associations–that is, associations with political purposes, which 
are also rooted in civil society, is often particularly controversial. These encompass 
a variety of civil society groups aimed at activities of advocacy, service delivery and 
cultural interventions in the public sphere. A contest is taking place between exclu-
sionary associations and other public-interest associations for the legitimate appro-
priation of the label of “goodness”.
Right-wing populist movements and parties are still an electoral minority, rang-
ing around a 15% of the vote in several countries, but their cultural framings have 
had a significant impact as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
“refugee reception crisis” of 2015 and the following years (Rea et al. 2019; Trenz 
et al. 2015). Populist voters express concern for personal security, economic secu-
rity, values of cultural protectionism, and hostility towards migrants (Rooduijn 
2018). The contrast between progressive inclusionary associations and exclusionary 
ones is marking the political climate of contemporary Europe and amounts to a 
struggle between a populist and an anti-populist bloc, which on the contrary articu-
lates values of cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and social inclusion.
As the literature on right-wing populism points out, the populist bloc is charac-
terized by a set of distinctive cultural features, which are used to define populism. 
Briefly, they include the assertion of a vertical split between people and elites, the 
belief in an essentially homogeneous “people”, which is betrayed by self-serving 
and corrupt elites. They are characterized by forms of enemy-thinking rooted in 
anti-universalist practices justified as a legitimate defense of an aggrieved but sup-
posedly virtuous part of the population. In their forms of political participation, they 
opt for anti-system action repertoires. In their political choices, they prefer to rely 
on charismatic leadership, whose unquestioned authority is seen as a way of bypass-
ing of checks and balances of liberal democracy, thereby creating a symbolic link 
between the leader and its “people”, and thus addressing the corruption of political 
elites. They typically assert the unquestioned values of nativism and nationalism as 
a source of inspiration for public policy (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). In contem-
porary Europe, it also notably includes strong Euroscepticism. Because of its fre-
quent use of unconventional action repertoires, its roots in civil society and the 
alternative policy vision it espouses, populism can be characterized as a social 
movement (Aslanidis 2016). It is opposed by an anti-populism movement, which is 
occasionally also determined, but in several ways still searching for responses to the 
populist challenge.
14 Civil Society Between Populism and Anti-populism
226
Populism and anti-populism are then more than purely political phenomena. 
They are different from ideologies formulated by parties born in Parliaments and 
confined to political elites. They might as well be utilized, defined, and redefined by 
elites in different social and political locations, but they are embedded in their 
respective societies. Their parties of reference have roots in communities. This is 
the reason why the political challenge of right-wing populism in its espousing of 
“uncivility” is novel and difficult. It is also difficult because “uncivility” is shaped 
and expressed differently in different political contexts. It is a chameleon-like 
behavior, which is a trade-mark ideological trait of populist formations, as several 
empirical studies have shown (Mazzoleni and Ruzza 2018; Taggart 2000). As two 
fields of actors and ideational constructs compete for legitimacy, supporters and 
resources, both populism and anti-populism shape and modify their messages 
according to emerging opportunities, and in doing so both populism and anti- 
populism can profit from the indeterminacy of their ideational systems of reference. 
For this reason, populism and anti-populism need to be seen as aspects of civil 
society with a different understanding of ethical behavior. In the following, I focus 
explicitly on the populist type.
14.4  The Features of Uncivil Society
While, as noted, the emergence of right-wing bad civil society organizations has 
been interpreted as a worrying indicator of more general social problems, discus-
sions of the organizational forms and ethical nature of these organizations are much 
less frequent in the literature. This is partly because two key issues–the definitional 
issue of the boundaries of ethically unacceptable behavior, and the issue of moral 
agency–are dependent on views of what is a good society, which analysts of com-
parative politics working on the extreme right rarely tackle. However, to properly 
conceptualize the role of uncivil society, it is necessary to examine at least briefly 
the concepts of the good and the bad society, and then the good and the bad civil 
society.
Given the limited space available, here I conceptualize concisely the good soci-
ety as a society that ensures a basic set of needs essential for human development. 
This approach to the good society is distinct from deontological and consequential-
ist conceptions, and is more closely related to approaches based on virtue ethics–
approaches that conceptualize the good society as societies in which humans can 
flourish, and their well-being is maximized (Swanton 2005). As noted by Draper 
and Ramsay (2011), approaches differ in how easily the main conceptions of the 
good society allow for empirical comparisons of societies. In terms of clarity and 
comparative qualities, they utilize the “capability approach” as an approach related 
to virtue ethics (Nussbaum 2000). In particular, they suggest Nussbaum’s and Sen’s 
concepts of the good life as optimal in this respect (Draper and Ramsay 2011; 
Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). As posited by Sen, at a minimum, a good society is a 
C. Ruzza
227
society that addresses the need for physical safety, access to the means to formulate 
informed decisions on peoples’ lives, and for civil and political rights. Using these 
standards, I argue that the extreme-right civil society can be classified as “bad civil 
society”. This is because unlike the good civil society it does not foster the general 
human needs posited by Sen. The reasons bad civil society does not address the 
above-mentioned human needs become clear after I discuss why the rest of civil 
society does, which it is then conceptualized as the “good civil society”.
“Civil society”, before the arrival of right-wing populist civil society associa-
tions, has often been associated with the good society. Civil society has been seen 
to promote a good society by engendering certain key qualities, such as the ones 
discussed by Sen (1999), but not only those. Different authors stress different 
aspects according to their conceptions of the good society. One key virtue that is 
often emphasized is the conceptualization of civil society as a training ground for 
developing social trust. I posit that at least an element of social trust is a necessary 
precondition for the enjoyment of the sense of safety, which Sen considers neces-
sary for humans to flourish. Trust is also connected to issues of rights, as the enjoy-
ment of rights is in turn based on sufficient inter-individual trust to protect individuals 
from violations perceived or actual of their political and social rights (Misztal 1996; 
Taylor-Gooby 2000). Similarly, Putnam has singled out the civic virtue of general-
ized reciprocity as an outcome of involvement in associational activities, and again 
reciprocity is often based on trust (Putnam 2000). This is of course not the case of 
associations based on “enemy politics”–a definitional aspect of bad civil society, 
which are therefore an intrinsically different type of civil society.
Other aspects connected to full-fledged visions of the good life differ markedly 
from left to right and relate to virtues that different systems of thought consider 
essential and entrenched in their ethical views of civil society (Chambers and 
Kymlicka 2002). For instance, the right and the left differ in their promotion of 
egalitarianism, self-reliance, deliberating skills, or caring communities (Ruzza 
2011). Similarly, fundamental differences in the role of associations characterize 
the currently dominant political visions of liberal minimalism, conventional repre-
sentation, and participatory democracy, and each of these visions is oriented by 
different principles (Fung 2003). Nonetheless, while there are differences of empha-
sis among philosophical conceptions of positive values, there are nonetheless shared 
values, such as the ones mentioned above, and there are disvalues that can also be 
shared by several political conceptions.
14.4.1  A Typology of Bad Civil Society
To sum up, the associational activities of groups belonging to bad civil or uncivil 
society are morally evil because they deny on several accounts the human needs for 
physical safety, access to the means to formulate informed decisions on peoples’ 
lives, and for civil and political rights. They can be classified in a set of distinctive 
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types, which consist of (1) Nazium-type bad civil society; (2) fanatical bad civil 
society (3) bad communitarianism; (4) banal bad civil society. As previously men-
tioned, not all right-wing populist-inspired civil society groups are uncivil. Some 
are mainly bonding and not bridging associations. However, this typology is helpful 
in putting together some of the case studies presented in this volume.
A “bad civil society” or an “uncivil society” is then a civil society which, unlike 
other types of civil society, cannot conceivably be said to foster either generalized 
trust or the positive values shared by other political conceptions. Alternatively, more 
stringently, it is a civil society that engenders the opposite of a good society, that is, 
a society marked by disvalues–negative values that all ethical worldviews despise, 
such as the promotion of racial discrimination. In this respect, it is often cited what 
in philosophy is sometimes known with sad irony as the “reduction ad Nazium” 
(Benn 1998). At the Nuremberg trial, it has been noted that no accuser defended 
their actions of torture and murder with reference to a moral theory of any sort 
(Rosanvallon 2006). This case is then often used to argue against moral relativist 
defenses and in favor of the postulation of an objective evil (Benn 1998). The prac-
tices of the Nazis can be conceptualized as the negation of human development 
and thriving. By examples such as this, it has been argued that there is such a thing 
as objective wickedness, defined as intentionally doing acts that are wrong (Midgley 
1984). In the words of a classic work of ethics on this topic:
We need to grasp clearly how appallingly human beings sometimes behave. Moreover, we 
must see that we cannot always shift responsibility for that behavior off onto an abstraction 
called ‘culture’. (Culture, after all, is made by people.) There have to be natural motives 
present in humans which make cruelty and related vices possible. (Midgley 1984: XI)
In our case, one can, for instance, classify as objectively evil the instances of 
right- wing skin-heads physical aggressions against migrants to inflict bodily harm. 
I characterize as a distinctive type of bad civil society the instances of unjustified 
and unexplained aggression–we shall call it the “Nazium-type bad civil society” (1). 
This category is illustrated by the extreme violence and destruction perpetrated on 
civil populations by armed gangs in the context of local wars, which has been noted 
for instance both in European and in African contexts (Nzau 2017). In several of 
these cases, extreme violence is perpetrated by armed gangs without clear ideolo-
gies and finalities.
With reference to the work of Koehn, it is possible to identify another category 
of evil civil society. Her category of “evil as fanatical impiety”, illustrated with the 
case of the right-wing terrorist Timothy McVeigh is particularly interesting as it 
typifies, in the extreme, right-wing acts of aggression of right-wing vigilantes 
groups, such as in the case of aggressions motivated by fanatical zeal against minor-
ities youth perceived as criminals, even when this perception is hardly justified 
(Koehn 2005, p.  207). She presents this case as one of “Fanaticism as the 
Unreasonable Repudiation of Reason” (Koehn 2005, p. 216). In a context such as 
this–fanatical right-wing extremism–the fundamental needs postulated by Sen 
(1999) are violated, such as needs for individual physical integrity, as well as civil 
rights as rights to mental integrity, life and safety, and as protection from 
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discrimination on grounds such as race or national origin. I call this type “fanatical 
bad civil society” (2). This category is illustrated for instance by the actions of 
Anders B. Breivik whose fanaticism has overridden all considerations for the lives 
of his victims (Hemmingby and Bjørgo 2016).
However, there are other types of activities of “bad civil society” groups inspired 
by identity-based associations, which have an objective exclusionary impact on 
the part of communities that are labelled as undesirable, “inassimilable” or margin-
alized and derided, without overt aggression. These associations take an ascriptive- 
based concept of communitarianism as their implicit philosophy. They idealize 
like-minded communities, which are defined in ethnic or racial terms to which they 
also often attribute distinctive identities and distinctive character traits. One can 
consider for instance the activities of associations that do not admit members from 
racial minorities and engage in activities in the public sphere that border with what 
has been defined as “hate speech”. In this case, the range of approaches has varied 
more widely, and the border between ethical and unethical behavior is debated. 
What are the practices of “identity building” for some, are instances of discrimina-
tion for others (Gilbert 2010). In this respect, it is well-known that following the 
example of the French Nouvelle Droite, the modern European extreme-right has 
appropriated the identity-based language of the new social movements of the eight-
ies to argue for exclusionist practices (Fella and Ruzza 2012; Lloyd 1998). While 
these uses have been stigmatized and condemned for their instrumentality, equiva-
lent identity-strengthening practices acting in the framework of a politics of cultural 
identity have been endorsed by philosophers from a range of traditions, and particu-
larly by communitarian scholars (Gilbert 2010, p. 11).
On the other hand, attacks against the glorification of many forms of politics of 
cultural identity have also been prominent in recent years (Barry 2001). Critics are 
not only focusing on the impact of excluded communities, but more generally on the 
conception of community that several defenders of the politics of identity endorse. 
There is in several of these conceptions an inability to recognize the fluidity of iden-
tities, and the constraining character on individuals that a strong defense of com-
munities’ cultures engenders. This leads some scholars to argue that “cultural 
identity is in several respects morally pernicious” (Gilbert 2010, p. 14). I character-
ize this type as “bad communitarianism” (3). The literature shows how some of 
these uncivil society groups organized around societal divisions often attempt to 
operate as alternatives to the state, oppose liberal democracy and liberal-legal pro-
cesses and engage in unruly behavior, including violence and criminality (Wallis 
2019). A “bad communitarianism” turn propagated by right-wing populist forma-
tions has been evidenced in the normalization of anti-pluralist views across many 
European public spheres in recent years (Krzyzanowski and Ledin 2017). This has 
particularly been noted in some Central and Eastern European countries (Bustikova 
and Guasti 2017).
However, rather than adopting a blanket negative connotation for all identity- 
based exclusionist groups, it is more appropriate to focus on the actual practices that 
the political pursuit of identity can generate. In this respect, it is useful to review the 
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actual associational practices of right-wing groups and the motivations behind these 
practices.
In addition to evil acts perpetrated intentionally by right-wing groups, if one also 
includes the broader category of exclusionary identity politics one also needs to 
consider (d) evil acts done not intentionally but in other ways, for instance out of 
carelessness for the consequences. We are referring to a carelessness that could be 
for instance rooted in the differential attribution of the category of humanity to 
“friends” and “enemies”. In this respect, there are several useful typologies avail-
able in the literature of evil acts committed out of mindless disregard for their con-
sequences, or because of prioritizing the obedience to orders, or instrumental pursuit 
such as career choice, which result in evil consequences, or from the unreflective 
assumption of a cultural framework of “politics of the enemy”. One can think in this 
respect of Arendt’s well-known category of the banality of evil (Arendt 2006). 
Mindless and careless evil can be perpetrated not only by single individuals, but by 
groups of individuals as well, such as in the instance of public derision of migrants, 
or religious groups by groups of insensitive individuals. I call this type of evil civil 
society “banal bad civil society” (4). I list in this category criminal gangs whose 
interest in acquiring resources legitimates corrupt practices that have negative con-
sequences for society. This category of “uncivil society” has been identified in the 
literature on several developing countries that show the mindless behavior of local 
organized actors and the negative consequences it produces (Caiani et  al. 2012; 
Hainsworth 2008). It has also been shown in the dealings between international 
“respectable” commercial and political actors in developing contexts, which unin-
tentionally legitimate and encourage corrupt practices and produce negative societal 
consequences (Cooley et al. 2018).
14.5  European Uncivil Civil Society
Considering the sections of this volume on the right-wing populist and retrogressive 
mobilization, one feature that emerges from several chapters is the extent to which 
the contest between the populist and the anti-populist bloc compete and sometimes 
interact in the public sphere results in a merger of traditional national values, and 
new populist ones. For instance, in the chapter by Anders Hellström and Mahama 
Tawat we see how multiculturalism is now defined as “unaffordable”–a change that 
has occurred in recent years, showing the diffusion of the values of populist groups, 
in both Sweden and Denmark. However, on other issues the two cases differ, reveal-
ing how traditional openness to refugees remains noticeable in Sweden. The chapter 
by Emil Edenborg also points to the way right-wing populism is enabled by con-
necting its xenophobic values to perceived national specificities, such as strong 
Swedish concern for gender equality, and therefore promoting an ethnopluralist 
mind frame and a securitizing narrative. It is useful to point out that the changed 
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image of multiculturalism is still quite recent. As late as 2011, Europeans debated 
the then-controversial assertion by political leaders such as the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and later by the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, that “multiculturalism has failed”.
The previously proposed typology offers some additional means to organize the 
findings from the previous book chapters. The formations which are most clearly 
identifiable as evil based on the criteria previously listed belong to the first type–the 
xenophobic groups. Xenophobic organizations and particularly racist organizations, 
situate themselves at the boundary between legal and semi-legal action or accept the 
price of illegality, with the organizational costs that this implies. Groups of skin- 
heads illustrate the Nazium-type of sheer wickedness (Midgley 1984). However, in 
the field of racist groups, one also finds examples of a different type of evil civil 
society: these are organized groups, which unlike the often uneducated and angry 
“globalization losers” of the skin-head sort are organized.
In the second category of our typology, extreme-right civil society groups illus-
trate the “fanatical bad civil society” type. These tend to prevail in organized mili-
tant right-wing groups. Several countries manifest a clear distinction between a 
right-wing populism, which while despising the institutions of liberal democracy 
takes part in elections and an extreme right, which acts outside of parliaments and 
is generally more radical and not infrequently staffed by fanatical activists. In this 
category, one would also have to count the fanatical online communities of which 
Breivik was a member. Although no chapters in this book focus on their activities, 
there is a wide literature on them in Europe that point to their relevance and to their 
fanatical use of violence (Caiani et al. 2012; Hainsworth 2008).
Several chapters in this volume illustrate the positions of parties that express 
what we have defined as bad communitarianism. They are particularly relevant in 
the current European context, including the chapter by Radu Cinpoeş and Ov 
Cristian Norocel where xenophobic remarks are routine in the political communica-
tion of the parties examined. This category includes committed nationalists. It refers 
to groups whose main concern is (national) territory. The protection, glorification, 
and asserted homogeneity of their territories of reference is a constitutive trait of 
most types of nationalism, which inspires most organized mobilization. In contem-
porary Europe, there is an old tradition of civic-nationalism that attempts to inter-
pret nationalism in non-exclusivist terms, for instance by setting relatively open 
criteria for membership. These include, for instance the Basque and the Catalan 
nationalisms, but there are also cases of movements that merge the nationalist frame 
and the xenophobic exclusionary fame, such as the Italian League and the Belgian 
Vlaams Belang, and thus situate themselves in the uncivil society category. The 
chapter by Gokay Özerim and Selcen Öner clearly illustrates the exclusivist nation-
alism of political dynamics occurred in Brexit and in the Austrian cases, and shows 
the “othering” or “enemy politics”-role that Turkey has played in the political life of 
these countries. Communitarian nationalists also include those civil society groups 
that articulate the vertical dimension of people against the elites. This is a dimension 
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that has produced a set of important movements and parties. The anti-elite narrative 
recurs in most European populist formations. Euroscepticism is pervasive in all 
European populisms and is particularly well illustrated by the UK case study.
The banal bad civil society is a type of civil society that emerges out of the natu-
ralization and institutionalization of xenophobic values and is more likely to be 
expressed at the individual level in countries where right-wing populist parties have 
been successful and have institutionalized their views in state policies. Not surpris-
ingly, the colonization of political culture by the populist bloc is stronger in coun-
tries with populist governments, such as shown in the chapter by Radu Cinpoeş and 
Ov Cristian Norocel with reference to Poland and Hungary. This is also the case of 
Italy, where in 2018 the majority supported strongly the previously mentioned anti- 
immigrant policies of their populist government. The Central and Eastern European 
cases and the Italian case also show how governmental rhetoric can counter the 
spirit of tolerance and protection of human rights that their countries’ membership 
in the EU should protect. All these cases, as well as the Finnish case examined by 
Katarina Pettersson, point to the “normalization” of xenophobia (Norocel 2017). 
Government positions on such controversial issues as migration and refugee poli-
cies are presented as sensible, factual, and thus uncontroversial. Frequently there is 
a tendency to favor a “culturalist” framing, whereby a natural pride in one’s cultural 
heritage or a feeling of nostalgia are the preferred ways to neutralize and communi-
cate the harsh policies marginalizing migrants. More generally, nostalgia, but also 
connected emotions are frequently and intentionally mobilized by right-wing popu-
list and extreme right formations as evidenced in the chapter by Katherine Kondor 
and Mark Littler with reference to the Hungarian case. Similarly, the emotional 
glorification of an imaginary past emerges centrally in the chapter on Generation 
Identity by Anita Nissen. The importance of nostalgia also comes forth clearly in 
the work of Andreas Önnerfors in his chapter on Pegida. These findings point to the 
importance of studying the role of emotions in the politics of uncivil society.
14.6  By Way of Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the distinctive features of populist civil society in con-
temporary Europe and offered a systematization of this political environment by 
anchoring it with examples from the contributions in the present volume. This not-
withstanding, we should not forget or dismiss the flourishing of a civil society that 
consolidates the anti-populist block. Indeed, this volume presents a multifaceted 
array of emancipatory initiatives from below, which denounce and forcefully 
oppose welfare chauvinism and narrow cultural retrenchment around national eth-
nic majorities. These take various forms, such as the analysis of the Danish 
Venligboerne by Martin Bak Jørgensen and Daniel Rosengren Olsen, which illus-
trates how a civil society actor decisively move beyond fear and nostalgia as a 
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master frame and provides a transitional space for learning. At the same time, the 
boundaries of  the civil society itself are questioned, as illustrated by Camilla 
Haavisto in her analysis of the “Right to Live” collective in Finland. In this case, 
Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers recast the culture of gratefulness towards the host 
country that asylum-seekers were previously expected to subscribe to, and attempt 
to present themselves as a collective with its own voice, visibility, and legitimacy in 
the public sphere. There is hope even in the Central and Eastern European context, 
as Alexandra Ana shows in her analysis of an emerging “street feminism”, which 
contours a politics of intersectional hope by way of bridge-building and solidarity 
among such diverse groups as forcibly evicted persons, feminist NGOs, anarchist 
groups, and Roma feminist and anti-racist organizations, and refugees. Last but not 
least, Larisa Lara-Guerrero and María Vivas-Romero evidence how Latin American 
migrants in Brussels are actively involved into a transnational social movement, 
which creates, transforms, and employ the transnational networks in both their 
homelands and the host land.
To conclude by returning to the two conceptual master frames that underpin the 
present volume, at the moment feelings of nostalgia are skillfully used to ensure the 
increase the visibility of uncivil society elements in European societies. This is 
nonetheless accompanied and counteracted by vigorous anti-populist emancipatory 
mobilizations, which instill hope in cosmopolitan visions of Europe.
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